By Popular Demand: The Effect of Public Opinion on Income Inequality

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 261-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Andersen ◽  
Anthony Heath ◽  
David Weakliem
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Reciprocal Causation ◽  
Low Incomes ◽  
The World ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Distribution Of Income

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between public support for wage differentials and actual income inequality using data from the World Values Surveys. The distribution of income is more equal in nations where public opinion is more egalitarian. There is some evidence that the opinions of people with higher incomes are more influential than those of people with low incomes. Although the estimated relationship is stronger in democracies, it is present even under non-democratic governments, and the hypothesis that effects are equal cannot be rejected. We consider the possibility of reciprocal causation by means of an instrumental variables analysis, which yields no evidence that income distribution affects opinion.

The Relationship between Globalization and Income Inequality in South Africa

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 223-249
Author(s):  
Oluwasheyi Oladipo
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Income Distribution ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
World Economy ◽  
The World ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Relationship

 The wave of globalization is having far-reaching implications for the economic wellbeing of citizens in all regions and among all income groups. Using data from 1994q1 to 2012q4, the paper investigates the relationship between globalization and income inequality in South Africa. We find no evidence that globalization might have deepened income inequality in South Africa, particularly in the provinces. Rather, the paper found strong evidence indicating that income distribution is improving, and has become more so, in provinces that have stronger links to the world economy. Strengthening those links appears to result in reductions in inequality. 

Gender Ideology and Fertility: Evidence for a Curvilinear Hypothesis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Stefani ◽  
Gabriele Prati
Keyword(s):  
Gender Ideology ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Curvilinear Relationship ◽  
World Population ◽  
Fertility Rates ◽  
The World ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Using Data ◽  
National Analysis ◽  
The Relationship

Research on the relationship between fertility and gender ideology revealed inconsistent results. In the present study, we argue that inconsistencies may be due to the fact that such relationship may be nonlinear. We hypothesize a U- shaped relationship between two dimensions of gender ideology (i.e. primacy of breadwinner role and acceptance of male privilege) and fertility rates. We conducted a cross-national analysis of 60 countries using data from the World Values Survey as well as the World Population Prospects 2019. Controlling for gross domestic product, we found support for a U-shaped relationship between gender ideology and fertility. Higher levels of fertility rates were found at lower and especially higher levels of traditional gender ideology, while a medium level of gender ideology was associated with the lowest fertility rate. This curvilinear relationship is in agreement with the phase of the gender revolution in which the country is located. Traditional beliefs are linked to a complementary division of private versus public sphere between sexes, while egalitarian attitudes are associated with a more equitable division. Both conditions strengthen fertility. Instead, as in the transition phase, intermediate levels of gender ideology’s support are associated with an overload and a difficult reconciliation of the roles that women have to embody (i.e. working and nurturing) so reducing fertility. The present study has contributed to the literature by addressing the inconsistencies of prior research by demonstrating that the relationship between gender ideology and fertility rates is curvilinear rather than linear.

Trust in Government and the American Public’s Responsiveness to Rising Inequality

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 790-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Macdonald
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
State Level ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trust In Government ◽  
Combine Data ◽  
Election Studies ◽  
The Relationship

The United States has become increasingly unequal. Income inequality has risen dramatically since the 1970s, yet public opinion toward redistribution has remained largely unchanged. This is puzzling, given Americans’ professed concern regarding, and knowledge of, rising inequality. I argue that trust in government can help to reconcile this. I combine data on state-level income inequality with survey data from the Cumulative American National Election Studies (CANES) from 1984 to 2016. I find that trust in government conditions the relationship between inequality and redistribution, with higher inequality prompting demand for government redistribution, but only among politically trustful individuals. This holds among conservatives and non-conservatives and among the affluent and non-affluent. These findings underscore the relevance of political trust in shaping attitudes toward inequality and economic redistribution and contribute to our understanding of why American public opinion has not turned in favor of redistribution during an era of rising income inequality.

scholarly journals The Limits of Income Inequality: Public Support for Social Policy across Rich Democracies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nate Breznau ◽  
Carola Hommerich
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Support ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Institutional Contexts ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
Income Concentration

Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections. However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980-2006) we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English-speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societies – especially with higher historical inequality – reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies – especially with lower historical inequality – opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.

scholarly journals Can Reducing Income Inequality Decouple Economic Growth from CO2 Emissions?

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 237802311877271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julius Alexander McGee ◽  
Patrick Trent Greiner
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
National Income ◽  
Recent Period ◽  
The Past ◽  
Socioeconomic Drivers ◽  
Advance Research ◽  
Developed Nations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Distribution Of Income

In the past two decades, income inequality has steadily increased in most developed nations. During this same period, the growth rate of CO2 emissions has declined in many developed nations, cumulating to a recent period of decoupling between economic growth and CO2 emissions. The aim of the present study is to advance research on socioeconomic drivers of CO2 emissions by assessing how the distribution of income affects the relationship between economic growth and CO2 emissions. The authors find that from 1985 to 2011, rising income inequality leads to a tighter coupling between economic growth and CO2 emissions in developed nations. Additionally, the authors find that increases in the top 20 percent of income earners’ share of national income have resulted in a larger association between economic growth and CO2 emissions, while increases in the bottom 20 percent of income earners’ share of national income reduced the association between economic growth and CO2 emissions.

A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption

2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
You Jong-sung ◽  
Sanjeev Khagram
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Significant Interaction ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Significant Interaction Effect ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The World ◽  
Corruption Index ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Control Of Corruption

This article argues that income inequality increases the level of corruption through material and normative mechanisms. The wealthy have both greater motivation and more opportunity to engage in corruption, whereas the poor are more vulnerable to extortion and less able to monitor and hold the rich and powerful accountable as inequality increases. Inequality also adversely affects social norms about corruption and people's beliefs about the legitimacy of rules and institutions, thereby making it easier for them to tolerate corruption as acceptable behavior. This comparative analysis of 129 countries using two-stage least squares methods with a variety of instrumental variables supports the authors' hypotheses using different measures of corruption (the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index and the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index). The explanatory power of inequality is at least as important as conventionally accepted causes of corruption such as economic development. The authors also found a significant interaction effect between inequality and democracy, as well as evidence that inequality affects norms and perceptions about corruption using the World Values Surveys data. Because corruption also contributes to income inequality, societies often fall into vicious circles of inequality and corruption.

scholarly journals From Left to Rights: Civil Liberties Lawyering Between the World Wars

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 622-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura M. Weinrib
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Legal Reform ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The World ◽  
American Civil Liberties Union ◽  
The Relationship

In the formative years of the modern First Amendment, civil liberties lawyers struggled to justify their participation in a legal system they perceived as biased and broken. For decades, they charged, the courts had fiercely protected property rights even while they tolerated broad-based suppression of the “personal rights,” such as expressive freedom, through which peaceful challenges to industrial interests might have proceeded. This article focuses on three phases in the relationship between the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the courts in the period between the world wars: first, the ACLU’s attempt to promote worker mobilization by highlighting judicial hypocrisy; second, its effort to induce incremental legal reform by mobilizing public opinion; and third, its now-familiar reliance on the judiciary to insulate minority views against state intrusion and majoritarian abuses. By reconstructing these competing approaches, the article explores the trade-offs – some anticipated and some unintended – entailed by the ACLU’s mature approach.

scholarly journals Public support for empowering police during the COVID-19 crisis: Evidence from London

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Yesberg ◽  
Zoe Hobson ◽  
Krisztián Pósch ◽  
Ben Bradford ◽  
Jonathan Jackson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Support ◽  
Specific Factor ◽  
Representative Survey ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Police Services ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Over Time

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, police services around the world were granted unprecedented new powers to enforce social distancing restrictions to help to get the virus under control. Using data from a representative survey of Londoners fielded during the height of the first wave of the pandemic (April – June 2020), we explore the scale of public support for giving police additional powers to enforce the regulations, how support for different powers changed over time, and what factors predicted support. Aside from one lockdown-specific factor, we find that even in the midst of a pandemic, trust, legitimacy and affect were the most important predictors of support for police empowerment.

Investigating Public Opinion in Confucian Nations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Adamczyk
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Family Stability ◽  
Substantial Portion ◽  
The Family ◽  
The World ◽  
Global North ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Kinship Ties

A substantial portion of the world’s people reside in countries where Buddhism, Taoism, and systems of ancestral belief dominate. To understand the factors shaping attitudes in these places, this chapter (and the next) examines Confucian nations. These societies (i.e., China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, and Hong Kong) are more tolerant than many Islamic, Middle Eastern, and African nations, but they are less supportive than countries in the Global North. Using data from the World Values Survey, this chapter shows that Confucianism has created a culture in which family stability and kinship ties are particularly valued. As a result, concerns about keeping the family intact and the importance of blood relationships are particularly important in shaping residents’ views about homosexuality.

Ignoring the Messenger? Limits of Populist Rhetoric on Public Support for Foreign Development Aid

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Burcu Bayram ◽  
Catarina P Thomson
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Survey Experiments ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Representative Samples

Abstract The negative impact of populist anti-aid rhetoric on public opinion has been based on anecdotal reports to date. Here, we take a systematic and empirical look at this inquiry. We hypothesize that even though populist rhetoric decreases support for foreign development aid in donor publics, this effect is conditioned by individuals’ preexisting beliefs about populist leaders. Using data from original survey experiments conducted with representative samples of American and British adults, we find that exposure to different variants of populist frames decreases individuals’ willingness to support their government providing development aid through an international organization. However, this effect is moderated by whether people think populist leaders stand up for the little guy or scapegoat out-groups. Connecting foreign aid and populism literatures, our results suggest that the future of global development might not be as bleak as previously feared in the age of populism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document