The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-670 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. M. Arnardottir
Author(s):  
Lisa Rodgers

‘Ordinary’ employment contracts—including those of domestic servants—have been deemed to attract diplomatic immunity because they fall within the scope of diplomatic functions. This chapter highlights the potential for conflict between these forms of immunity and the rights of the employees, and reflects on cases in which personal servants of diplomatic agents have challenged both the existence of immunity and the scope of its application. The chapter examines claims that the exercise of diplomatic immunity might violate the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the way in which courts have dealt with these issues. The chapter analyses diplomats’ own employment claims and notes that they are usually blocked by the assertion of immunity, but also reflects on more recent developments in which claims had been considered which were incidental to diplomatic employment (eg Nigeria v Ogbonna [2012]).


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Donoghue ◽  
Claire-Michelle Smyth

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a trilogy of cases involving Muslim claimants, has granted state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights a wide margin of appreciation with respect to the regulation of public manifestations of Islam. The ECHR has justified its decisions in these cases on the grounds that Islamic symbols, such as the ḥijāb, or Muslim commitments to the shari‘a — Islamic law — are inconsistent with the democratic order of Europe. This article raises the question of what kinds of commitments to gender equality and democratic decision-making are sufficient for a democratic order, and whether modernist Islamic teachings manifest a satisfactory normative commitment in this regard. It uses the arguments of two modern Muslim reformist scholars — Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa — as evidence to argue that if the relevant degree of commitment to gender equality is understood from the perspective of political rather than comprehensive liberalism, doctrines such as those elaborated by these two religious scholars evidence sufficient commitment to the value of political equality between men and women. This makes less plausible the ECHR's arguments justifying a different treatment of Muslims on account of alleged Islamic commitments to gender hierarchy. It also argues that in light of Muslim modernist conceptions of the shari‘a, there is no normative justification to conclude that faithfulness to the shari‘a entails a categorical rejection of democracy as the ECHR suggested.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-123
Author(s):  
Mikael Rask Madsen

Abstract The European Convention of Human Rights system was originally created to sound the alarm if democracy was threatened in the member states. Yet, it eventually developed into a very different system with a focus on providing individual justice in an ever growing number of member states. This transformation has raised fundamental questions as to the level of difference and diversity allowed within the common European human rights space. Was the system to rest on minimum standards with room for domestic differences, or was it to create uniform standards? These questions have come up as increasingly contentious issues over the past years and have triggered a number of reforms seeking to introduce more subsidiarity in the system, striking a different balance between the European and national oversight of human rights. The article analyses this turn to subsidiarity by exploring whether the reform process has introduced new forms of difference and diversity within the common space of European human rights. Covering the period from 2000 to the end of 2019 and using a dataset of all judgments of the period, the article provides a structural analysis of developments in reference to the margin of appreciation which is the European Court of Human Rights’ long-standing tool for balancing the common standards, yet leaving space for individual member states to find local solutions to implementing those standards. It concludes that recent developments have contributed to a more federal-style construction of European human rights with more space for differences within the common general standards.


When interpreting domestic legislation courts must, so far as it is possible, read and give effect to such legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights; see s3(1). Hence domestic courts are given a degree of latitude – reference to the jurisprudence of Strasbourg is mandatory – but it need only be taken into account. Legislation must be construed in a manner compatible with the Convention but only so far as is possible. Three points are particularly worth noting: • When applying the European Convention on Human Rights a domestic court should be prepared to take a generous view as to whether an activity falls within the protection afforded by the Convention’s articles. • The Convention is to be regarded as a ‘living’ or ‘dynamic’ instrument to be interpreted in the light of current conditions. More recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be regarded as carrying more weight than earlier decisions. • Where an Article of the Convention permits some state interference with the enjoyment of a right, a court assessing the extent to which that interference is compatible with the Convention should consider (i) whether the interference is provided for by law; (ii) whether it serves a legitimate purpose; (iii) whether the interference is proportionate to the end to be achieved; (iv) whether it is necessary in a democratic society; (v) whether it is discriminatory in operation; and (vi) whether the state should be allowed a margin of appreciation in its compliance with the Convention – that is, be allowed to apply the Convention to suit national standards. The ‘quality of law test’

1996 ◽  
pp. 88-88

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, European Court of Human Rights. This case concerned a book which breached the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The publisher, Handyside, contended that the domestic law (the 1959 Act) breached his Article 10 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The case introduced the concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ accorded to states as regards the implementation of convention rights. The case predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Claire Fenton-Glynn

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as it relates to children. Over the past 60 years, the ECtHR has developed a substantial and ever-growing body of case law concerning children, covering issues ranging from juvenile justice and physical integrity to immigration, education, and religion, as well as a code of family law which significantly expands the scope and influence of the ECHR. The chapter explains four key principles of interpretation (positive obligations, the living instrument doctrine, subsidiarity, and the margin of appreciation), as well as the Court’s use of international instruments.


Author(s):  
Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz

Además de un instrumento internacional para la protección de los derechos humanos, el Convenio de Roma de 1950 es también un tratado concebido, en los términos del Tribunal de Estrasburgo, para el mantenimiento y la promoción de los valores e ideales de una sociedad democrática. Esta finalidad se encuentra muy presente en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, en particular, aunque no solo, en el ámbito de los artículos 8-11 del Convenio y 3 del Primer Protocolo Opcional. Por otro lado, una jurisprudencia bastante reciente utiliza como criterio de identificación del ámbito de aplicación del margen de apreciación la «calidad» del proceso político nacional que ha conducido a la regulación general de la que trae causa una concreta injerencia en el derecho fundamental que el convenio garantiza. En este artículo se analiza tanto el concepto de democracia que resulta de las demandas decididas por el Tribunal como las exigencias que del mismo resultan para definir la extensión del margen de apreciación nacional.The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 is not only an international treaty of protection of human rights, but also, in Strasbourg Court's terms, an instrument for maintaining and promoting the values and aspirations of a democratic society. This aim permeates all the case law of the Court, particularly in the field of articles 8-11 of the Convention and article 3 of the First Optional Protocol. On the other hand, the “quality” of the national political process has been considered in recent case law as a criterion for the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. This paper analizes the concept of democracy shaped by the Court and its consequences for defining the extension of the national margin of appreciation.


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