Conclusion

Author(s):  
James Cameron

The conclusion summarizes the argument of the book as a whole, pointing to the central importance of domestic public and congressional opinion since the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, and through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of Richard Nixon’s administration, in the formulation of US nuclear strategy, even when such opinion diverges fundamentally from the views of the president. This forces presidents into playing a double game in their attempt to reconcile their personal beliefs on nuclear weapons with public expectations. The chapter argues that this dilemma is common across U.S. national security policymaking, but is especially acute in the case of nuclear strategy because of its extremely abstract nature. The chapter concludes by showing how the double game between presidents and their publics played out for the rest of the Cold War. It then offers a tentative prediction regarding its resurgence as the United States’ global commitments come under new pressure from Russia and China.

Author(s):  
James Cameron

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
Brad Roberts

Since the end of the Cold War, changes to the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States have been pursued as part of a comprehensive approach aimed at reducing nuclear risks. These changes have included steps to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and deterrence strategies. Looking to the future, the United States can do more, but only if the conditions are right. Policy-makers must avoid steps that have superficial appeal but would actually result in a net increase in nuclear risk. These include steps that make U.S. nuclear deterrence unreliable for the problems for which it remains relevant.


2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 1019-1029
Author(s):  
Michael H. Bodden

Alfred McCoy's paper offers a masterful analysis of the way in which the Philippines, and more generally Southeast Asia, were used as base and laboratory for extending US dominance—its hegemony—in the twentieth century, and in particular the Cold War era and its aftermath. He offers a succinct summary of the way in which US organs of global domination—the National Security Council, the CIA, the Defense Department—worked throughout the developing world and in Europe to ensure compliant, anti-communist regimes during the Cold War period, which also meant that more than once the United States was thwarting democracy in a number of locales and thus casting its own ideology of democratic progress and prosperity into doubt.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Gerson

The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,” the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. By not adopting NFU, the NPR missed an important opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The traditional case for NFU hinges on the argument that the threat of nuclear first use is unnecessary for deterrence. Yet the continued U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first is not only unnecessary but dangerous. Given the size and accuracy of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, and given the variation in the nuclear capabilities of current and potential adversaries, the first-use option risks creating instabilities in a severe crisis that increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate nuclear use. In a future crisis with a nuclear-armed state, the fear—whether real or imagined—that the United States might attempt a disarming nuclear first-strike increases the possibility of nuclear escalation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-176
Author(s):  
Anthony DiFilippo

This article will analyze the connection between history, countervailing ideologies, that is, the legacy of the Cold War, and the perceived identification of human rights violations as they pertain to countries with major security interests in Northeast Asia. This article will further show that the enduring nuclear-weapons problem in North Korea has been inextricably linked to human rights issues there, specifically because Washington wants to change the behavior of officials in Pyongyang so that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes a state that at least remotely resembles a liberal democracy. Although supported by much of the international community, including the United States' South Korean and Japanese allies in Northeast Asia, Washington's North Korean policy has remained ineffective, as Pyongyang has continued to perform missile testing and still possesses nuclear weapons.


2018 ◽  
pp. 48-78
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

Several leading international scholars argue that West Germany enjoyed limited autonomy in the Cold War and was thus susceptible to American coercion, especially on issues relating to nuclear weapons. This chapter challenges such arguments. It shows that the alliance with the United States was less useful for curbing West German nuclear ambitions than commonly presumed. It also demonstrates that in-theater conventional forces mattered for bolstering American extended nuclear guarantees to West Germany. American coercion of West Germany was important, but it played a much less direct role than what many scholars claim. Other factors—especially domestic politics—drove West Germany’s final choices pertaining to whether it should get nuclear weapons.


Author(s):  
Democrit Zamanapulov

Introduction. In Russian historiography, the issue of the reasons for the beginning of the U.S. special operations in Nicaragua is a complex problem that requires careful development due to its importance as one of the elements of the confrontation during the Cold War. The scientific relevance of this issue is determined by the insufficient degree of its study. The socio-political relevance is related to the current military-political situation in the world in general and the actions of the United States in particular, which, as part of ensuring their national security, use special operations to achieve certain goals and objectives. An example of this is the U.S.-led special operation to destroy Osama bin Laden, during which the sovereignty of Pakistan was violated. Another example of U.S. special operations at the present stage is Washington’s support of the “proxy” forces loyal to it in Syria. Special operations conducted by the United States in Nicaragua during the first half of the 80s were in many ways the main tool for achieving U.S. state interests in this country. In this regard, it seems that a detailed consideration of the first attempt in the history of the United States to conduct a global special operation, which began with the program of supporting the anti-Communist forces “Contras” in Nicaragua, which was later funded by the illegal supply of American weapons to Iran, would be useful for the domestic scientific doctrine. Methods and materials. In the course of the research, the historical-comparative method, the method of analysis and synthesis, as well as the system approach are applied. The study uses: 1) a set of unpublished materials on the special activities of the United States in Nicaragua, declassified in connection with the “Iran-Contra” scandal, and contained on the electronic website of the National Security Archive at the George Washington University; 2) published sources related to the Cold War; 3) scientific literature on the problems of U.S. special operations during the cold war; 4) memoir literature. Analysis. This article analyzes the reasons that influenced the decision of the U.S. political leadership to authorize special operations in Nicaragua based on the documents and materials studied in the Iran-Contra Affair. Results. The scientific development of the problems of the U.S. special policy in Nicaragua was observed back in the 80s in the USSR. However, it was conducted in hot pursuit, it was biased, considered a complex set of processes taking place in Central America from the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and did not take into account the American position, which made the scientific assessment of these events less complete and justified. New studies of this period take this factor into account, are based on new methods and previously unknown to the scientific community documents and materials that were declassified after the end of the Cold War. Results. In the course of the study, an attempt was made to highlight the mechanism for the development and implementation of U.S. special operations in Nicaragua. The author concludes that the use of the National Security Council personnel for special operations was conditioned by the need to avoid legislative restrictions of the U.S. Congress when implementing U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua.


2021 ◽  
pp. 98-106
Author(s):  
С.И. Гребенкин

Преподавание русского языка в Военном институте иностранных языков Министерства обороны США ведется с 1947 г. За 72 года существования русские программы института играли и сейчас продолжают играть важную роль в обеспечении национальной безопасности США и их союзников. Реализация этих программ всегда напрямую зависела от характера отношений между США и СССР/РФ. Сегодня на фоне геополитических изменений в мире Военный институт и его программы по обучению русскому языку военнослужащих МО США вносят свой неоценимый вклад в подготовку нового поколения военных лингвистов-русистов. Russian has been taught at the U.S. Defense Language Institute without interruption since 1947. Over the last 72 years the Russian programs have played a distinguished role in the national security of the United States and its allies. The size of the Russian programs closely reflected the nature of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR. Today the Defense Language Institute and its Russian programs stand ready to meet future needs of the nation as its relationship with Russia undergoes further changes in the years to come.


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