scholarly journals The Right of Intervention for the Protection of Nationals : Reassessing the Doctrinal Debate

2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-493
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

The legality of a forceful intervention by a state to protect its nationals has been the subject of a continuing controversy over the past 15 years. Many see it as an unlawful use of force prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations, others see it as a lawful exercice of a self-standing right recognized under contemporary international law, some finally claim it falls under the scope of self-defence. The author proposes not to restate that debate, but more to reassess it, examining and challenging some of the arguments raised on both sides of the question. Within that debate, it will be concluded that the international legal order does indeed recognize the validity of the use of force for such a purpose : if the avenue of self-defence is rejected, for conceptual as well as practical reasons, the right of intervention to protect nationals is indeed, for the author, part of the comtemporary international legal order. Then, the author wishes to broaden the debate and proposes another option, which has not been explored by scholars and publicists but which is found more satisfactory than any other approach : intervention to protect nationals can be justified under international law because of the existence, in a particular case, of a "state of necessity" as defined by the International Law Commission.

Author(s):  
Christine Gray

This chapter examines the law on the use of force. It discusses the UN Charter scheme; the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; intervention, civil wars, and invitation; self-defence; the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; UN peacekeeping; and regional action under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The UN Charter provisions on the use of force by States, Article 2(4) on the prohibition of force, and Article 51 on self-defence, have all caused fundamental divisions between States. There is disagreement as to whether the prohibition on force should be interpreted strictly or whether it allows humanitarian intervention, as in Kosovo. There is also disagreement over the scope of the right of self-defence. The response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks has led to a fundamental reappraisal of the law in this area.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAKSYMILIAN DEL MAR

AbstractThis paper argues that the concerns and methodology of the recently completed Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) over the fragmentation of international law presuppose a particular way of understanding legal language which tends to separate the understanding of rules from their factual adaptability to certain recurring social problems faced within specific institutional contexts. The paper argues that separating rules from their factual adaptability focuses the analysis on surface coherence – coherence at the level of abstract terms and phrases. It is the argument of this paper that this presupposition is not warranted, and that the understanding of rules cannot be thus separated. An alternative model of the understanding of legal language is developed on the basis of the work of Bernard Jackson and Geoffrey Samuel. This is further supplemented by the approach to the study of institutional contexts in the recent work of Robert Summers and John Bell. Together, these resources can lead to the analysis of the deep coherence of the international legal order, that being one that prioritizes not the unity of that order, but its responsiveness. The ideal of responsive law is elaborated upon by reference to the work of Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet. Finally, a different agenda for the ILC is offered on the basis of the methodology of deep coherence. The upshot is that the paper calls for a reorientation of international legal theory, away from concerns about ‘the law itself’ and towards an engagement with the responsiveness of legal work performed in international legal institutions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Bill Gilmore

This chapter examines the doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ used by the state to exercise its coercive powers beyond national territory for law enforcement purposes. It discusses hot pursuit by sea, land, and air in the context of international law, particularly with respect to self-defence and reprisal. Whilst hot pursuit is well recognized in the customary international law of the sea, it has yet to achieve that form of normative recognition in relation to pursuit on land or by air. The chapter considers the debate over hot pursuit as a legal justification for cross-border military incursions independent of the right of self-defence and describes the concept of extended constructive presence before concluding with an analysis of hot pursuit in a use of force context.


1979 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Vagts ◽  
Detlev F. Vagts

The existence of a significant relationship between the concept of the balance of power and international law would be regarded as improbable by most modern international lawyers. They would think of the balance as a wholly obsolete conception and, in any case, as a part of international policy, or worse, part of cynical Realpolitik rather than of law. Earlier generations of jurists, however, did see international equilibrium either as an integral part of the system of rules of the law of nations or at least as a necessary precondition to the existence of such a law. Such a view of the interrelationship was never unanimous; indeed, there were in the past many legal observers who saw the balance of power as an obstacle to the development of an international legal order based on something more moral than force alone. This article is devoted to a study of the relationships between those two concepts as seen by the publicists who created the corpus of international law, principally during the period from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. It is not a study of the balance of power at large—a topic to which volumes might be dedicated—but only of that idea’s relationship with law.


2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.


This Oxford Handbook is a comprehensive and authoritative study of the modern law on the use of force. Over 50 experts in the field offer a detailed analysis, and to an extent a restatement, of the law in this area. The Handbook reviews the status of the law on the use of force and assesses what changes, if any, have occurred as a result of recent developments. It offers cutting-edge and up-to-date scholarship on all major aspects of the prohibition of the use of force. Part I reviews the history of the subject and its recent challenges, and addresses the major conceptual approaches. Part II covers collective security, in particular the law and practice of the UN organs, and of regional organizations and arrangements. Part III considers the substance of the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-defence and associated doctrines. Part IV is devoted to armed action undertaken on behalf of peoples and populations, including self-determination conflicts, resistance to armed occupation, and forcible humanitarian and pro-democratic action. The possibility of the revival of classical, expansive justifications for the use of force is addressed in Part V, followed by Part VI which considers new security challenges and the emerging law in relation to them. Part VII ties the key arguments developed in the book into a substantive conclusion. The Handbook is essential reading for scholars and students of international law and the use of force, and legal advisers to both governments and NGOs.


2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bill Bowring

AbstractThis response to Robert Knox’s very kind and constructive review1 of my 2008 book The Degradation of the International Legal Order: The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics gives me the opportunity not only to answer some of his criticisms, but also, on the basis of my own reflections since 2008, to fill in some gaps. Indeed, to revise a number of my arguments. First, I restate my attempt at a materialist account of human rights. Next I explain why, for me, the right of peoples to self-determination is absolutely central to a materialist understanding of human rights; and also fill a serious gap in my own account in the book. This leads me not only to a reply to Robert Knox on the question of ‘indeterminacy’ in international law, but also to a disagreement with him on the use or misuse of the language of self-determination. My fourth section returns to our very different evaluations of the significance and meaning of the work of Yevgeny Pashukanis, and what, for me, is Pashukanis’s misunderstanding, for reasons consistent with his general theoretical trajectory, of Marx and Lenin on the Irish question. Finally, I present an outline of a re-evaluation of Marx’s principled position on self-determination.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 01008
Author(s):  
V. Upeniece

The Charter of the United Nations wasthought to establish a normative order, maintain international peace and security. According to the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs”[1]. However the Article 51 doesnot propose a legal definition of the conduct which is considered as an armed attack or the commencement of such an attack. It does not propose strict criterions for the use of force for self-defence. As a result different interpretations of this norm have been arising and continuing to change in response to new situations and threats.


Author(s):  
A. N. Vylegzhanin ◽  
B. I. Nefedov ◽  
E. R. Voronin ◽  
O. S. Magomedova ◽  
P. K. Zotova

INTRODUCTION. The term “rules-based order” is increasingly referred to in speeches within many international forums as well as declared from national political tribunes. The initial question is whether this notion is of purely political nature (since it is not used in the UN Charter or in other universal international conventions and this term is not relied upon by the International Court of Justice or by the UN International Law Commission). On the other hand, with the popularization of such a political discourse, the frequent usage of this term by representatives of some states (not only of Western States, but also of China, for example) can affect international law. The very application of this term definitely provokes a splash of other questions. How does the term “rules-based order” correlate with the universally recognized term “international legal order”? Does the idea to use the term “rules-based order” have substantive legal grounds? Which rules in concreto1 are meant by the term? Who and how creates these rules? What is the nature of these rules – are they rules of national law and if so – national rules of what State? If these are rules of international law – why is it not reflected in the term? Due to the attractive wording the concept gets widespread, but lacking a common understanding of its content, everyone might put a different meaning into the concept. Does it result in the fact that some officials, representing states, become politically entitled with the right to abuse the international legal order as it is established by modern international law? This research examines these theoretic aspects of the concept “rules-based order”, taking into account that in the context of international relations it may be referred to also as “rules-based international order”. An additional question to answer is whether the concept might be regarded as one of the numerous attempts to adapt the current international law to new challenges.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research paper is based on the analysis of numerous statements of representatives of states, in which their attitude to the “rules-based order” concept is manifested, positive and critical remarks relating to the concept made by international lawyers, as well as other research papers of Russian and foreign international scholars. The methodological instruments include general scientific and special methods, among them the historical method, methods of formal logic, analysis, synthesis, as well as systemic, comparative legal methods.RESEARCH RESULTS. Although the above-noted questions about the legal meaning of the term “rulesbased order” have arisen only in recent years mainly in the context of the anti-Russian rhetoric of Western politicians, the term has been used much earlier at different levels in a wide variety of topics. The question of inconsistent perceptions of this term is another reflection of a more general problem of weakening or strengthening the universal legally binding international order. One of the appropriate interpretive versions of this concept might be that “rules-based order” means first and foremost the world order which is based on norms of international law (which are mandatory as well known), and on applicable non-binding international rules containing a normative element, such as international rules provided in the documents of intergovernmental organizations and conferences, interstate political arrangements, and other mutually accepted rules, formed in the contemporary practice of international relations. This interpretation allows to bring the concept in line with modern international law. Nevertheless, even within such interpretation, it is necessary to respect the distinction between the norms of international law, which are binding, and other rules, which do not create State’s obligations under international law. Thus, unilateral or “blocking” imposition of values of one State on other States under the guise of rules on which, according to the first State, the world order is based, will not be allowed.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. If another interpretation prevails, the “rules-based order” concept may have a negative impact on the existing international legal order insofar as it “washes out” the established legitimate procedures of international law-making, thus rejecting traditional international values of legal stability and diminishing the role of international law in international relations. Such scenario would not only multiply legal uncertainly and even unreasonable expectations among the participants of the international processes, but also might lead to undermining the very fundamentals of modern international law based on the UN Charter. The latter in its turn will inevitably lead to the global legal instability and will dramatically increase the risks of World War III. At the moment, the frequent abuse of the term “rules-based order” by the representatives of the NATO countries in support of their politically motivated statements, agreed upon only among them, impedes achievement of accepted understanding of the concept at the universal level, that might be consistent with international law.


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