scholarly journals Culture Age and Drying Time as Variables of the AOAC Sporicidal Test

2001 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 1159-1164
Author(s):  
Norman A Miner ◽  
Michelle A Taylor ◽  
Sara E Bernal ◽  
Valerie L Harris ◽  
Mashike J Sichinga

Abstract In the United States, the AOAC Sporicidal Activity of Disinfectants Method 966.04 is the standard for identifying a liquid chemical germicide as a sterilant. Furthermore, the highest level of a disinfectant must also be a sterilant as defined by Method 966.04, when used in its sterilant mode for a longer exposure time. The AOAC Sporicidal Test is also used as a part of the standard test methods to define a sterilant for Australia and the European Union. Many laboratories have identified variables of this test that can affect the sterilization exposure time for sterilants, or even the ability to classify a chemical as a sterilant. Method 966.04 requires spore-labeled porcelain penicylinders (cylinders) and silk suture loops, collectively referred to as carriers, to be dried for 24 h, but allows these carriers to be used for at least 7 days, in effect allowing a drying time of 24 h to at least 7 days. We tested the resistance of cylinders that had been labeled with Bacillus subtilis spores cultured for 72, 96, and 120 h, and dried for 24, 48, and 72 h against a 60 min exposure to 2.0%alkaline glutaraldehyde, and 2, 5, 10, 15, and 20 min exposures to 2.5N HCl. All the culture incubation and drying times met the standard of resistance to 2.5N HCl for at least 2.0 min at 20°C, and all carriers contained at least 105 colony-forming units (CFU) of B. subtilis per carrier. However, for 3 repeated tests, regardless of incubation time, an average of 96%of the carriers were sterilized by the 2.0%glutaraldehyde after drying for 24 h, and an average of 61%were sterilized after drying for 48 or 72 h. We propose that the variable of drying time be eliminated from Method 966.04.

Author(s):  
Attarid Awadh Abdulhameed

Ukrainia Remains of huge importance to Russian Strategy because of its Strategic importance. For being a privileged Postion in new Eurasia, without its existence there would be no logical resons for eastward Expansion by European Powers.  As well as in Connection with the progress of Ukrainian is no less important for the USA (VSD, NDI, CIA, or pentagon) and the European Union with all organs, and this is announced by John Kerry. There has always ben Russian Fear and Fear of any move by NATO or USA in the area that it poses a threat to  Russians national Security and its independent role and in funence  on its forces especially the Navy Forces. There for, the Crisis manyement was not Zero sum game, there are gains and offset losses, but Russia does not accept this and want a Zero Sun game because the USA. And European exteance is a Foot hold in Regin Which Russian sees as a threat to its national security and want to monopolize control in the strategic Qirim.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
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Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


2016 ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Marcin Jan Flotyński

The global financial crisis in 2007–2009 began a period of high volatility on the financial markets. Specifically, it caused an increased amplitude of fluctuations of the level of gross domestic products, the level of investment and consumption and exchange rates in particular countries. To address the adverse market circumstances, governments and central banks took actions in order to bolster the weakening global economy. The aim of this article is to present the anti-crisis actions in the United States and selected member states of the European Union, including Poland, and an assessment of their efficiency. The analysis conducted indicates that generally the actions taken in the United States in response to the crisis were faster and more adequate to the existing circumstances than in the European Union.


Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.


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