Old abuses in new markets? Dealing with excessive pricing by a two-sided platform

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeynep Ayata
Keyword(s):  
Competition Authority ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Platform Competition ◽  
New Markets ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Traditional Markets ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
Competition Enforcement

Abstract Exploitative abuses, especially excessive pricing, have been one of the most debated forms of abuse of dominant position. Unlike exclusionary abuses, they have been prohibited only under certain jurisdictions and on rather rare occasions. In Europe there have been few recent decisions and investigations that have reiterated existing approaches and tests for establishing excessive pricing. The Turkish Competition Authority’s Sahibinden.com decision has come at such a time where the discussion on excessive pricing has been somewhat revived. However, this decision stands out as it is the first one where a competition authority has found prices to be excessive and therefore abusive in the context of a two-sided platform. Competition in platform markets display unique dynamics that may be very different from what may be observed in traditional markets especially in terms of pricing strategies. This article aims to demonstrate, through the Turkish Competition Authority’s recent decision, the difficulties in applying existing tests and criteria on excessive pricing to a two-sided platform. A thorough analysis of this decision demonstrates that competition enforcement in what may be called ‘new’ platform markets necessitates new approaches or adjustments of existing ones.

Excessive Pharmaceutical Pricing as an Abuse of Dominant Position – The Case of CD Pharma (Denmark)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behrang Kianzad
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Pharmaceutical Market ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Pharmaceutical Pricing ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Abstract On 31 January 2018, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority adopted a decision1 finding the Swedish company generic distributor CD Pharma in breach of Art. 102(a) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by abusing its dominant position and having imposed excessive and unfair prices for the drug Syntocinon. The company increased the price of the drug by 2000% in the period April-October 2014 in the Danish pharmaceutical market. CD Pharma appealed to the Danish Competition Appeals Board,2 which on 29 November 2018 upheld the decision by the Authority. On subsequent appeal to the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court,3 the judgment by the previous court was upheld in a 3-2 decision on 2 March 2020, thus finding CD Pharma liable for infringement of Danish competition law as well as Art. 102(a) TFEU. The decision is final and not subject to further appeal. The case raises outstanding legal-economic issues regarding excessive pricing such as relevant market definition in pharmaceutical cases, the length of abuse, competitive price benchmarks, definition of economic value and the matter of dominance in public procurement and tenders. The case is rather unusual in that the alleged abusive period amounted to a six-month period, CD Pharma was the ‘losing’ party in the bidding process for the supply of the medicine in question, and CD Pharma subsequently had reduced prices through negotiations with the Danish central medicine procurer, Amgros. Similar to the Aspen Pharma decision4 by the Italian Competition Authority, where the Italian Medicine Agency (AIFA) reported the case to the Competition Authority, it was the Danish medicine procurer Amgros who had notified the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority about allegedly abusive practices. This subsequently led to an investigation and the adoption of the Decision. Following an introduction describing the Danish pharmaceutical market and specifics of the case, section two of this contribution details the proceedings at Danish Competition Authority. Section three depicts the proceedings at Competition Appeals Tribunal, and section four deals with the proceedings at the Maritime and Commercial Court. Section five concludes.

Review of judicial cases involving the competition authority

2021 ◽  
pp. 102-106
Author(s):  
L. V. Vovkivskaya ◽  
E. V. Savostina
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Foreign Investor ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
Administrative Responsibility

Analysis of the legal positions of arbitration courts in cases of violation of antitrust laws in terms of consideration of issues: exceptions to the patent monopoly, approaches to proving anticompetitive agreements, establishing the fact of being under the control of a foreign investor, abuse of dominant position, bringing to administrative responsibility in the absence of representatives of the person involved. Target: developing uniform approaches in law enforcement practice in cases of violation of antitrust laws.

Abuse of Dominant Position and Cease-and-Desist Agreements: Risks to Brazilian Competition Policy Arising from the Atypical Case of Petrobras’ Refineries

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (7) ◽  
pp. 706-726
Author(s):  
Mário André Machado Cabral
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Oil Refinery ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
The Third ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Abstract This paper aims to analyze how the Brazilian competition authority, Cade, deals with cease-and-desist agreements involving abuse of dominant position. The focus is a recent abuse-of-dominant-position case. Cade and the Brazilian state-owned oil and gas company, Petrobras, negotiated a cease-and-desist agreement establishing as remedy the divestment of eight out of 13 Petrobras’ refineries. The hypothesis is that the case was atypical in the light of Cade’s own case law. The paper assesses the Petrobras’ case and compares it to Cade’s case law (2012-2019) concerning cease-and-desist agreements relating to the abuse of a dominant position. The results of the study confirm the atypicality of the case. It demonstrates that the case causes risks to Brazilian competition policy. The paper is divided as follows: after an introduction, the first section discusses abuse of dominant position in Brazil, especially the cases that concluded with cease-and-desist agreements; the second section describes the case related to Petrobras’ oil refinery assets; the third section verifies whether the case may be considered atypical; the fourth section debates the legal and policy risks arising from the case; the final section contains some concluding remarks.

scholarly journals Digital Economy, Big Data and Competition Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-89
Author(s):  
Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and disseminate voluminous amounts of data. Companies have been improving their revenues with information about the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations of their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive input. The article focuses on the current discussion regarding the possible use of competition law and policy to address privacy concerns related to big data companies. The most traditional and powerful tool to deal with privacy concerns is personal data protection law. Notwithstanding, the article examines whether competition law should play an important role in data-driven markets where privacy is a key factor. The article suggests a new approach to the following antitrust concepts in cases related to big data platforms: assessment of market power, merger notification thresholds, measurement of merger effects on consumer privacy, and investigation of abuse of dominant position. In this context, the article analyses decisions of competition agencies which reviewed mergers in big data-driven markets, such as Google/DoubleClick, Facebook/ WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn. It also reviews investigations of alleged abuse of dominant position associated with big data, in particular the proceeding opened by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook, in which the German antitrust authority prohibited the data processing policy imposed by Facebook on its users. The article concludes that it is important to harmonise the enforcement of competition, consumer and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to protect the users of dominant platforms, maximising the benefits of the data-driven economy.

scholarly journals Exploitative Abuse of a Dominant Position in the Bulgarian Energy Markets

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 33-55
Author(s):  
Miroslava Marinova ◽  
Kremena Yaneva-Ivanova
Keyword(s):  
Energy Markets ◽  
Regulatory Control ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Water Regulation ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
The Eu

In the last few years the behavior of undertakings operating in the regulated utility markets, such as energy, water and communications, has been in the focus of the Bulgarian Competition Authority (hereinafter, BCA). Typically, these companies are dominant due to their exclusive licenses to operate in a certain territory and thus the contents of their contractual relationships with customers are often defined in general terms and conditions (hereinafter, GTCs) adopted or approved by the respective sector regulator. Most or all aspects of their pricing policy is also subject to sector regulation. By analysing critically two landmark decisions of the BCA concerning abuses of companies active in the energy markets, this paper raises the following questions: (1) to what extent the BCA is competent to intervene and sanction those undertakings for conduct which is subject of regulatory control by the sector regulator (the Energy and Water Regulation Commission (hereinafter, EWRC)) and (2) whether in its enforcement practice against those undertakings, the BCA is following the legal standards adopted by the EU courts.

scholarly journals РЕФОРМУВАННЯ СИСТЕМИ ОРГАНІВ АНТИМОНОПОЛЬНОГО КОМІТЕТУ УКРАЇНИ ЗА ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИМИ СТАНДАРТАМИ ЗАХИСТУ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ КОНКУРЕНЦІЇ

World Science ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (11(51)) ◽  
pp. 26-33
Author(s):  
Михальчишин Н. Л. ◽  
Нанівський С. Л.
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
Central Apparatus ◽  
Business Structures ◽  
European Standards ◽  
Law Making ◽  
Competition Enforcement

The competition is flexible and needs to be controlled by competing agencies on the commodity markets. The competition control quality and decision-making speed depends on the competence and professionalism of the competition agencies, which eliminates the control of other state bodies and business structures. The competing agencies independence has also the preventing effect of such agencies use in the fight against competitors, and putting pressure on business. The proposed scientific study analyses the legal status of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine as a competition authority, identifies aspects of improving the efficiency of its activity and proposes ways to reform the system of bodies of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine in accordance with European standards of economic competition protection. The interaction mechanisms between the central apparatus and territorial divisions of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine are identified and decentralization ways of control and supervisory functions of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine through the antitrust authorities system are proposed. The research focuses on both law making and competition enforcement in relation to the activities of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine.

scholarly journals An Overview of the New Competition Law: Issues for the Oil and Gas Industry

1987 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Lawson A. W. Hunter ◽  
John F. Blakney
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Oil And Gas Industry ◽  
Gas Industry ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
Restraint Of Trade

This paper reviews the major changes to Canada's competition law enacted in 1986, including new merger and abuse of dominant position provisions, the establishment of a Competition Tribunal, mandatory pre-notification of certain transactions, and revisions of the prohibition against agreements in restraint of trade. Special attention is given to joint ventures, export agreements and vertically integrated resource companies.

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