scholarly journals Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y procesos políticos nacionales: democracia convencional y margen de apreciación

2019 ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Optional Protocol ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights

Además de un instrumento internacional para la protección de los derechos humanos, el Convenio de Roma de 1950 es también un tratado concebido, en los términos del Tribunal de Estrasburgo, para el mantenimiento y la promoción de los valores e ideales de una sociedad democrática. Esta finalidad se encuentra muy presente en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, en particular, aunque no solo, en el ámbito de los artículos 8-11 del Convenio y 3 del Primer Protocolo Opcional. Por otro lado, una jurisprudencia bastante reciente utiliza como criterio de identificación del ámbito de aplicación del margen de apreciación la «calidad» del proceso político nacional que ha conducido a la regulación general de la que trae causa una concreta injerencia en el derecho fundamental que el convenio garantiza. En este artículo se analiza tanto el concepto de democracia que resulta de las demandas decididas por el Tribunal como las exigencias que del mismo resultan para definir la extensión del margen de apreciación nacional.The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 is not only an international treaty of protection of human rights, but also, in Strasbourg Court's terms, an instrument for maintaining and promoting the values and aspirations of a democratic society. This aim permeates all the case law of the Court, particularly in the field of articles 8-11 of the Convention and article 3 of the First Optional Protocol. On the other hand, the “quality” of the national political process has been considered in recent case law as a criterion for the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. This paper analizes the concept of democracy shaped by the Court and its consequences for defining the extension of the national margin of appreciation.

scholarly journals papel del artículo 8 CEDH en la construcción del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
The Right

El artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos –que protege los derechos al respeto la vida privada y familiar, el domicilio y la correspondencia– se ha configurado en estos setenta años de Convenio como uno de los escenarios habituales del desarrollo del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado. Esto parece justificarse en el contenido y estructura de este artículo y en las restricciones y limitaciones al ejercicio de estos derechos establecidas por su párrafo segundo. En este marco, el objetivo de este artículo es analizar cuál ha sido el papel del artículo 8 CEDH en el desarrollo de estos estándares interpretativos y cómo ha influido en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights –which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence– has been configured as a traditional place for the development of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of State’s positive obligations. The scope and structure of this article and its limitation clause in the second paragraph seem to justify these developments. In this context, the objective of this article is to analyse the role of Article 8 ECHR in the development of these interpretative standards and its influence in the European Court of Human Rights case-law.

scholarly journals EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SUBJECT OF INTERPRETATION OF LAW

2016 ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Анатолий Ковлер ◽  
Anatoliy Kovler
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
European System ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights

The article analyses a so called “evolutive interpretation” of the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights creating its case-law. Doing so the Court as a subject of this interpretation has a legitimate competence in the light of the Article 32 of the Convention. The problem is how wide could be this interpretation taking in account the principle of subsidiarity of the european system of the protection of human rights and doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” of the contracting States.

Discriminación racial y ejercicio del derecho a la instrucción en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. El caso de la minoría gitana

2012 ◽  
pp. 247-291
Author(s):  
Lucía CASADO CASADO
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
European Court ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right

LABURPENA: Lan honetan, lehen-lehenik, hurbilpen orokor bat egingo dugu Giza Eskubideak eta Oinarrizko Askatasunak Babesteko Europako Hitzarmenak jasotzen dituen diskriminazio-debekuaren eta hezkuntzarako eskubidearen eraketari; eta ondoren, arraza-diskriminazioaren debekuak hezkuntzarako eskubidearekin duen lotura aztertuko dugu, Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren esparruan. Horretarako, eremu horretako lau epai esanguratsuri helduko diegu: Giza Eskubideak eta beste batzuk Txekiar Errepublikaren aurka kasua, bi epai sortarazi dituena (bata Bigarren Sekzioarena, eta bestea Sala Nagusiarena); Sampanis eta beste batzuk Greziaren aurka kasua, eta Orsus eta beste batzuk Kroaziaren aurka kasua. Kasu horietan planteatzen den auzia da ea estatu jakin batzuek ijito etniako umeak eskolaratzeko abiarazi dituzten neurriak diskriminatzaileak diren ala ez. Horretaz gainera, gogoeta batzuk egingo ditugu alor horretako jurisprudentziaren bilakaeraz eta beraren ondorioez. RESUMEN: este trabajo, tras realizar una aproximación general a la configuración de la prohibición de discriminación y al derecho a la instrucción en el Convenio Europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, analiza la prohibición de discriminación racial en conexión con el ejercicio del derecho a la instrucción en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para ello, examina cuatro sentencias relevantes recaídas en este ámbito (casos D.H. y otros contra República Checa, que ha dado lugar a dos sentencias —una de la Sección 2.ª y otra de la Gran Sala—; Sampanis y otros contra Grecia; y Orsus y otros contra Croacia), en las que se plantea si las medidas adoptadas por determinados Estados en relación con la escolarización de niños de etnia gitana son o no discriminatorias. También se realizan algunas consideraciones en torno a la evolución jurisprudencial en este ámbito y sus consecuencias. ABSTRACT: After a general approximation to the configuration of the prohibition of discrimination and of the right of instruction by the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, this work analyzes the prohibition of racial discrimination in relation with the exercise of the right of instruction within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. For this purpose, four relevant judgments on the subject (cases D.H and others against the Czech Republic, which produced two rulings: one by the Second section and other by the Grand Chamber; Sampanis against Greece; and Orsus and others against Croatia) where it arose whether the measures adopted by some States in relation to the schooling of kids from the gypsy ethnic group are or not discriminatory are studied. Some considerations regarding the evolution by the case law regarding this area are also carried out and their consequences.

scholarly journals The scope of the margin of appreciation in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. O. Trykhlib
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Consensus ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Restrictive Measures ◽  
Discretionary Powers

The article analyzes the essence and features of the application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It has been established that the margin of appreciation can be wide or narrow. The factors influencing the scope of the state’s margin of appreciation while effectively ensuring and protecting the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights have been identified and examined. The core criteria and principles of law, which are applied and developed in its case-law by the European Court of Human Rights when granting a certain scope of discretionary powers, have been studied. It is concluded that the key task of the European Court of Human Rights is to exercise effective review over the ensuring and protection of human rights and freedoms enshrined by the European Convention on Human Rights. When defining and granting the margin of appreciation, the European Court of Human Rights is guided by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The scope of the state’s discretion always depends on the circumstances of each particular case, the type and specifics of the violated and/or limited right, its significance for the individual, the characteristics of competing interests, the background and context of the interference, the presence or absence of the European consensus on the issue at stake, the purpose of the interference, the degree of its intensity and the duration, the nature of restrictive measures and their results, as well as the proportionality of the restriction of human rights and freedoms.

scholarly journals El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE y «le mouvement nécessaire des choses»

2017 ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Luis López Guerra
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Protection ◽  
Progressive Development ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights

El progresivo desarrollo de dos sistemas de protección internacional de derechos humanos en Europa, a partir del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos de y de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, hace necesaria una coordinación entre ellos, y particularmente entre los órganos jurisdiccionales en la cima de cada sistema, es decir, los Tribunales de Estrasburgo y Luxemburgo. En el presente artículo se mantiene que, pese a la ausencia de mecanismos formales de coordinación, debido a la no adhesión, hasta el momento, de la Unión Europea al Convenio, esa coordinación se está produciendo mediante una concordancia práctica entre la jurisprudencia de ambos tribunales, que, en un proceso de diálogo formal e informal, van delimitando sus respectivos ámbitos de jurisdicción.The progressive development of two systems of international protection of Human Rights in Europe, one derived from the European Convention on Human Rights and the other from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires coordination, particularly between the two main jurisdictional bodies of those systems, the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts. This article asserts that in spite of the lack of formal mechanisms of coordination due to the EU’s non-accession (for the time being) to the Convention, coordination is nevertheless achieved through a practical concordance between the case law of both courts, which in a process of both formal and informal dialogue is defining the scope of the two Courts’ respective jurisdictions.

scholarly journals On the rule of law and the quality of the law: reflections of the constitutional-turned-international judge

2019 ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Law

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.

When interpreting domestic legislation courts must, so far as it is possible, read and give effect to such legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights; see s3(1). Hence domestic courts are given a degree of latitude – reference to the jurisprudence of Strasbourg is mandatory – but it need only be taken into account. Legislation must be construed in a manner compatible with the Convention but only so far as is possible. Three points are particularly worth noting: • When applying the European Convention on Human Rights a domestic court should be prepared to take a generous view as to whether an activity falls within the protection afforded by the Convention’s articles. • The Convention is to be regarded as a ‘living’ or ‘dynamic’ instrument to be interpreted in the light of current conditions. More recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be regarded as carrying more weight than earlier decisions. • Where an Article of the Convention permits some state interference with the enjoyment of a right, a court assessing the extent to which that interference is compatible with the Convention should consider (i) whether the interference is provided for by law; (ii) whether it serves a legitimate purpose; (iii) whether the interference is proportionate to the end to be achieved; (iv) whether it is necessary in a democratic society; (v) whether it is discriminatory in operation; and (vi) whether the state should be allowed a margin of appreciation in its compliance with the Convention – that is, be allowed to apply the Convention to suit national standards. The ‘quality of law test’

1996 ◽  
pp. 88-88
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
National Standards ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Domestic Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
State Interference

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Claire Fenton-Glynn
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Juvenile Justice ◽  
Family Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Past ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Growing Body ◽  
International Instruments

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as it relates to children. Over the past 60 years, the ECtHR has developed a substantial and ever-growing body of case law concerning children, covering issues ranging from juvenile justice and physical integrity to immigration, education, and religion, as well as a code of family law which significantly expands the scope and influence of the ECHR. The chapter explains four key principles of interpretation (positive obligations, the living instrument doctrine, subsidiarity, and the margin of appreciation), as well as the Court’s use of international instruments.

The Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 611-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Cultural Relativism ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Rome Convention ◽  
Related Notion ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Sensitive Issues

What song the Syrens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among the women, although puzzling questions are not beyond all conjecture.What is so fundamental in terms of the protection of human rights in Europe that it requires the same standards for all countries and what, by contrast, would be better dealt with by each State's organs in line with verbigratia Michael Walzer's-related notion of “thick morality”?. Where should the line be drawn between unity and diversity notwithstanding the resulting risk of human rights cultural relativism associated to the latter?. On what grounds could the axiomatic universality of human rights possibly be connoted in a continent which prides itself on possessing the most developed regional system for the protection of human rights world-wide in view of the resulting risk of legal contagion to other systems for the protection of human rights and, even, to general international law that such a practice can trigger?. At the end of the day, these are the sort of questions that the study of the margin-of- appreciation doctrine raises. The Trojan Horse-like character of the Strasbourg's judge-made margin-of-appreciation doctrine within the European human rights protection system has long since bothered human rights lawyers. Cases of reliance on this review doctrine have been generally criticised as denials of justice for individuals, abdications by the Court of its duty of adjudication in difficult or sensitive issues or as a judicial diluting technique of the strict conditions laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights. This line of criticism, aimed at what from the viewpoint of some occupants of the bench is seen as “a well established and legitimate part of the convention's jurisprudence”, has been reinforced by the entry of 21 new Eastern and Central European contracting parties to the Council of Europe following the 1989-1991 events. With a current membership of 46 States, all of which have ratified the 1950 Rome Convention, it is further feared that the doctrine will increasingly become an open door for abusive limitations in the exercise of human rights in states who traditionally leaned towards human rights cultural relativism. Against this background, I will briefly look into the technical criteria used by Strasbourg's judicial interpreters to factually implement this “much maligned notion” or, as one commentator has put it, this “manière pseudo-technique d'évoquer le pouvoir discrétionnaire que les organes de Strasbourg ont estimé reconnu aux Etats par la Convention dans certains cas”. I will, secondly, provide a basic overview of the general doctrinal positions one can adopt regarding this long debated question.

The European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Arctic Indigenous Peoples Rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-52
Author(s):  
Mikael Lundmark
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Solid Foundation

Based on an ongoing case in Sweden, where Girjas Sami village sued the Swedish state for violation of property rights, this article examines the European Court of Human Rights’ potential influence in the Arctic region’s legal system when it comes to protection of property of Arctic indigenous peoples. This article shows that notwithstanding the historical background of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the case law of the Court provides a solid foundation to advocate that the Court can take a more active role in protecting the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples. What is different in the case of indigenous peoples is that their rights pre-exist that of a modern state, and this does not correlate with the structure of the Convention, which seemingly leads to less protection under the Convention for indigenous peoples. This puts a higher level of responsibility both upon the applicants, as well as on the Court to scrutinize, and apply, the case law of the Court in line with the Convention and the adopted principle of interpretation.

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