Part III Forms of Organization, Ch.6 Formal Intergovernmental Organizations

Author(s):  
Klabbers Jan

International law provides little support for a hard and fast distinction between formal and informal international organizations (IOs). To the extent that the terms are useful, it is to signify a relative value: some organizations exhibit a higher degree of institutionalization than others or, differently put, the mixture of formal and informal elements in any organizational design may locate the organization on different points on a continuum between formal and informal. This chapter explores to what extent the formal-informal distinction affects foundational decisions: the decision to set up an organization, to grant or withhold international legal personality, and to endow it with specific powers. It suggests that the distinction between formal and informal meets with little resonance in the law of IOs or, more accurately, that while founding actors can opt for higher or lower degrees of formalization or institutionalization, their intentions have little direct bearing on the legal nature of the organization per se.

1980 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
Reinhold Reuterswärd

AbstractAmong contemporary writers on international law it is a widely held view that international organizations are new kind of subjects of international law besides the States, i.e., have an international legal personality distinct from that of their member States. Many writers, indeed, treat this as something almost self-evident and beyond dispute. Actually, however, the international legal personality of international organizations remains a theoretical thesis rather than a scientific fact. Although this thesis seems to be supported by most writers, there are considerable differences of opinion among theorists as regards both the basis of that international personality and its meaning. Furthermore, some important aspects of the matter have been given little attention by most writers. It would seem, therefore, that the problem is far from solved. Some writers differ from the majority and deny that international organizations have international legal personality. They have, I submit, convincingly shown that there are strong reasons to question the validity of the generally accepted doctrine.1 The purpose of the present paper is to set forth some of the facts which support the view of this minority and which deserve more attention than has so far been given to them.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
MSc. Ornela Taci

The article titled “International legal subjectivity: Concept and reality in the UN” the first, identifies debates on subjects of International Law briefly. The identification of debates serves to deal the creation of UNO (United Nations). Then, the article treates a brief historical overview on the functions of the UN since its creation until today to analyze international legal personality and its legal nature opposite functions that are dampened and transnational capabilities, the UN priority today. Also, it gives the reasons why the debate on UN reform should remain open.The aim of this study is to examine from the perspective of a qualitative methodology the characteristics of the legal status of the UN in space and in time to create a model based on Charter and on the real exercise of its functions but not according to denomination. The theories on international legal personality, the distribution of the United Nations and the consequences are not treated for this reason in this study. Also, historical and legal methods are used.The legal status of UNO is a tool to fulfil mission in approach of action of International Law, the challenge of the debate today. UNO was established in 1945 and acts are based on its Charter and international documents. The UN mission has changed today but the International Order is not in danger because the target of the UN is its renewal through reforms. The open debate on reform gives a contribution on evolution of International Law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3(16)) ◽  
pp. 381-408
Author(s):  
Enis Omerović

The first chapter of the paper elaborates the question of whether one of the constitutive elements of the internationally wrongful act and a precondition for responsibility could be embodied in an existence of damage that has to be inflicted upon participants with international legal personality. In this regards legal doctrine, the arbitral awards, international judgments as well as the works of the UN International Law Commission will be examined, particularly the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations from 2001 and 2011, respectively. An interesting question could be raised concerning the terms used in Law on Responsibility and that is whether there is a difference between damage, injury, and unlawful consequence. Punitive or penal damage and its application in Law on Responsibility will be further assessed. The author will begin its research with the definition of punitive damage, and will further take into consideration international legal doctrine, international arbitral awards, judicial decisions of international courts, decisions of various claims commissions as well as norms of general international law in supporting his hypothesis that international law does not entail reparations for punitive damages. One of the aims of this paper is to indicate the question of whether the existence of punitive damages in international law, if any, be linked to a legal nature of State and international organization responsibility, in the sense that application of punitive damages in international law would support the thesis on the very existence of criminal responsibility of the named subjects of international law? It is interesting to note that the criminal responsibility of states has been abandoned by the removal of Article 19 in the final Draft Articles on Responsibility of States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (42) ◽  
pp. 35-61
Author(s):  
Nataliya Yakymchuk ◽  
Ganna Vlasova ◽  
Oksana Vaitsekhovska ◽  
Petro Tsymbal ◽  
Yuliia Baliuk

The article is devoted to the issue of international legal personality of cities as subnational persons. The rapid urbanization of cities, modern processes of decentralization of power in the countries and the growth of economic globalization in the world have led to an increase in the autonomy of subnational individuals (especially such their kind as cities). The sphere of greatest manifestation of such independence is economic, within which, cities are increasingly entering into foreign economic relations not only with foreign legal entities, but also with international intergovernmental organizations and governments of foreign countries when solving economic and economic issues of local level. The rapid growth and such foreign economic activity, the legal basis of which, as a rule, are international treaties between the countries, has caused ambiguous understanding of the legal status of subnational persons and highly actualized the research of this problem in the context of determining their international legal personality. The article analyzes the doctrinal approaches to the concept of "subject of international law" and the criteria for their separation from other legal entities participating in relations with a foreign element. The basic international documents and normative legal acts of foreign countries that regulate the legal status of territorial communities of cities as subjects of local self-government and give the rights to enter into a contractual relationship on their own and in a responsible manner in a transboundary context are investigated. Exploring the forms of urban cooperation at the regional and universal levels, the following forms of networking of cities as infrastructures, which are factors of international legal regulation (aimed at economic solidarity) and political ones, in which cities often act as agents of international intergovernmental organizations, are distinguished. Based on the analysis of international documents and national legal acts regulating the legal status of subnational persons and their relations with subjects of international law, as well as domestic and foreign doctrines of international legal personality, a scientific approach to the status of cities in economic relations with a foreign element is formulated. Cities are defined as complementary (substantive) subjects of international legal relations with a special international legal personality: in the formally-legal plane they are granted the rights in foreign economic activity by the legal norms of the national law, which these relations are regulated; similarly to the states, cities (like other subnationals) are representatives of the public interest of the communities of cities; in the economic-practical plane act as independent subjects of economic relations of an international character. Illustrated signs of the rapid development of "city diplomacy", which, on the background of decentralization of authorities to territorial communities and economic globalization, led to the expansion of the scope of international legal personality in the practice of foreign economic relations and caused a gradual change in their international legal personality in international acts.


The article analyzes the content and the procedure for concluding working arrangements of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). It is noted that, taking into account its legal personality, the Agency's partners may be third countries and international organizations with which it has the right to enter into the relevant arrangements on its own. The author draws attention to the fact that in FRONTEX’s enforcement practices there are different names of concluded agreements, but in form and content they are all working arrangements. The procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of working arrangements is analyzed and it is concluded that the EU pays serious attention to the legal instrument under consideration for cooperation with international partners. In particular, it is noted that the Commission and the Member States play a significant role in the harmonization of the text of the agreement. It is proposed to empower the European Parliament by granting it the right of prior approval of the final text of the document. The content of working arrangements concluded with third countries and international organizations is analyzed in detail and the following features are established: 1) since 2012, there is a trend to consolidate the principle of respect for human rights in agreements with third countries; 2) the agreements may contain provisions on the financial aspects of cooperation between the parties; 3) for the first time in the working arrangement with Kosovo, the provision on the exchange of personal data is enshrined; 4) certain working arrangements provide for the possibility of suspend of the agreement until the dispute is settled between the parties. It is concluded that the working arrangements are not international public treaties, because: 1) agreements with third countries directly establish that such documents do not create international obligations; 2) the agency is not endowed with the international legal personality to conclude agreements on behalf of the Union under the procedure provided for in Art. 218 TFEU; 3) the text of the document mainly contains non-binding wording. The author proposes to consider working arrangements as acts of soft law, the implementation of which leads to legal consequences. Cooperation between FRONTEX and third countries and international organizations is not limited by working arrangements and may be expanded by additional agreements.


Author(s):  
Noemi Gal-Or

SummaryThis article challenges the argument that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is devoid of executive or governing functions and, hence, immune from the regime set out in the International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (RIO). A brief drafting history of the RIO, clarification of the terminology associated with matters of international responsibility, and two hypothetical examples illustrating the potential for WTO responsibility set the stage for the article’s main argument. The author examines the WTO’s nature by analyzing its constituent law, its sui generis mandate and functions, its international legal personality, and its own use of terminology in presenting itself to the world. Critical analysis of RIO Articles 64 (on lex specialis) and 10 (on the existence of a breach of an international obligation), and their application to the WTO, completes the argument. The author thus refutes both the notions that (1) the WTO is exclusively member driven and, hence, not an executive, governing organization but a sui generis entity and (2) the WTO is therefore unable to breach an international obligation and thus immune from the RIO regime. The article concludes that, while a breach by the WTO of an international obligation may be exceedingly rare, it nonetheless — as any international organization — comes within the ambit of the RIO regime. The WTO should therefore consider adjusting its internal rules accordingly.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean d'Aspremont

AbstractIt is classically contended that when an international organization endowed with international legal personality commits an international wrongful act, the organization is to be held exclusively responsible even though the act would have constituted a violation of its member states' obligations if committed by them. This Article intends to depart from such a rigid interpretation of the responsibility of international organization and makes the argument that when member states abuse the international legal personality of an international organization through the exercise of an excessive control over the decision-making process of the organization, they must be held, together with the organization, responsible for violations of international law by the organization provided that such a wrongful act would also constitute a breach of the member states' international obligations if committed by them. It is posited here that, in this situation, member states can no longer hide behind the screen of the international legal personality of the organization. Failing to take the extent of control exercised by member states over the decision-making process of an international organization into account boils down to ignoring that autonomy is one of the constitutive elements of the legal personality of an international organization, which can bolster the contemporary move away from international institutionalism.


Author(s):  
August Reinisch

This chapter notes that for a considerable period, international organizations scholarship was preoccupied with establishing international organizations as actors enjoying their own international legal personality. With the increase and diversification of tasks fulfilled by such organizations, the question has come to the fore as to what extent these subjects of international law may become responsible for their actions. This debate has overshadowed the underlying and more fundamental question of what kinds of obligations can be identified as binding upon international organizations. According to this chapter, the latter central question requires one to turn to the sources of international organizations’ law. It places special emphasis on the practical implications of identifying the right sources for accountability issues, whether they concern UN embargoes, targeted sanctions, peacekeeping, or the administration of (criminal) justice by international organizations.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-1016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cedric Ryngaert

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4


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