Diplomacy in the ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the focal point for regional diplomacy and interstate governance in Southeast Asia. Since its foundation in 1967, the organization’s membership, institutional footprint, and mandate have expanded markedly. The now ten member states—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—and its professed ASEAN Community are engaged in an ever-expanding array of regional initiatives across political-security, economic, and sociocultural concerns. The organization is of growing importance for states beyond the region as well, given the region’s place within the wider “Indo-Pacific” region and ongoing tensions between the United States and China. The literature on diplomacy in ASEAN is vast and varied. Much material centers on the origins, evolution, and efficacy of ASEAN as a regional organization and its diplomatic principles and norms, the so-called ASEAN way. The literature surveyed here examines the institutional and normative context within which ASEAN diplomacy operates and highlights major contemporary issues in the study of ASEAN diplomacy. This article is structured in eleven sections. It begins with a series of general, canonical accounts of ASEAN diplomacy and governance. The second section highlights literature engaged in a debate over the efficacy and consequence of ASEAN and its diplomatic norms. The third section surveys literature that centers attention on a core element of the study of ASEAN diplomacy: the prospects of a security community in Southeast Asia. The fourth section surveys a growing and related literature that examines the practice and discourse in ASEAN diplomacy. The fifth section highlights literature that situates ASEAN diplomacy within the context of the institutions of the wider Asia-Pacific region, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asian Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Section six focuses on regional peace and conflict management between ASEAN member states. The seventh section explores two additional intraregional issues: leadership in ASEAN and relations with the so-called CLMV states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, with a focus on Myanmar. Section eight centers on track two diplomacy and the role of civil society organizations in regional diplomacy and governance. Section nine examines institutional evolution with a focus on the changing organizational and normative context of ASEAN diplomacy. Section ten highlights ASEAN-China relations with a focus on the diplomatic management of the South China Sea disputes. The final section surveys a growing literature that places ASEAN diplomacy and governance in a comparative context.

Author(s):  
Sangjoon Lee

This chapter recounts how Nagata Masaichi, president of Daiei Studio in Japan, pitched the idea of founding the Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Southeast Asia (FPA) and an annual Southeast Asian Film Festival. It discusses the consensus among American foreign officers stationed in Asia that communists had infiltrated the Japanese film industry since the end of the US occupation of Japan in April 1952. It also describes the activities of the “Reds” in the Japanese motion picture industry that is considered a threat to the United States' strategic Cold War interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter cites Rashomon, which won the award for Best Foreign Language Film at the Oscars and elicited simultaneous respect and jealousy from other nations in the region. It elaborates how the unprecedented success of Rashomon rapidly established Nagata's presence in the Japanese film industry.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter describes how Australia decided to launch a multilateral military intervention to stop the bloodshed in East Timor. The force Australia assembled was called the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Despite the humanitarian character of the intervention, few of the participants joined INTERFET on their own initiative. Rather, Australia had to conduct an explicit recruitment process that involved cajoling countries to join the operation. Australia's diplomatic networks played an indispensable role in this process: Australian officials exploited these networks to retrieve information on deployment preferences of potential coalition participants. Australia also used the APEC summit in Auckland and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York as opportunities to make bilateral appeals for troop contributions. Nevertheless, Australia's diplomatic cloud had its limitations. Especially when it came to recruiting countries from outside of the Asia-Pacific region, Australian networks were insufficient. Australia thus turned to the United States and the United Kingdom for assistance in drawing multilateral support for its coalition, thereby leaving these states to function as cooperation brokers. The chapter then considers the deployment decisions of the three largest troop-contributing countries: Thailand, Jordan, and the Philippines; Canada, a deeply embedded state with Australia; and Brazil, a weakly embedded state with Australia.


Author(s):  
Valeria V. Vershinina ◽  

The article analyzes the interactions between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, examines bilateral political and economic contacts as well as outlines key bilateral disputes and mechanisms for their resolution. The author concludes that Vietnam conducts a policy of strategic partnership with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in order to strengthen its position within the ASEAN, to prevent the dominance of China and the United States in Southeast Asia and to provide stability and security in the region.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Irawan Jati

The U.S. and China relations in Southeast Asia have been a long contesting history. It is no question that the U.S. and China are playing strategy to stronghold Southeast Asia for their gain. Both states seek greater influence by applying the multilateral and bilateral approach to ASEAN and its member states. In engaging to ASEAN, the U.S. and China joined ASEAN led multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three. Traditionally, the U.S. and China already have bilateral diplomatic relations with all ASEAN member states. But it does not necessarily represent their deep commitment to the Southeast Asia region. Furthermore, ASEAN relations with the U.S. and China are overshadowed by the rivalry between the two major powers. The US increasing military tied with the Philippines and Thailand's strategic plan to acquire submarines from China are the recent development of rivalries between the two. Therefore, it is fascinating to examine how the US and China's bilateral and multilateral approaches affecting ASEAN and its member states policies. It is argued that ASEAN should maintain neutral performance in engaging with the U.S. and China. It also suggests that ASEAN member states should keep their 'community' identity to derogate the possible deterioration of the stability in the region. Hubungan antara Amerika Serikat (A.S) dan Tiongkok di kawasan Asia Tenggara memiliki sejarah persaingan yang panjang. A.S dan Tiongkok memainkan strategi untuk menguasai Asia Tenggara demi kepentingan mereka. Kedua negara berusaha untuk mencapai pengaruh yang lebih luas dengan melakukan pendekatan multilateral dan bilateral pada ASEAN dan negara anggotanya. Dalam hubungaannya dengan ASEAN, A.S dan Tiongkok terlibat dalam forum multilateral ASEAN seperti ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), dan ASEAN Plus Three. Secara tradisional, A.S dan Tiongkok telah memiliki hubungan diplomasi bilateral dengan negara anggota ASEAN. Namun hal tersebut belum menunjukkan komitmen utama mereka di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Lebih jauh lagi, hubungan ASEAN dengan A.S dan Tiongkok dibayangi oleh persaingan antar kedua negara besar tersebut. Peningkatan hubungan militer A.S dengan Filipina dan rencana strategis Thailand untuk membeli kapal selam dari Tiongkok merupakan perkembagan teranyar dari persaingan antar kedua negara tersebut. Oleh karenaya, artikel ini akan menganalisis bagaimana pendekatan multilateral dan bilateral yang dilakukan oleh A.S dan Tiongkok mempengaruhi kebijakan ASEAN dan negara anggotanya. Argumen utama dalam artikel ini adalah ASEAN harus tetap mempertahankan netralitas dalam kebijakannya terhadap A.S dan Tiongkok. Artikel ini juga merekomendasikan agar ASEAN dan negara anggotanya tetap berpegang pada identitas ‘komunitas’ untuk menghindari kemungkinan eprpecahan di kawasan.


Author(s):  
A.T. Ibragimova ◽  
◽  
Chuke Wu ◽  

For decades, Beijing has been arguing with several countries of the Asia-Pacific region over the territorial ownership of a number of islands in the South China Sea, on the shelf of which significant hydrocarbon reserves were discovered. We are talking primarily about the Sisha archipelago (Paraselsky Islands), the Nansha (Spratly) and Huangyan (Scarborough Reef) islands. Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines are involved in this debate to one degree or another. The United States is not a party to the dispute, but it does not recognize the claims of China and insists on its right to “free shipping” in the region.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph A. Cossa ◽  
Brad Glosserman ◽  
Michael A. McDevitt ◽  
Nirav Patel ◽  
James Przystup ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 135-153
Author(s):  
Vladimir Batyuk

Despite the critical attitude of the current American President towards his predecessor, the Trump administration actually continued the course of the Obama administration to turn the Asia-Pacific region into the most important priority of American foreign policy. Moreover, the US Asia-Pacific strategy was transformed under Trump into the Indo-Pacific strategy, when the Indian Ocean was added to the Asia-Pacific region in the US strategic thinking. The US Pacific command was renamed the Indo-Pacific command (May 2018), and the US Department of defense developed the Indo-Pacific strategy (published in June 2019). The Indo-Pacific strategy is an integral part of Trump’s national security strategy, according to which China, along with Russia, was declared US adversary. The American side complained about both the economic and military-political aspects of the Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, official Washington is no longer confident that it can cope with those adversaries, China and Russia, alone. Trying to implement the main provisions of the Indo-Pacific strategy, official Washington has staked not only on building up its military power in the Indo-Pacific, but also on trying to build an anti-Chinese system of alliances in this huge region. Along with such traditional American allies in the region as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, the American side in the recent years has made active attempts to attract India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to this system of alliances as well. These American attempts, however, can only cause serious concerns not only in Beijing, but also in Moscow, thereby contributing to the mutual rapprochement of the Russian Federation and China. Meanwhile, the Russian-Chinese tandem is able to devalue American efforts to strategically encircle China, creating a strong Eurasian rear for the Middle Kingdom.


Author(s):  
M. V. Ulchenko ◽  

Currently, the Asia-Pacific market is a priority goal for almost all major producers of liquefied natural gas(LNG). This is due to the relatively high price that local consumers are willing to pay, as well as the accelerated growth rate of natural gas consumption. At the same time, China is the main driver of growth in demand for LNGin the world, has concluded a trade agreement with the United States, which involves the purchase of energy resources worth more than $ 52 billion over two years. Given the decline in LNG prices, as well as increased competition, the issue of the prospects for sales of Russian Arctic gas on the market of the Asia-Pacific region becomes particularly relevant.The study provides a generalized assessment of the needs of the main importers of LNG ––China, South Korea and Japan, with a planning horizon of 4–5 years. The relatively high growth rates of the economy, partial rejection of nuclear energy, struggle to improve the environmental situation, as well as the desire to diversify supply routes explain the needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region for additional volumes of LNGin the near future. The analysis showed that both Japan and South Korea are interested in increasing the volume of imports of Russian arctic LNG, whose key advantages over most competitors are the price and relative proximity of sales markets. At the same time, the reduction in the number of operating gas drilling rigs in the United States indicates that it will not be possible to maintain the growth rate of LNG production at the level of 2018 and 2019.


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