scholarly journals Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī

Author(s):  
Emad Hamdeh

Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–1999) was one of the most influential Salafi scholars in the 20th century. He sought to reform Islam by requiring Muslims to return a puritanical and literalist approach toward scripture. Albānī moved from Albania to Damascus with his family as a child, and his father became a leading Ḥanafī scholar in the Albanian Muslim community in Syria. From a young age, Albānī disagreed with his father and the Albanian Ḥanafī community. He rejected their allegiance to the Ḥanafī school of law and instead advocated a strict adherence to the Qurʾān and Sunna. His scholarly career was full of tug-of-war battles with traditional jurists over the validity of following a madhhab and particular principles of Islamic legal theory. His legal scholarship contains many unconventional opinions, and he was therefore taken most seriously in the field of ḥadīth, not fiqh. A distinctive aspect of Albānī’s legacy is his constant effort to reevaluate the authenticity of ḥadīth. He sifted through thousands of ḥadīths and reevaluated them using traditional ḥadīth methodology.

Author(s):  
Mairaj Syed

This article surveys the three approaches—source-critical, phenomenological, and hermeneutical-theological—that prevail in the historiography of consensus in early, classical, and modern Islamic legal thought. The source-critical approach dominates the historiography of the early period. Scholars using this approach question the narrative found in classical Islamic legal theory: that specific verses of the Qur’an or Hadith of Muhammad establish consensus as a source of law. They believe instead that consensus emerged gradually, in response to the social needs of the Muslim community. Scholars using the phenomenological approach seek to define the doctrine of consensus in classical Islamic legal theory whilst scholars using the hermeneutical-theological approach view consensus as a powerful argument in issues of Islamic thought today. These approaches are not mutually exclusive and scholars often combine them. The article ends with identification of the areas for growth in future studies of consensus.


Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Liyakat Takim

Many contemporary scholars claim that erstwhile juristic determinations were intertwined with the socio-political realities in the eighth and ninth centuries, the classical period of Islamic law. They also maintain that although the Qur’an is a divinely revealed and immutable text, the applicability of its verses is contingent on the needs and conditions of the times. This paper argues that there is a need to move beyond the current form of ijtihad to an era of neoijtihadism in Twelver Shi‘ism. The present ijtihad, which was developed in the medieval ages, has failed to produce a coherent legal system that can effectively respond to the needs of contemporary Muslims. The paper will focus on the neoijtihadist phenomenon and will argue that the traditional text-centered ijtihad has to be replaced with a new form of ijtihad which utilizes different forms of exegetical and epistemological principles to formulate rulings that will serve the Muslim community better. Neoijtihadism, as I call it, will entail a re-evaluation of classical juristic formulations and, based on the application of new exegetical and interpretive principles, can engender a divergent form of jurisprudence that is based on different epistemological parameters and universal moral values. Neoijtihadism will also entail revamping traditional Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh), which has hampered rather than enhanced the formulations of newer laws.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Ahmed Akgunduz

AbstractIslamic Law is one of the broadest and most comprehensive systems of legislation in the world. It was applied, through various schools of thought, from one end of the Muslim world to the other. It also had a great impact on other nations and cultures. We will focus in this article on values and norms in Islamic law. The value system of Islam is immutable and does not tolerate change over time for the simple fact that human nature does not change. The basic values and needs (which can be called maṣlaḥa) are classified hierarchically into three levels: (1) necessities (Ḍarūriyyāt), (2) convenience (Ḥājiyyāt), and (3) refinements (Kamāliyyāt=Taḥsīniyyāt). In Islamic legal theory (Uṣūl al‐fiqh) the general aim of legislation is to realize values through protecting and guaranteeing their necessities (al-Ḍarūriyyāt) as well as stressing their importance (al‐ Ḥājiyyāt) and their refinements (taḥsīniyyāt).In the second part of this article we will draw attention to Islamic norms. Islam has paid great attention to norms that protect basic values. We cannot explain all the Islamic norms that relate to basic values, but we will classify them categorically. We will focus on four kinds of norms: 1) norms (rules) concerned with belief (I’tiqādiyyāt), 2) norms (rules) concerned with law (ʿAmaliyyāt); 3) general legal norms (Qawā‘id al‐ Kulliyya al‐Fiqhiyya); 4) norms (rules) concerned with ethics (Wijdāniyyāt = Aḵlāqiyyāt = Ādāb = social and moral norms).


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
Sayed Sikandar Shah ◽  
Mek Wok Mahmud

As an intellectual process, critical thinking plays a dynamic role in reconstructing human thought. In Islamic legal thought, this intellectual tool was pivotal in building a full-fledged jurisprudential system during the golden age of Islamic civilization. With the solidification of the science of Islamic legal theory and the entrenchment of classical Islamic jurisprudence, this process abated somewhat. Recent Islamic revival movements have engendered a great zeal for reinstituting this process. The current state of affairs in constructing and reconstructing Islamic jurisprudence by and large do not, however, reflect the dynamic feature of intellectual thought in this particular discipline. Thus this article attempts to briefly delineate this concept, unveil the reality on the ground, and identify some hands-on strategies for applying critical thinking in contemporary ijtihad.


1990 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-191
Author(s):  
Louay M. Safi

Shari'ah (Islamic law) has been the dominant moral and legal code ofMuslim societies for the gnxter part of their history. During the early centuriesof Islam, Shari'ah hcilitated the social growth and develojment of the Muslims,growth that culminaa in the establishment of a vast emph and an outstandmgcivilization. By the close of the fifth century of Islam, however, Shari'ahbegan to lose its role as the guiding force that inspired Muslim creativityand ingenuity and that nurtured the growing spirit of the Muslim community(Ummah). Consequently, the Ummah entered a period of stagnation thatgradually gave way to intellectual decline and social decadence. Regrettably,this painful trend continues to be more or less 'part of the individualconsciousness and collective experience of Muslims.This paper attempts to trace the development of the principles of Islamicjurisprudence, and to assess the impact of Shari'ah on society. It argues thatthe law ceased to grow by the sixth century of Islam as a result of thedevelopment of classical legal theory; more specifically, law was put on hold,as it were, after the doctrine of the infallibility of ijma' (juristic consensus)was articulated. The rigid principles of classical theory, it is contended, havebeen primarily induced by the hulty epistemology employed.by sixth-centuryjurists.Shari'ah, or Islamic law, is a comprehensive system encompassing thewhole field of human experience. It is not simply a legal system, but rathera composite system of law and morality. That is, Islamic law aspires to regulateall aspects of human activities, not only those that may entail legalconsequences. Hence, all actions and relationships are evaluated in accordancewith a scale of five moral standards.According to Shari'ah, an act may be classified as obligatory (wajib),recommended (mandub), permissible (mubah), reprehensible (makruh), orprohibited (haram). These five categories reflect the varying levels of moral ...


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-235
Author(s):  
Fabienne Gilbertz

Interference instead of Belatedness – Polysystem Theory as a Descriptive Model for ‘Small’ Literatures. Luxembourg literature can be considered a ‘small’ literature from various angles. Its small size, young age and the existence of a sparsely diffused language within a multilingual setting are features that also apply to other small European literary systems and that affect their self-perception fundamentally. In that context, Jeanne E. Glesener has identified a “discourse on smallness” which is developed by the literary centres and unconsciously internalized by the actors of small literary systems themselves: this discourse is essentially shaped by the ideas of creative sterility, poor visibility and, particularly, literary belatedness. However, as Glesener points out with respect to Pascale Casanova’s concept of literary time, the notion of belatedness wrongly implies that all literary systems sooner or later generate the same literary phenomena; it is therefore highly problematic. This paper introduces Itamar Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory – which has been designed in view of the Israeli literary system – as an alternative descriptive model for ‘small’ and multilingual literatures. Proceeding from the example of Luxembourg ‘Heimatliteratur’ in the second half of the 20th century, I would like to argue that by openly acknowledging every system’s historical and sociological characteristics and by excluding the notion of comparison from the analysis, the concept of ‘polysystemic interference’ allows for a more neutral study of literary contacts and literary change.


Author(s):  
Luana Sion Li

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Cecep Lukman Yasin

The Qur’anic text states that it is lawful to marry women from among the People of the Book, while in the prophetic tradition it is reported that the Prophet himself had a non-Muslim wife. However, the campaign to propagate Christianization which had been tirelessly carried out by well-organized missionary organizations was reported to have successfully christianized segments of the Indonesian population especially in the heathen hinterland and among outer island tribes. Given the circumstances, the Muslim leaders and ulama perceived inter-religious marriage as a hidden Christianization. The increasing incidence of inter-religious marriage raised the concern of the Indonesian Council of Ulama. Responding to this problem, in June 1, 1980 the Council issued a fatwa which explicitly prohibits a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim. Even though the position adopted by the fatwa was quite a radical departure from the prevalent opinion in classical fiqh text, this legal opinion is still within the permissible frame of Islamic legal theory of maslahah (beneficial theory). This legal theory is encapsulated in the Syafi’i school’s legal maxim stating that “Dar’u al-mafâsid muqaddam ‘alâ jalb al-masâlih” (Preference is given to the prevention of harm than to attainment of benefit)<br /><br />Al-Quran menegaskan kehalalan menikahi wanita Ahl al-Kitab, sementara hadis menyebutkan bahwa Nabi sendiri beristeri seorang non-Muslim. Namun, gerakan kristenisasi yang dijalankan oleh lembaga missionaris terorganisir telah berhasil memurtadkan sejumlah penduduk Muslim Indonesia, terutama di daerah pinggiran dan pedalaman. Karena itu, para ulama dan pemimpin Islam memandang pernikahan beda agama sebagai bagian dari gerakan kristenisasi terselubung. Tingginya kasus pernikahan beda agama memunculkan keprihatinan Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Menanggapi masalah ini, pada 1 Juni 1980, MUI mengeluarkan fatwa yang secara tegas melarang seorang pria Muslim menikahi wanita non-Muslim. Meskipun menyimpang dari pendapat yang dianut dalam fiqh klasik, fatwa ini masih berada dalam bingkai teori hukum Islam yang dikenal dengan konsep maslahah. Teori hukum ini dirumuskan dalam kaidah fiqhiyah madzhab Syafi’i yang berbunyi “upaya mencegah kemudaratan lebih didahulukan dari pada upaya meraih kemaslahatan.”<br /><br />Keywords: Fatwa, The Council of Indonesian Ulama, Inter-Religious Marriage<br /><br />


Author(s):  
Peter Whiteford

Arthur Prior is scarcely a household name in New Zealand, but in some respects his story repeats a narrative we like to think of as quintessentially Kiwi—that of the small town boy who ‘makes it’ on the world stage. Born and raised in the rural township of Masterton in 1914, Prior became a leading philosopher of the 20th century, feted for his invention of tense logic (or temporal logic as it is now called), invited by no less a figure than Gilbert Ryle to deliver the prestigious John Locke lectures in Oxford in 1956, offered a Chair in Philosophy at Manchester in 1958, then a Fellowship at Balliol College, Oxford, in 1966. Tragically, he died at the relatively young age of 54, but he remains one of the central figures in the development of logic in the 20th century.


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