Copts and Salafis

2019 ◽  
pp. 140-156
Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust
Keyword(s):  
Labor Unions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Freedom ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Public Figures ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter assesses the most important period in the revolution, namely the last three months of 2011. By that time the revolutionary forces—those that stayed mobilized or that remobilized periodically throughout the year—had articulated a series of demands that went far beyond the ubiquitous but vague “bread, freedom, and social justice” slogan. They included the cleansing of institutions from Mubarakist elements, greater autonomy and political freedom within universities and al-Azhar, independent labor unions, the cessation of military trials for civilians, unambiguous civilian rule, and redress for those killed or injured by the security forces. None of this had anything to do with an institutionally nurtured “democratic transition” that occupied the attention of political scientists; none of it was acknowledged by institutions or powerful public figures, who never deviated from the line that the revolution was incoherent, and merely the product of a few feckless youths. Hence, chants at demonstrations of “down with military rule” were heard by March, but it was a series of massacres and street battles beginning in October and lasting until early February of 2012 that brought anti-SCAF (Supreme Council for the Armed Forces) sentiment much more openly into the mainstream than anyone could have dreamed, given the deeply institutionalized reverence for the military in Egyptian public culture. At that point, the military had little choice but to push ahead with elections that it knew would result in a transfer of power to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Coups and Revolutions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Minority Groups ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The United States ◽  
Business Elite ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
Revolutionary Movements ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Regime Support

This book offers the first analysis of both the revolution and counterrevolution in Egypt, beginning in January 2011 until July 2018. The period of revolutionary upheaval played out in three uprisings against three distinct forms of authoritarian rule: the Mubarak regime and the police state that protected it, the unelected military junta known as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, and the religious authoritarianism of the Muslim Brotherhood. The second part of the book analyzes the counterrevolution, which is divided into two periods: the first under Adly Mansour as interim president; and the second after Abdel Fattah El -Sisi was elected president. During the first wave, the regime imprisoned or killed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and many secular activists, while during the second wave the regime turned against civil society at large: nongovernmental organizations , charities, the media, academia, and minority groups. In addition to providing new and unprecedented empirical data, the book makes two theoretical contributions. First, a new framework is presented for analyzing the state apparatus in Egypt, which is based on four pillars of regime support that can either prop up or press upon those in power: the Egyptian military, the business elite, the United States, and the multiheaded opposition. Second , the book brings together the literature on bottom-up revolutionary movements and top-down military coups, and it introduces the concept of a coup from below in contrast to the revolution from above that took place under Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Anatomy of the Egyptian Counterrevolution

2014 ◽  
pp. 91-100
Author(s):  
A. Korotaev ◽  
L. Isaev
Keyword(s):  
Urban Poor ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Events ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

The authors analyze roots, causes and implications of both major political events that took place in Egypt in the last three years, namely the Tahrir Revolution of 2011 and what they call the Counterrevolution of 2013. Focus of the article is on the role of the military and the Islamists. The young educated democrats of middle class who initiated the revolution in 2011 under the slogans of combatting autocratic and corrupt government were joined by the poverty-stricken population of Cairo, by the desolate and unemployed and – what was especially important – by the Muslim Brotherhood. This combination of forces proved too strong for the army and government, Mubarak had to resign. But the urban poor who played a decisive role in the victory of the revolution had always been under a very strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, so it was inevitable that free and fair elections would bring the Islamists to power. Moursi became President. The Islamists, however, made a number of grave mistakes while in power, and the old elites, both economic and military/bureaucratic, did their best to sabotage the government policy. At last the army (supported by the Egyptian economic elites) came on top, so both the Muslim Brothers and the young secular democrats have lost.

يسقط‎ يسقط‎ حكم‎ العسكر‎ “Down, Down with Military Rule”

2019 ◽  
pp. 74-103
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Business Elite ◽  
Single Person ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
First Time

After Hosni Mubarak stepped down, Egypt was ruled by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). During this time, a new form of antimilitarist activism emerged for the first time in Egyptian history. Of the three waves of antigovernment uprisings, this one was perhaps the most revolutionary: the goal was not to topple a single person or to hold elections but rather to dismantle the entrenched power of the armed forces. This chapter offers insights into these groups that fall in between the Muslim Brotherhood/military dichotomy. Many of these groups were led by women. After Mubarak was ousted, certain private companies celebrated the revolution in their advertising, but opposition to the SCAF was never commercialized. Despite egregious human rights abuses committed under the SCAF, neither the business elite nor the United States ever withdrew support from the military junta. However, the SCAF did lose popular support, evidenced when mass protests emerged in July during the Tahrir sit-in, and then again during the Battle of Mohamed Mahmoud in November–December 2011.

CC ا‎ العرص‎ / قاتل‎ انتخبوا‎# “Sisi is a Killer”/“Elect the Pimp”

2019 ◽  
pp. 139-191
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Vice President ◽  
First Year ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
University Campuses ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Egyptian History

The first year of the counterrevolution under interim President Adly Mansour is covered in chapter 6. In contrast to the period of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, when men in uniform ruled Egypt, after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi the authorities created a semblance of civilian rule, installing a civilian interim president, a civilian vice president, and a civilian prime minister. Nonetheless, there was no civilian control of the armed forces. The goal during the first wave of the counterrevolution was not only to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from politics but also to crush any group that could mobilize for street protests, regardless of ideology. It was the bloodiest period in modern Egyptian history. After carrying out numerous massacres of the Muslim Brotherhood, the state turned to secular and independent activists next. The Protest Law passed in November 2013 essentially criminalized even small and entirely peaceful protests. The regime was slowly able to regain control of the streets and university campuses. The nature of the coup determined the nature of the crackdown: precisely because it was a “coup from below,” characterized by mass protests that reached deep and wide into Egyptian society, the crackdown had to reach this extent as well.

scholarly journals Performing (for) Populist Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-321
Author(s):  
Joel W. Abdelmoez
Keyword(s):  
Military Service ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Military Leadership ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Gender Constructions ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The Military

Abstract In July 2013, after months of protest, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, was ousted by the Egyptian armed forces. The Muslim Brotherhood, who supported Morsi, took to the streets, chanting and singing against the ousting, which they termed a military coup, while supporters of Sisi, who viewed it as a revolution, began producing songs to show their allegiance to the military leadership. While abundant research has been conducted on the role of oppositional and revolutionary music in Egypt since 2011, relatively little has been done on the widely popular pro-military music sometimes known as watani music. Watani songs are a genre of patriotic music made by popular artists to show their allegiance to the Egyptian armed forces. In this paper I examine the surge of watani songs and trace their history back to the Nasser era, thereby showing a continuity in style as well as content. I further argue that there are connections between nationalism and gender constructions, as the national project comes with obligations for men to offer their bodies to the cause. This obligation is aided by constructions about ‘male bravery’ and ‘courage’ that are designed to make men believe that military service is somehow essential to masculinity. Watani music, whether commissioned or not, fits well with this mythology of military men. It forms an ideological undercurrent, supports the narrative that it is necessary for patriotic military men to bravely safeguard the nation against its enemies.

scholarly journals The Rule of Abd аl-Fattah al-Sisi: Politics, Economics and International Relations of Egypt in the 2010s.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-77
Author(s):  
G. Sh. Kadirova
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military

The article is devoted to the history of coming to power and the analysis of the domestic and foreign policy of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE), Field Marshal Abd-аl Fattah al-Sisi. The author notes that the new leader of the country chose a tough internal political course aimed at strengthening his own power and suppressing the opposition, fi rst of all, the Muslim Brotherhood (the organization’s activities are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation), and the 2014 Constitution and its 2019 amendments led to the virtual disappearance of the independent branches of power and its concentration in the hands of the president, as well as the consolidation in the Basic Law of provisions on the special role of the military in the life of society. Thus, the head of state and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces determine the political processes in the country, controlling civil institutions. Unlike the traditional ARE course, Abd-al Fattah al-Sisi is building a tougher and more uncompromising policy, demonstrating a readiness to use force, primarily in Libya, narrowing his scope for diplomatic maneuver.

Variations among North African Military Regimes

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Federico Battera
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
North African ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Military

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.

Burundi: Assessing Military Institutional Reforms Post-Arusha

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Astrid Jamar ◽  
Gerard Birantamije
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Military Politics ◽  
The Military

Military politics have been entangled with the trajectory of Burundian public institutions, experiences of violence, and the army formation. From 1994 to 2009, the peace process brought together different political parties, security forces, and rebel groups to negotiate ceasefires and major institutional reforms. Adopted in 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement contained some of the most ambitious and sophisticated security reforms. While most literature emphasizes mostly on the Arusha Peace Agreement, 22 agreements were signed by different sets of parties, including political parties and rebel groups during these 15 years of peace meditation. The Arusha Peace Agreement provides for complex security arrangements: (a) a strictly defined role, structure, and mandate of the army and other security forces; (b) sophisticated power-sharing arrangements for both leadership and composition of the army and other security forces; (c) demobilization, disarmament, integration, and training of armed forces; (d) transformation of armed groups into political parties; and (e) ceasefires. The peace talks integrated various armed political groups into Burundian institutions. Responding to four decades of violence and military dictatorship, these reforms of the military and other security forces aimed to disentangle the military from politics. Initially contested, the agreements shaped the reading of the historical contexts that justified these institutional military reforms. Indeed, provisions of these agreements also framed a narrative about violence and imposed fixed interpretations of political mobilization of violence. These imposed interpretations neglected key elements that enabled and, continue to enable, the political use of violence as well as the emergence of new forms of military politics. The main institutional approaches adopted to tackle issue of inclusion and correct imbalances in armed forces was the introduction of power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic dimensions. The formulation and further implementation of ethnic quotas reinforced the binary elements of ethnic identities, rather than promote a more fluid understanding that would appreciate intersecting elements, such as gender, political affiliation, and class and regional dimensions in the undertaking of power, alliance, and relations between executive and military institutions. Security reforms continue to affect the functioning of public institutions, with limited effects for disentangling politics and military.

Scripting a Massacre

2019 ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
National Community ◽  
Crisis Events ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Revolution

This chapter explains that it is not entirely wrong to partially attribute the coup, the massacre, and the certainty of those who backed these actions to the notion that revolutionary politics left no alternative to violence, which manifested in the Rabʻa Massacre. But it is entirely wrong to neglect the long-standing discursive apparatus of excommunicating the Muslim Brotherhood from the national community that was operational during the period of revolutionary liminality and before it. Resorting to such concepts as imitation and crisis in no way obviates the need to delve into the production, meaning, and circulation of this discourse. If anything, the need to document and interpret the means of excommunication are heightened by one's attention to the form of crisis: the creation or occurrence of a threshold in the present; a plunge into liminality, and then a reckoning. The revolution created a series of thresholds, not just the initial threshold of the plunge into the void when the label “revolution” was applied to events on January 25, 2011. The Maspero Massacre was a threshold; the Battle of Muhammad Mahmud Street was too, and so were a number of other crisis events, including the Tamarrud demonstration against Muhammad Morsy in 2013 and the coup that followed shortly thereafter.

Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 13-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Dina Bishara
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Political Transformation ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
Path Dependent ◽  
The Military

Though there are many expectations regarding the interim character of the current political order, the future of Egyptian democracy remains highly uncertain. A closer look at the take-over of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is imperative to an understanding of a political system at a decisive crossroads, but also of the path-dependent implications of the military’s engagement in politics. We project that, irrespective of the institutional framing and the results of the current political transformation, the military will play a decisive role in the country’s political future. In addressing its role during the current revolutionary events, we account for the reason for the military’s engagement in politics, the path of the take-over of political power, and the military’s management of politics. Thus, our analysis will attempt to provide preliminary answers to three questions: When and how did the Egyptian military intervene directly in revolutionary politics? Why did it intervene? And how does it manage the transformation?

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