Conclusion

The concluding chapter summarizes the role of the Egyptian military, the business elite, the United States, and the opposition during each of the waves of revolution and counterrevolution. If we expand our conceptual vocabulary to include “coups from below,” this would allow scholars to properly conceptualize the unique confluence of military intervention and mass mobilization without resorting to normative terms like “democratic coup d’état.” Furthermore, it could allow US policymakers to suspend military aid in the future should there be similar events. By comparing the period from 1952 to 1956 that experienced a revolution from above with a coup from below between 2011 and 2018, it becomes clear that it may in fact be Egypt’s own revolutionary legacy that is the biggest impediment to democratization.

تيران‎_وصنافير‎_مصرية‎ “Tiran and Sanafir are Egyptian!”

The second wave of the counterrevolution is covered in chapter 7. With the election of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi as president, the level and form of state repression changed again. During the second wave of the counterrevolution, the regime turned against civil society at large, including both groups that played no role in mobilizing for street protests and those who had supported the coup or the first wave of the crackdown. The objective was to silence independent civil society: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), charities, the media, universities, researchers, and minority groups including the LGBTQ community and the Nubian minority. An NGO law criminalized normal NGO activity, including the work of those organizations that were engaging in apolitical work that supported Egypt’s development goals. As a rule, security forces took action before legislation was issued to justify the action.

الشعب‎ يريد‎ اسقاط‎ النظام‎ “The People Want to Overthrow the Regime”

This chapter analyzes the first wave of the revolution against Hosni Mubarak. Refuting arguments that focus on the role of the social media, or divisions among the elite, and the alleged neutrality of the Egyptian military, the chapter illustrates that it was a revolutionary coalition of the middle and lower classes that created a breaking point for the regime. Key features of this mass mobilization included the refusal of protesters to be cowed by state violence, the creation of “liberated zones” occupied by the people, “popular security” organizations that replaced the repressive security apparatus of the state, and strikes that crippled the economy in the final days of the Mubarak era. Key moments during the 18 days are described with ethnographic detail, including the unfiltered reactions of protesters to the deployment of soldiers on January 28. The revolutionary nature of the uprising is that people demanded more than just the ouster of Mubarak—they wanted to topple “the regime” by naming the names of a slew of Mubarak’s cronies to remove them from power.

Introduction

In 2011 Egypt witnessed more protests than any other country in the world, kicking off a revolutionary process that would unfold in three waves of revolution, followed by two waves of counterrevolution. This chapter briefly contrasts the period of Gamal Abdel Nasser to the recent wave of upheaval. Nasser and the Free Officers implemented wide-ranging reforms by overthrowing the monarchy, declaring a republic, implementing land reform, expropriating the Suez Canal, expelling British troops from Egypt, and joining the nonaligned movement in efforts to move away from the colonial past. In so doing they turned a coup into a “revolution from above.” By contrast, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has not implemented any major reforms. His actions have led to the reconstitution of the old Mubarak regime, but with even greater authoritarianism aimed to crush any entity that is seen as independent of the regime. Instead of setting Egypt on a path of greater economic independence, Egypt’s reliance on foreign donors has grown, with increased financial flows from the Gulf. As a crude form of “payback” for this financial support, Egypt handed over the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia.

يسقط‎ يسقط‎ حكم‎ العسكر‎ “Down, Down with Military Rule”

After Hosni Mubarak stepped down, Egypt was ruled by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). During this time, a new form of antimilitarist activism emerged for the first time in Egyptian history. Of the three waves of antigovernment uprisings, this one was perhaps the most revolutionary: the goal was not to topple a single person or to hold elections but rather to dismantle the entrenched power of the armed forces. This chapter offers insights into these groups that fall in between the Muslim Brotherhood/military dichotomy. Many of these groups were led by women. After Mubarak was ousted, certain private companies celebrated the revolution in their advertising, but opposition to the SCAF was never commercialized. Despite egregious human rights abuses committed under the SCAF, neither the business elite nor the United States ever withdrew support from the military junta. However, the SCAF did lose popular support, evidenced when mass protests emerged in July during the Tahrir sit-in, and then again during the Battle of Mohamed Mahmoud in November–December 2011.

Revolutions and Coups

Because the revolution in Egypt was directed at the state, it is important to properly conceptualize the state apparatus and the regime that ruled it. Thus, chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on authoritarian regimes and explains why it is important to distinguish between states and regimes. Hosni Mubarak’s powerful presidency did not preclude the development of a diverse and unruly civil society, including tens of thousands of nongovernmental organizations. A new framework is employed in order to understand which parts of the state apparatus are most crucial during a period of revolutionary upheaval. It is important to distinguish between tools of the regime and pillars of support for the regime; the latter have the ability to either prop up or potentially withdraw their support. Mubarak relied on four pillars of regime support: the military, the business elite, the United States, and the acquiescence of the people. The chapter then turns to an overview of the literature on revolutions and military coups, which have usually been studied separately, as well as the literature on how establishing civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation.

CC ا‎ العرص‎ / قاتل‎ انتخبوا‎# “Sisi is a Killer”/“Elect the Pimp”

The first year of the counterrevolution under interim President Adly Mansour is covered in chapter 6. In contrast to the period of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, when men in uniform ruled Egypt, after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi the authorities created a semblance of civilian rule, installing a civilian interim president, a civilian vice president, and a civilian prime minister. Nonetheless, there was no civilian control of the armed forces. The goal during the first wave of the counterrevolution was not only to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from politics but also to crush any group that could mobilize for street protests, regardless of ideology. It was the bloodiest period in modern Egyptian history. After carrying out numerous massacres of the Muslim Brotherhood, the state turned to secular and independent activists next. The Protest Law passed in November 2013 essentially criminalized even small and entirely peaceful protests. The regime was slowly able to regain control of the streets and university campuses. The nature of the coup determined the nature of the crackdown: precisely because it was a “coup from below,” characterized by mass protests that reached deep and wide into Egyptian society, the crackdown had to reach this extent as well.

يسقط‎ يسقط‎ حكم‎ المرشد‎ “Down, Down with the Supreme Guide”

During the first six months of Mohamed Morsi’s presidency, there was a great deal of collaboration between Morsi and the military. The Mubarak-era business elite also displayed a willingness to continue their profit-making schemes and showed little resistance to Morsi’s administration. American officials had vowed to support whoever won Egypt’s first real elections, and they believed a “democratic transition” was in the offing. Of the four key players, it was the citizenry who turned against Morsi first, including some of the very people who voted him into office. Opposition to Morsi began even before Tamarod emerged when he issued a Constitutional Declaration in the fall of 2012. Tamarod can be divided into two wings: one that was Nasserist, and another that was opposed to the military returning to power. Tamarod was not a creation of the deep state but a broad-based social movement, with all the diversity and contradictions that many big tent movements face, including the emergence of divisions between radicals and moderates and the co-optation of a few key leaders by the regime. The summer of 2013 constituted a watershed moment as the balance of power shifted back in favor of the military, heralding the beginning of the counterrevolution.