Coups and Revolutions

Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

This book offers the first analysis of both the revolution and counterrevolution in Egypt, beginning in January 2011 until July 2018. The period of revolutionary upheaval played out in three uprisings against three distinct forms of authoritarian rule: the Mubarak regime and the police state that protected it, the unelected military junta known as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, and the religious authoritarianism of the Muslim Brotherhood. The second part of the book analyzes the counterrevolution, which is divided into two periods: the first under Adly Mansour as interim president; and the second after Abdel Fattah El -Sisi was elected president. During the first wave, the regime imprisoned or killed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and many secular activists, while during the second wave the regime turned against civil society at large: nongovernmental organizations , charities, the media, academia, and minority groups. In addition to providing new and unprecedented empirical data, the book makes two theoretical contributions. First, a new framework is presented for analyzing the state apparatus in Egypt, which is based on four pillars of regime support that can either prop up or press upon those in power: the Egyptian military, the business elite, the United States, and the multiheaded opposition. Second , the book brings together the literature on bottom-up revolutionary movements and top-down military coups, and it introduces the concept of a coup from below in contrast to the revolution from above that took place under Gamal Abdel Nasser.

2019 ◽  
pp. 74-103
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

After Hosni Mubarak stepped down, Egypt was ruled by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). During this time, a new form of antimilitarist activism emerged for the first time in Egyptian history. Of the three waves of antigovernment uprisings, this one was perhaps the most revolutionary: the goal was not to topple a single person or to hold elections but rather to dismantle the entrenched power of the armed forces. This chapter offers insights into these groups that fall in between the Muslim Brotherhood/military dichotomy. Many of these groups were led by women. After Mubarak was ousted, certain private companies celebrated the revolution in their advertising, but opposition to the SCAF was never commercialized. Despite egregious human rights abuses committed under the SCAF, neither the business elite nor the United States ever withdrew support from the military junta. However, the SCAF did lose popular support, evidenced when mass protests emerged in July during the Tahrir sit-in, and then again during the Battle of Mohamed Mahmoud in November–December 2011.


2019 ◽  
pp. 139-191
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

The first year of the counterrevolution under interim President Adly Mansour is covered in chapter 6. In contrast to the period of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, when men in uniform ruled Egypt, after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi the authorities created a semblance of civilian rule, installing a civilian interim president, a civilian vice president, and a civilian prime minister. Nonetheless, there was no civilian control of the armed forces. The goal during the first wave of the counterrevolution was not only to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from politics but also to crush any group that could mobilize for street protests, regardless of ideology. It was the bloodiest period in modern Egyptian history. After carrying out numerous massacres of the Muslim Brotherhood, the state turned to secular and independent activists next. The Protest Law passed in November 2013 essentially criminalized even small and entirely peaceful protests. The regime was slowly able to regain control of the streets and university campuses. The nature of the coup determined the nature of the crackdown: precisely because it was a “coup from below,” characterized by mass protests that reached deep and wide into Egyptian society, the crackdown had to reach this extent as well.


Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust

This chapter assesses the most important period in the revolution, namely the last three months of 2011. By that time the revolutionary forces—those that stayed mobilized or that remobilized periodically throughout the year—had articulated a series of demands that went far beyond the ubiquitous but vague “bread, freedom, and social justice” slogan. They included the cleansing of institutions from Mubarakist elements, greater autonomy and political freedom within universities and al-Azhar, independent labor unions, the cessation of military trials for civilians, unambiguous civilian rule, and redress for those killed or injured by the security forces. None of this had anything to do with an institutionally nurtured “democratic transition” that occupied the attention of political scientists; none of it was acknowledged by institutions or powerful public figures, who never deviated from the line that the revolution was incoherent, and merely the product of a few feckless youths. Hence, chants at demonstrations of “down with military rule” were heard by March, but it was a series of massacres and street battles beginning in October and lasting until early February of 2012 that brought anti-SCAF (Supreme Council for the Armed Forces) sentiment much more openly into the mainstream than anyone could have dreamed, given the deeply institutionalized reverence for the military in Egyptian public culture. At that point, the military had little choice but to push ahead with elections that it knew would result in a transfer of power to the Muslim Brotherhood.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-24
Author(s):  
Richard W. Bulliet

The causes and processes of the Arab Spring movements are less important for current political developments than the responses to those movements by states that were not directly involved. After discussing the Turkish, Israeli, Iranian, and American responses, the focus turns to the recently announced military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Did the Saudi government conspire with the Egyptian high command to plot the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Cairo? If so, as seems likely, was the United States aware of the conspiracy? More importantly, what does the linkage between the Egyptian army and Saudi and Gulf financial support for President al-Sisi's regime suggest for the future of stability and legitimate rule in the Arab world?


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (36) ◽  
pp. e2105125118
Author(s):  
Yao Lu ◽  
Neeraj Kaushal ◽  
Xiaoning Huang ◽  
S. Michael Gaddis

Mounting reports in the media suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified prejudice and discrimination against racial/ethnic minorities, especially Asians. Existing research has focused on discrimination against Asians and is primarily based on self-reported incidents or nonrepresentative samples. We investigate the extent to which COVID-19 has fueled prejudice and discrimination against multiple racial/ethnic minority groups in the United States by examining nationally representative survey data with an embedded vignette experiment about roommate selection (collected in August 2020; n = 5,000). We find that priming COVID-19 salience has an immediate, statistically significant impact: compared to the control group, respondents in the treatment group exhibited increased prejudice and discriminatory intent against East Asian, South Asian, and Hispanic hypothetical room-seekers. The treatment effect is more pronounced in increasing extreme negative attitudes toward the three minority groups than decreasing extreme positive attitudes toward them. This is partly due to the treatment increasing the proportion of respondents who perceive these minority groups as extremely culturally incompatible (Asians and Hispanics) and extremely irresponsible (Asians). Sociopolitical factors did not moderate the treatment effects on attitudes toward Asians, but prior social contact with Hispanics mitigated prejudices against them. These findings suggest that COVID-19–fueled prejudice and discrimination have not been limited to East Asians but are part of a broader phenomenon that has affected Asians generally and Hispanics as well.


Significance Al-Nour Party was the only Islamist political group to participate in the elections. However, the conservative Salafist party has seen its fortunes decline, from being the second most successful party in the relatively diverse political landscape of 2011-13, to an underperforming one in the current parliamentary elections. Impacts Al-Nour's lack of credibility among Egyptian Islamists will obstruct its development. As a result the Muslim Brotherhood will have greater influence as and when the regime reconciles with political Islamists. Supporters of the state, especially the media, will view al-Nour as an extension of the Brotherhood.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 827-856 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTYN FRAMPTON ◽  
EHUD ROSEN

ABSTRACTThe aftermath of Hosni Mubarak's forced abdication as president of Egypt in 2011 brought the culmination of a long-running debate over whether Western governments should engage with the Muslim Brotherhood. At the heart of that debate was the question of how to judge the Brothers: as ‘moderates’ with whom the US might do business, or as part of a movement ultimately hostile to American interests. As this article demonstrates, the idea of engaging in some form of dialogue with the Brotherhood is itself nothing new to United States diplomats. An examination of the Wikileaks cache of documents confirms that contacts of varying kinds have existed since the first half of the 1980s (with dialogue only abandoned for a brief period during the early years of the ‘war on terror’). Such contacts were a product of the normal, low-level political intelligence-gathering conducted by all American embassies; at no stage were they allowed to jeopardize America's key strategic alliance with the Mubarak regime. Nevertheless, the cables pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood do reveal the limits of such diplomacy, with officials often struggling either to understand the character of the Brotherhood, or read the runes of its internal contours. In particular, the question of whether the Muslim Brothers should indeed be seen as ‘moderates ‘– and as suitable partners for the US – is shown to be one of enduring, but unresolved, concern. The history of this relationship thus serves as a crucial backdrop to contemporary debates and developments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

In July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt – only two and a half years after the 2011 Revolution. This article investigates the hegemonic power of the private press owned by Egypt’s business elite during the coup period. In the context of this research objective, this study answers the question of “how did Egypt’s private press provide popular support to the 2013 military coup?” through following a critical approach and conducting framing analysis of news headlines in a period of 112 days. This article examines the popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan as the main case studies. Findings show that Egypt’s business elite engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup - for the purpose of maintaining their hegemonic position in the country. They particularly used the frame of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood, potential violence and political chaos) and the frame of “promotion” by portraying the military as a saviour.    


2019 ◽  
pp. 12-45
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

Because the revolution in Egypt was directed at the state, it is important to properly conceptualize the state apparatus and the regime that ruled it. Thus, chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on authoritarian regimes and explains why it is important to distinguish between states and regimes. Hosni Mubarak’s powerful presidency did not preclude the development of a diverse and unruly civil society, including tens of thousands of nongovernmental organizations. A new framework is employed in order to understand which parts of the state apparatus are most crucial during a period of revolutionary upheaval. It is important to distinguish between tools of the regime and pillars of support for the regime; the latter have the ability to either prop up or potentially withdraw their support. Mubarak relied on four pillars of regime support: the military, the business elite, the United States, and the acquiescence of the people. The chapter then turns to an overview of the literature on revolutions and military coups, which have usually been studied separately, as well as the literature on how establishing civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation.


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