scholarly journals Oil wealth and US public support for war

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lala Muradova ◽  
Ross James Gildea

How does the oil wealth of a potential target state affect the likelihood of the US public favoring the use of military force? Recent studies suggest that public opinion on foreign policy is responsive to the core characteristics of target states, such as regime type and majority religion. This article advances this research agenda by examining the effects of intra-regime heterogeneity in respect of an important characteristic of target states: their oil wealth. To examine the relationship between oil wealth and US public opinion on war, we fielded a conjoint experiment with US citizens. Respondents chose between hypothetical pairs of target states that varied across seven different intra-regime characteristics. We found that that the oil wealth of a target exerts a statistically significant (albeit small) effect on public support for the use of force, independent of the effects of other regime characteristics.

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-39
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN E. GOLDSMITH

Previous research (e.g., Horiuchi, Goldsmith, and Inoguchi, 2005) has shown some intriguing patterns of effects of several variables on international public opinion about US foreign policy. But results for the theoretically appealing effects of regime type and post-materialist values have been weak or inconsistent. This paper takes a closer look at the relationship between these two variables and international public opinion about US foreign policy. In particular, international reaction to the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) are examined using two major multinational surveys. The conclusions of previous research are largely reinforced: neither regime type nor post-materialist values appears to robustly influence global opinion on these events. Rather, some central interests, including levels of trade with the US and NATO membership, and key socialized factors, including a Muslim population, experience with terrorism, and the exceptional experiences of two states (Israel, Albania) emerge as the most important factors in the models. There is also a consistent backlash effect of security cooperation with the US outside of NATO. A discussion of these preliminary results points to their theoretical implications and their significance for further investigation into the transnational dynamics of public opinion and foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Dennis C. Spies

The chapter summarizes the New Progressive Dilemma (NPD) debate, identifying three arguments from comparative welfare state and party research likely to be relevant to the relationship between immigration and welfare state retrenchment: public opinion, welfare institutions, and political parties. Alignment of anti-immigrant sentiments and welfare support varies considerably between countries, especially between the US and Europe, leading to different party incentives vis-à-vis welfare state retrenchment. The chapter introduces insights from comparative welfare state and party research to the debate, discussing inter alia, political parties in terms of welfare retrenchment, immigrants as a voter group, and cross-national variation of existing welfare institutions. It addresses the complex debates around attitudinal change caused by immigration, levels of welfare support, voting behavior, and social expenditures. Combining these strands of literature, a common theoretical framework is developed that is subsequently applied to both the US and Western European context.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 261-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Andersen ◽  
Anthony Heath ◽  
David Weakliem

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between public support for wage differentials and actual income inequality using data from the World Values Surveys. The distribution of income is more equal in nations where public opinion is more egalitarian. There is some evidence that the opinions of people with higher incomes are more influential than those of people with low incomes. Although the estimated relationship is stronger in democracies, it is present even under non-democratic governments, and the hypothesis that effects are equal cannot be rejected. We consider the possibility of reciprocal causation by means of an instrumental variables analysis, which yields no evidence that income distribution affects opinion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Golby ◽  
Peter Feaver ◽  
Kyle Dropp

Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views? We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly 12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorsements of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.


Author(s):  
Christopher Clary ◽  
Sameer Lalwani ◽  
Niloufer Siddiqui

Abstract Research on public opinion and crisis behavior has focused largely on pressures felt by leaders who have initiated a crisis, not on leaders in target states responding to adversary provocation. Our survey experiment involving 1,823 respondents in Punjab, Pakistan, finds public support for escalating rather than de-escalating in response to such provocation. It shows how public pressures can encourage conflict even in instances where a leader has engaged in no prior effort to generate audience costs following crisis onset. Survey respondents were more likely to support escalatory decisions if they were made by a military, rather than civilian, leader, although we do not find that military leaders receive more support in de-escalatory decisions. Finally, while we demonstrate that leaders can mitigate the costs of de-escalating by highlighting the dangers of conflict, they still incur opportunity costs in foregone public support when they opt to de-escalate rather than escalate a crisis.


1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 569-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON

This article argues that citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration process. It develops a model of public opinion toward European integration based on attitudes toward the political system, the incumbent government, and establishment parties. With the help of data from Eurobarometer 34.0, the study tests political and economic models of public support for membership in the European Union in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The analyses show that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership in the European Union. The results also suggest that the relationship between economic factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam van Noort

American geopolitical power partly relies on foreign public support for its leadership. Pundits worry that this support is evaporating now that the United States—which claims to be the world’s beacon of democracy—has itself experienced democratic back- sliding. I provide the first natural experimental test of this hypothesis by exploiting that the January 6 insurrection of the US Capitol unexpectedly occurred while Gallup was conducting nationally-representative surveys in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Romania, and Vietnam. Because Gallup uses random digit dialing I can identify the effect by comparing US leadership approval among respondents that were interviewed just before, and just after, January 6, 2021. I find that the insurrection had no effect on US approval. If even a violent attempt to overturn a free and fair election does not affect US approval abroad it is unlikely that any other domestic anti-democratic event will.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Busby ◽  
Craig Kafura ◽  
Jonathan Monten ◽  
Jordan Tama

AbstractInternational relations scholars have found that multilateral approval increases public support for the use of military force and have developed competing explanations for this phenomenon. However, this literature has given little attention to the attitudes of individuals who participate directly in the foreign policy process or shape foreign policy debates. In this research note, we administer a survey experiment to both a cross-section of US foreign policy elites and a nationally representative sample of the US public. We find that US foreign policy elites are more responsive to multilateral approval than the US public, with elites with direct foreign policy decision-making experience valuing it especially highly. These findings point to the importance of considering differences between elites and the public when investigating or theorizing about the impact of multilateral cooperation on domestic politics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao ◽  
Po-San Wan

This article, which is based on a comparative survey conducted in late 2014, explores public opinion in Taiwan and Hong Kong on the Sunflower and Umbrella movements. We find that public support for the local movement in each place was almost equally divided. As for the other movement, the supporters outnumbered opponents. The basic patterns of the relationship between socio-demographic attributes, political attitudes, as well as the evaluation of the “China impact”, and public support for the two movements were consistent in both societies. Those most likely to support the Sunflower and Umbrella movements were: the young; Minnanese, Hakka, or Hong Kong-born people; those who support the “Pan-Green” or “Pan-democracy” camps; those who agreed that democracy is the best political system; those who had a negative view of the “China impact”, especially its harmful influence on local democracy. Notwithstanding these similarities, in Taiwan, support for the Sunflower Movement was mainly divided by ethnic group and for the Umbrella Movement by gender; while in Hong Kong, support for both movements was largely divided by age, and the perceived “China impact” on local economic growth had no independent effects.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomz ◽  
Jessica L.P. Weeks ◽  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

AbstractMany theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies. Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption. We use experiments to examine two mechanisms—responsiveness and selection—through which opinion could shape decisions about the use of military force. We tested responsiveness by asking members of the Israeli parliament to consider a crisis in which we randomized information about public opinion. Parliamentarians were more willing to use military force when the public was in favor and believed that contravening public opinion would entail heavy political costs. We tested selection by asking citizens in Israel and the US to evaluate parties/candidates, which varied randomly on many dimensions. In both countries, security policy proved as electorally significant as economic and religious policy, and far more consequential than nonpolicy considerations such as gender, race, and experience. Overall, our experiments in two important democracies imply that citizens can affect policy by incentivizing incumbents and shaping who gets elected.


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