Particularism in Ethics
Particularism has certainly cut much ice with the development of analytical ethics since the late 20th century. Its proto-idea goes back at least to Aristotle, who maintains that the major function of practical wisdom is to discern the moral truth via a close examination of the situational particulars. Particularism’s contemporary prominence, on the other hand, is largely due to Jonathan Dancy, who endows the doctrine with much of its flesh and bones. Yet, in spite of this, no consensus has been reached on what exactly particularism amounts to. There are many versions of it. Roughly, they all take the basic line that moral principles of one sort or another play no essential role in the key areas of ethics. As a view about moral metaphysics, particularists maintain that the distinction between rightness and wrongness does not depend upon the existence of universal moral principles; instead, what is right or wrong is determined by the morally relevant particulars of the case before us. As a view about action guidance, particularists argue that the moral principles are, at best, nothing more than rules of thumb and, at worst, may lead us seriously astray. The key to making sound moral judgments lies in the exercise of moral sensitivity rather than in rule following. As a view about moral explanations and justifications, particularists contend that their ultimate sources lie in the particulars of the situations rather than in any universal moral principles. As a view about moral education, particularists oppose the idea that it consists essentially in the teaching of moral principles; rather, what really matters is the cultivation of moral vision. As a view about moral reason, particularists subscribe to ‘reason holism,’ the view that what is a reason for in one context may not be so in another, or may even turn out to be a reason against. Particularists reject the contrary doctrine of ‘reason atomism,’ the idea that each reason behaves in the same principled way on any occasion. In each of these key areas in ethics, there can be a version of particularism in support of the view that moral principles do not play an essential role. And there can be a version of ‘principlism,’ or what is sometimes called ‘generalism,’ that denies it. This article provides a survey of the major issues involved in the debate between the particularists and the so-called generalists or principlists.