The Baltic States

Author(s):  
Katherine Graney

This chapter examines the successful “return to Europe” by the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It details how they presented European gatekeepers in the EU and NATO with expertly shaped historical and cultural-civilizational narratives that cast the Baltic states as “essentially European” states that had been “captured” by the alien Soviet Union in 1939, hence worthy of “rejoining” a European community they had been unjustly severed from. Skilled leadership and high levels of human development and national unity also helped ease the Baltic return to Europe. The chapter discusses the Baltics’ key role in pushing for an expanded understanding of Europe that would encompass other ex-Soviet states like Ukraine and Georgia, while denying Europeanness to Russia, which is seen as a threat to Europe. Case studies of each of the three Baltic states detail their specific Europeanization processes since 1989.

Author(s):  
Tanel Kerikmäe ◽  
Archil Chochia ◽  
Max Atallah

Integration with the European Union has been far less distressing for the three Baltic States than for numerous other accessing countries owing to their strong societal impetus to (re)join Western political, economic, and legal culture after they regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. However, the accession of these states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had several distinctive features related to constitutional background and settings, which heavily influenced problem solving between government and the EU institutions. In general, the controversial issues regarding how to solve the problems with supranational power have never been dramatic with regard to the Baltic States, which leads to the assumption that often the governments have taken rather compliant positions. The latest cases, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism, indicate the change in paradigm: the three Baltic States are more aware of the margin of appreciation and actual borderlines between policy making- and decision making. Today, in setting up an EU-related agenda, more skills than previously are needed in finding allies and choosing partners. The road the Baltic States took in joining the EU was a difficult one, nor has their role in the EU been easy. Should a small state with a big initiative be allowed to mentor other member states regarding that initiative, meaning in particular Estonia and its digital development? Another peculiar aspect of the Baltic States is their (inter)relationship with Russia. Considering themselves a bridge between East and West, the Baltics have been active in Eastern Partnership and Development Aid initiatives and have also spoken out strongly against intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. This position sometimes complicates any EU attempt to achieve consensus on foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Katherine Graney

This chapter examines the process of EU expansion into the former Soviet Union since 1989, identifying the different criteria that have been used to judge candidates for EU membership. The Central European and Baltic states successfully made arguments about their “intrinsic Europeanness” and “belonging” to Europe and the EU, while the Balkan states have had a harder time proving their suitability for Europe. Unlike the Baltic states, the other ex-Soviet republics, like Ukraine and Georgia, have had a harder time convincing the EU of their fitness for membership, that is, their “intrinsic Europeanness,” and have had to settle for being made “Eastern Partners” of the EU and signers of Association Agreements with the EU. Russia has sought a form of partnership with the EU, while rejecting any idea of conditionality. Finally, the EU shows little concern for the ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, not seeing them as fundamentally European in any way.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-23
Author(s):  
Jeremy W. Lamoreaux ◽  
Nicholas Dyerly

AbstractAs early as 1994, scholars, analysts and policymakers began to wonder the extent to which the Baltic States mattered in the relationship between Russia and the West. The general consensus for the following 20 years was that the Baltic States matter considerably, especially following their inclusion in both the EU and NATO in 2004. However, in the past few years two trends have emerged which begin to call this accepted knowledge into question. First, the relationship between Russia and the West has turned more hostile following nearly 20 years of detente. The West insists (especially NATO) insists that it is within its right to protect states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union/Russia’s “near abroad”. Russia, on the other hand, insists that NATO incursion into the “shared neighborhood” is a violation of trust and overstepping normal geopolitical bounds.Second, the Baltic States who once presented something of a united front for the West against Russia, no longer appear to have a common approach to foreign policy. While Estonia leans toward Scandinavia, and Lithuania leans toward Poland and Ukraine, Latvia is a bit of an odd man out with nowhere to turn. Furthermore, even other states in the Shared Neighborhood no longer seem to see Latvia as a valuable ally within the West. Considering this state of affairs, this paper considers whether Latvia matters anymore in regional geopolitics, or whether they are losing relevance.


Author(s):  
Ilkhomjon M. Saidov ◽  

The article is devoted to the participation of natives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in the Baltic operation of 1944. The author states that Soviet historiography did not sufficiently address the problem of participation of individual peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, and therefore their feat remained undervalued for a long time. More specifically, according to the author, 40–42% of the working age population of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Such figure was typical only for a limited number of countries participating in the anti-fascist coalition. Analyzing the participation of Soviet Uzbekistan citizens in the battles for the Baltic States, the author shows that the 51st and 71st guards rifle divisions, which included many natives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, were particularly distinguished. Their heroic deeds were noted by the soviet leadership – a number of Uzbek guards were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In addition, Uzbekistanis fought as part of partisan detachments – both in the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, the Western regions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and Moldova. Many Uzbek partisans were awarded the medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War” of I and II degrees.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (52) ◽  
pp. 1559-1569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nimalan Arinaminpathy ◽  
Christopher Dye

The ongoing global financial crisis, which began in 2007, has drawn attention to the effect of declining economic conditions on public health. A quantitative analysis of previous events can offer insights into the potential health effects of economic decline. In the early 1990s, widespread recession across Central and Eastern Europe accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, despite previously falling tuberculosis (TB) incidence in most countries, there was an upsurge of TB cases and deaths throughout the region. Here, we study the quantitative relationship between the lost economic productivity and excess TB cases and mortality. We use the data of the World Health Organization for TB notifications and deaths from 1980 to 2006, and World Bank data for gross domestic product. Comparing 15 countries for which sufficient data exist, we find strong linear associations between the lost economic productivity over the period of recession for each country and excess numbers of TB cases ( r 2 = 0.94, p < 0.001) and deaths ( r 2 = 0.94, p < 0.001) over the same period. If TB epidemiology and control are linked to economies in 2009 as they were in 1991 then the Baltic states, particularly Latvia, are now vulnerable to another upturn in TB cases and deaths. These projections are in accordance with emerging data on drug consumption, which indicate that these countries have undergone the greatest reductions since the beginning of 2008. We recommend close surveillance and monitoring during the current recession, especially in the Baltic states.


Author(s):  
V. V. Vorotnikov

The economic crisis fueled contradictions among the parties and weakened public support of internal and external policies of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). Natural necessity to abandon previous one-sided Euro-Atlantic foreign political and foreign economic orientation in favor of more balanced approach towards relations with Eastern neighbours (primarily with Russia) has become the issue of key importance that turned out to be a stumbling block for main political parties (ruling parties, opposition, so called ‚Russian‘ parties) in the Baltic states. The attitude to this problem became crucial during recent political crisis in Latvia, whereas in Lithuania and Estonia it led to changing rhetoric on foreign political issues by opposition parties. It is possible to nominally define the political situation in Lithuania as partisan consensus, whereas in Latvia and Estonia foreign political strategies complicated by unresolved domestic ethnic and language minorities problems are a battlegroud for ruling right-wing conservative coalitions and social-democratic oppositions. So, main social and political forces in the Baltic states faced the task to find a new consensus on foreign political issues in order to efficiently develop national economies under the conditions of financial economic turbulence in the EU and worldwide as well as to support social unity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Tomas Bekišas

This paper aims to determine Lithuania’s, Latvia’s, and Estonia’s parties’ positions on the European Union (EU) and to ascertain whether these party positions mirror their voters’ positions on the EU. Analysis suggests that parties in this region have rather varied positions on the EU, with the exception of hard-Eurosceptic views, which are absent in Baltic states’ party systems. This paper also indicates that parties in the Baltic states tend to mirror, with some exceptions, their voters positions on the EU. This suggests that there may be additional factors determining parties’ positions regarding the EU in the Baltics.


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