Emotions and the dialectic of narrative identity

Author(s):  
Giovanni Stanghellini

This chapter argues that a significant part of a person’s self-experience and self-understanding is based on self-narratives—an ongoing process of establishing coherent formulations about who I am, who I was, and where I am going. Through self-narratives I seek to understand my actions and experiences as a semantically coherent pattern of chronologically ordered elements, and to grasp the way I relate myself to that understanding and to the world. The emotional experiences of moods and affects play a crucial role in the life and self-experience of the person. A given mood can develop itself into a character trait, that is, a permanent part of one’s sense of personal identity; this transformation occurs pre-reflectively and without a deliberate and thematic involvement of the person. Through narratives, moods can also be incorporated actively, reflectively, and thematically into a person’s identity. Moods are connected to self-understanding. My questioning about myself is often elicited by my mood before my identity becomes an explicit problem.

2020 ◽  
pp. 151-181
Author(s):  
Karen E. Shackleford ◽  
Cynthia Vinney

This chapter explores the way fictional stories impact personal identity. It discusses how identity develops with a particular focus on adolescence. Then, it sheds light on how fiction contributes to identity construction as teens gain insight into things like careers, relationships, values, and beliefs through stories and how these insights can impact their choices for their futures. The chapter also looks at the way people’s emotional investments in their favorite stories can cause them to become extensions of themselves and how this may lead them to use these stories as symbols of who they are. Finally, it explores the topic of narrative identity—the internalized, constantly evolving life story each person tells of himself or herself—and how fiction influences and becomes incorporated into people’s life stories.


2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jérôme Dokic ◽  
Stéphane Lemaire

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-dependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions.


Author(s):  
María Rosa Palazón

In Soi-même comme un autre, Ricoeur defines the personal identity as singular; so, it is the way in which every individual structures a sediment of experiences and  ways of being in the world common within a chronotop, and, a personalized way of reacting to circumstance challenges. Commonly, due to what is shared, the other is an alter ego. Identity is a holon which can not be atomized, as the puzzling cases or Musil’s L’Homme sans qualités intend to do. Ricoeur splits the identity in “mêmeté” and “ipséité”. The first one designates a center of acummulative experiences; the ipséité, the other from the soi-même, that is, the historical or changing quality of the mêmeté. With Bremond and Greimas theories, Ricoeur attributes to the literary narration the best examples of the dialectics between mêmeté and ipséité. Besides, with McIntyre, he considers literary narration as the best way to formulate ethic judgements from the described experiences.


Costume ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-110
Author(s):  
Patrizia Bassini

This article examines the problem of what to wear among Tibetans in Qinghai, China. Starting with recent media coverage, which reported how Tibetan traditional attire is becoming a powerful political statement, I will attempt to illustrate how the dramatic transformations in the way Tibetans dress are not a new phenomenon but an ongoing process of the past fifty years. From the analysis of people’s narratives and extended participant observation, it emerges that the choice of garments is of real concern to many Tibetan people as it communicates messages about the self and their position in the world. I contend that Tibetan men especially have strategically taken to wearing Western-style suits in an attempt to enact Han Chinese economic success.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-60
Author(s):  
Ronald E. Santoni

I have two aims: to analyze Jonathan Webber’s analysis of bad faith and compare it to my own, traditional, account and to show that Webber’s focus on character, as a set of dispositions or character traits that incline but do not determine us to view the world and behave in certain ways, contributes further to understanding Sartre’s ‘bad faith’. Most Sartre scholars have ignored any emphasis on ‘character’. What is distinctive and emphatic in Webber’s interpretation is his insistence ‘on bad faith’ as a ‘social disease’ distorting the way one views, interprets, and even thinks about the world. (Matt Eshleman also moves in this direction). But, again, this pattern is not deterministic. Early in his work, Webber tells us that Sartre does not claim that we have bad faith by ‘ascribing character traits where there are none but by pretending to ourselves that we have ‘fixed natures’ that e.g. preclude the behaviour or character trait of which one is being accused.Though hardly disagreeing radically with Webber (or he with me) I do offer critical considerations. While Webber focuses on character, I focus on Sartre’s contention that the ‘most basic’ or ‘first act’ of bad faith is ‘to flee from what [the human being] cannot flee, from what it is’, specifically human freedom. And I disagree partially with Webber’s articulation of the ‘spirit of seriousness’, and strongly with both Sartre’s and his supporting claim that bad faith cannot be cynical. I also demur from Webber’s overemphasis on the ‘social’. For me, the root of all bad faith is our primitive ontological condition; namely, that at its very ‘upsurge’, human reality, anguished by its ‘reflective apprehension’ of its freedom and lack of Being, is disposed to flee from its nothingness in pursuit of identity, substantiality - in short, Being.


Author(s):  
Tereza Matějčková

AbstractThe concept of narrativity and narrative identity has two birth certificates: it is linked to the phenomenological tradition—beginning with Arendt’s “political phenomenology” —and to the tradition of German Idealism gradually slipping into existentialism. In this article, the author focuses on the latter tradition that helped to pave the way of the concept of narrative self. Key among the thinkers of Classical German Idealism has been Hegel, often considered the philosophical storyteller. Yet the author argues that Hegel’s concept of narrativity is not exclusively applied to the self and has hardly any role in the constitution of consciousness. This is the reason why Hegel (rather than thinkers who place the core of personal identity into narrativity) has the means to formulate a more convincing concept of the self and personal identity. The author does not deny that narrativity is seminal, both for leading a life as a human being and as a concrete person; however, originally consciousness and self-hood are born out of negativity. One enacts one’s selfhood, once one realizes that one has to interrupt narrativity, step in, refuse to live by it, or just ordinarily rephrase it consciously and by this appropriate it.


Ars Educandi ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Piotr Zamojski

This paper investigates the educational dimention of theory, that is, the way theory forms or catalyzes human’s relation with the world. This is analysed through the examples of three theoretical standpoints: technology, critique and philosophy of responsibility. The first two have played their major part in contemporary thought, while the third one seems to play a crucial role in currently emerging theories of education. However the exercise presented in this paper does not aim at apprising one of these standpoints over the others. Rather it indicates the educational work of theory beyond its application and function.


1997 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Parisi

Civic journalism advances discussion of news as a coherent narrative of the world, serving particular interests. But in practice, it limits its horizons to community news agendas and solutions. To define a truly public journalism, a story on the threat of environmental catastrophe is analyzed. The analysis suggests that journalism must in significant part be an active narrative initiative carried forward by journalists themselves. The difficulties lying in the way of realizing public journalism are also discussed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Stefano Ercolino

Abstract This essay focuses on a little-understood phase of Franco Moretti’s work that spans 1976 to 1986. My aim is to shed light on Moretti’s cultural background as it was formed in that period and to account for the transition from the Trotskyist, politically-militant stance of his first book, Literature and Ideologies in England in the 1930s, to the idiosyncratic, seemingly disengaged character of Signs Taken for Wonders and The Way of the World. Adorno’s concept of ‘unrestrained individuation’ plays a crucial role in the argument. Following a personal political crisis, Moretti opted to enact a form of critical individuation, encoding the explicit social antagonism of the earlier years within a highly personal style and a new theoretical eclecticism. In this way, by disguising it as an alluring form of individualism, Moretti managed to smuggle an antagonistic critical discourse into an increasingly neoliberal world that would soon prove hostile toward it.


Author(s):  
Sophie Duchesne

This chapter deals with the way in which French social scientists study their fellow citizens’ national identity. Following Billig, national identity refers here to the way people feel “emotionally situated” within nations, whatever these emotions are; how and to what extent they believe that being French is part of their personal identity. Over recent decades, social scientists all over the world have investigated the complex feelings citizens have about their nations. In France, however, this issue has been somewhat overlooked. This disparity is a consequence of the political context and the role of social scientists in French public debates, as well as a legacy of Bourdieu’s work which has made them well aware of the power of categorization. As a conclusion, the chapter outlines a research agenda in order to overcome this sociological blind spot.


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