ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLUSION IN CHILE

Author(s):  
Umut Aydin

ABSTRACT In the last two decades, competition agencies around the world have increasingly directed their attention to enforcement against cartels. With the encouragement of the antitrust authorities of the United States, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, various countries have introduced leniency programs, and sanctions for individuals found guilty of colluding. Critics are concerned, however, that these measures are not backed by broad public support, which could jeopardize their enforcement. This paper explores public attitudes toward cartels in Chile, an emerging economy that introduced a leniency program in 2009 and criminal sanctions in 2016, by presenting the results of a public opinion survey conducted in this country in August–September 2019. The results of the survey show high awareness of cartels and the harm they cause, and high public disapproval of cartel conduct among the Chilean respondents. In particular, up to 70 percent of the respondents support prison sentences against individuals found guilty of colluding. Such strong public support for anti-cartel measures could be considered positive from the perspective of enforcement. The results also emphasize the importance of continued competition advocacy directed at the society to explain and gain public support for the anti-cartel agenda.

Author(s):  
Gary R. Hicks

The public’s perception of, beliefs about, and interest in LGBT individuals and the issues impacting them has long had great significance to the community’s social, political, and legal progress. The last decade has seen monumental changes in public attitudes about LGBT people and the laws that affect them in the United States and around the world. Much of this change has been positive, including the landmark Supreme Court decision to legalize same-sex marriage. In some parts of the world—even those that have witnessed great strides for LGBT equality—there have also been signs of a backlash against the community’s newfound rights and visibility in society. Stereotypes of LGBT individuals, mostly negative, have been responsible for much of this reaction, as well as their historically negative view in by the public. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the mass media has played a major role in creating and perpetuating these stereotypes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 089443932110314
Author(s):  
David Rozado ◽  
Musa Al-Gharbi ◽  
Jamin Halberstadt

This work analyzes the prevalence of words denoting prejudice in 27 million news and opinion articles written between 1970 and 2019 and published in 47 of the most popular news media outlets in the United States. Our results show that the frequency of words that denote specific prejudice types related to ethnicity, gender, sexual, and religious orientation has markedly increased within the 2010–2019 decade across most news media outlets. This phenomenon starts prior to, but appears to accelerate after, 2015. The frequency of prejudice-denoting words in news articles is not synchronous across all outlets, with the yearly prevalence of such words in some influential news media outlets being predictive of those words’ usage frequency in other outlets the following year. Increasing prevalence of prejudice-denoting words in news media discourse is often substantially correlated with U.S. public opinion survey data on growing perceptions of minorities’ mistreatment. Granger tests suggest that the prevalence of prejudice-denoting terms in news outlets might be predictive of shifts in public perceptions of prejudice severity in society for some, but not all, types of prejudice.


2019 ◽  
pp. 120-149
Author(s):  
John M. Thompson

Chapter 6 considers US-Japanese relations from 1905 to 1909. It examines several sources of tension, including an anti-Japanese movement that was particularly strong among organized labor in San Francisco, sensationalist newspapers in both countries, and concerns that Japan would attack the Philippines or Hawaii. The chapter argues that Roosevelt sought to strike a delicate balance in relations with Tokyo by protecting Japanese already in the United States, but also reducing the inflow of immigrants to mollify anti-Japanese sentiment. In an effort to upgrade US capabilities in the event of war, the president also convinced Congress to build additional battleships and sent the navy on a cruise around the world. TR also viewed the cruise as a way to increase public support for naval expansion.


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
YAKUP BEKTAS

Shortly after he made a working model of his electromagnetic telegraph in 1837, Samuel F. B. Morse and his associates began an intense initiative to publicize and market it to the world. At first, using the social skills he had learned during his years as a portrait painter, Morse strove to gain the support of the upper classes in Europe. He and his agents saw the physical seats of institutions such as palaces and academy lecture halls as the most desirable settings for public demonstrations of the apparatus. To win public support back at home, they made a point of politicizing the invention by presenting it as an example of American mechanical ingenuity. Their efforts to market the invention were not confined to the United States, Britain and France, but included the rest of Europe and the Near and Far East as well. The telegraph promoters, presuming an oriental fascination with magic, endeavoured to exploit potential markets in the East, particularly the Ottoman Empire and Japan, by making the most of its wondrous effects. The Sultan's palace provided a most exotic setting for display of the electromagnetic telegraph.


2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 239-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alynna Lyon ◽  
Mary Fran Malone

AbstractWhat leads a country's population to support or oppose peacekeeping operations? Are there cross-national diff erences in public support for peacekeeping? In this paper, we aim to answer these questions by examining public attitudes towards peacekeeping operations in the United States and ten European nations (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey). is paper also assesses several explanations for cross-national variations in support for these missions. More specifi cally, we aim to determine whether theories of risk assessment, elite cues, and policy objectives can explain public support for peacekeeping cross-nationally.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 01-14
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Stober

Let us think for a moment, the United State is home to 5% of the world population, but 28% of the world’s prisoners. That is more than one out of four human beings in the world, with their hands-on bars, shackled, and locked up in the land of the free. Ninety-seven percent of this incarcerated people never had a trial. So as public support for criminal justice reform continues to build, it is now more important than ever that we get the facts straight and understand the big picture. With a much-needed clarity in crime rate and justice’s system, this empirical analysis will be digging deep into available data to offer some much-needed clarity by piecing together the United States’ disparate system of confinement. The study emphasizes the need to understand how 2.52 million people ended up in jails or prison and why the majority of those people are poor, and also brown and black.  In the end, the reform of the criminal justice system is not about whether or not black lives matters, but it is about changing the way United States understands human dignity.


Author(s):  
Kathryn L. Schwaeble ◽  
Jody Sundt

The United States is unique in its reliance on incarceration. In 2018 the United States had the largest prison population in the world—more than 2.1 million people—and incarcerated 655 per 100,000 residents, the highest incarceration rate in the world. The U.S. public also holds more punitive attitudes in comparison to citizens of other Western, developed countries. For example, when presented with the same description about a hypothetical criminal event, Americans consistently prefer longer sentences compared to residents of other countries. Attitudes about the death penalty are also instructive. Although international support for the death penalty has declined dramatically over time, the majority of Americans are still in favor of capital punishment for certain crimes. In comparison, Great Britain abolished the death penalty in 1965, and only 45% of its citizens continue to support capital punishment. This raises an important question: Can understanding the will of the public help explain how governments respond to crime? The answer to this question is more complicated than expected upon first consideration. The United States generally starts from a more punitive stance than other countries, in part because it experiences more violent crime but also because Americans hold different moral and cultural views about crime and punishment. U.S. public officials, including lawmakers, judges, and prosecutors, are responsive to trends in public attitudes. When the public mood became more punitive during the 1990s, for example, U.S. states universally increased the length of prison sentences and expanded the number of behaviors punishable by incarceration. Similarly, the public mood moderated in the United States toward the end of the 2000s, and states began reducing their prison populations and supporting sentencing reform. It is also true, however, that public officials overestimate how punitive the public is while citizens underestimate how harsh the justice system is. Moreover, the public supports alternatives to tough sentences including prevention, treatment, and alternatives to incarceration, particularly for juveniles and nonviolent offenders. Thus public opinion about punishment is multifaceted and complex, necessitating the exploration of many factors to understand it. Looking at public attitudes about punishment over time, across culture and societies, and in a variety of ways can help explain why social responses to crime change and why some people or groups of people are more punitive than others. Two ideas are helpful in organizing motivations for punishment. First, public support for punishment may be motivated by rational, instrumental interests about how best to protect public safety. Public concern about crime is a particularly important influence on trends in the public mood, but fear of crime and victimization are inconsistently related to how individuals feel about punishment. Second, attitudes about punishment are tied to expressive desires. Attitudes are influenced by culture and moral beliefs about how to respond to harm and violations of the law. Thus attitudes about punishment are relevant in understanding how the public thinks about the problem of crime, as how people think and feel about crime influences what they think and feel should be done about it.


Author(s):  
William M. Lewis

A societal conflict as prolonged and complex as the reversal of national policy on wetlands in the United States must contain some lessons for the future. Perhaps we are still too close to the issues to have everything in perspective historically, but two lessons seem obvious. One of these has to do with the channelizing effect of change in public attitudes toward wetlands and the other with the stabilizing effect of science on regulations and policies intended for the protection of wetlands. A look back at the previous chapters suggests that the history of wetland policy in the United States can be divided into three eras: a classical era during which removal was the policy; a modern era during which protection was the policy; and a new era, which appears to be postmodern in the sense that we adjust protection qualitatively in an attempt to make our coexistence with wetlands more comfortable. Politics of the removal era appear to have been relatively tranquil, as congressional action surrounding wetlands developed almost entirely through consultation with a single interest group (i.e., those who saw some economically beneficial potential in federal progams subsidizing or encouraging the removal of wetlands; Tzoumis 1998). The desire for protection, although present in some circles much earlier, became politically potent in parallel with the growth of general public support for environmental legislation. From that time forward, legislation and national policy have consistently been formed in an atmosphere of strongly opposing viewpoints, but the protectionist impulse has prevailed. It seems doubtful now that an open legislative assault on wetland protection would be successful, simply because the public has fully absorbed the idea of protection for about a generation. The fundamental intent of protectionism, however, still could be subverted judicially or administratively; this is the main issue for the future. From 1970 to the present, the politics of wetlands has seemed unstable and even chaotic. Participants in the contest over wetlands typically have viewed the future with a high degree of pessimism. This is especially true for the defenders of wetlands, who fear, and in some cases almost anticipate, reactionary backsliding.


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