Sir, Yes, Sir! Hierarchy, Coups and the Political Preferences of Army Officers

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (629) ◽  
pp. 1317-1345
Author(s):  
Gustavo Fajardo
Keyword(s):  
Fuzzy Regression ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Chain Of Command ◽  
Time Requirements ◽  
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Hugo Chavez ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

ABSTRACT I show that coups that break the chain of command polarise the military along hierarchical lines. I study an instance of Venezuelan history in which the political preferences of individual members of the army towards former coup leader Hugo Chávez became observable. Outranking Chávez at the time of the insubordination increases the probability of later opposing his presidency. Causal estimates rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where minimum time requirements for promotion in the army provide exogenous variation in the ranking of officers at the time of the coup. I discuss implications for the literature on civil–military relations.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Horror Vacui

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Dense Material ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Coup Attempt

Nature, Aristotle said, abhors a vacuum. He argued that a vacuum, once formed, would be immediately filled by the dense material surrounding it. Aristotle’s insights into vacuums in the physical world also apply to civil-military relations. Where a vacuum exists in domestic politics because the political parties are weak, unstable, or underdeveloped, the dense material that is the military may fill the void by staging an intervention into domestic politics. But when, as in the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the civilian leaders themselves hold densely concentrated authority—in other words, are powerful, popular, and credible—their attempts to keep the military at bay are far more likely to succeed. Without a vacuum there is no void for the military to fill.

West Africa: Civil–Military Relations From a Colonial Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naila Salihu
Keyword(s):  
West Africa ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
West African ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Societal Actors ◽  
Military Institutions ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Coups D'etat

Civil–military relations is traditionally concerned with the nature and interaction among three societal actors namely military institutions, political elites, and the citizenry. The nature of this complex relationship and whether it is harmonious to prevent military intervention in politics depends on how these societal actors cooperate on certain societal variables. Civil–military relations of West African countries are influenced by those countries’ colonial and postindependence experiences. The military establishments of most African states were birthed from colonial armies. Historically rooted pathologies about the role of the security and defense forces in society created deep cleavages between state and the military, and their relations to political authority on the one hand, and society on the other. The use of African armies for political and imperialist purposes during the colonial era and their roles in the struggle for independence were important factors in shaping the behavior of African armies after independence. Most colonial states did not attain independence with indigenous, nationalist-oriented military institutions. The transition of colonial regiments into the national armies of newly independent states were met with challenges in terms of establishing legitimacy and effectiveness, as these institutions had been set up under conditions that were not ideally suited to the needs of new states. Most postindependence African leaders missed the opportunity to build democratic and national militaries; instead, they maintained the status quo, as these leaders appeared more interested in building large armies for the purposes of regime stability. Successive political leaders resorted to deleterious devices such as patron–client systems, ethnic manipulation, and politicization of the military. These practices undermined the professionalism of the security apparatus and provided breeding grounds for pretorian tendencies. As the military became conscious of their political power, coups d’état became a common feature in the political dispensation of West African states. Frequent military interventions in West Africa often came with destabilizing consequences such as devastating military rules, intra-military conflicts, insurgencies, and even civil wars. Even in those countries where civil wars did not occur, the military were influential in the political landscape, in which autocratic regimes ruled with an iron hand and often used the military to inflict severe hardship on the citizens. With the return to constitutional democracies from the late 1980s, it was widely expected the role or influence of the military in the political space would be diminished as those states became more professional and democratic. However, coups d’état have reduced in the region, rather than going away completely, and the military as a state institution with a monopoly over legitimate force remains a very strong political actor, even under civilian governments. Former metropoles have been providing defense and security assistance programs to West African states for diverse reasons, including maintaining strategic hold on former colonies. Some of these interventions that aim at professionalization of the military have produced mixed outcomes in the region. In Anglophone West Africa, the British colonial policy of indirect rule contributed to the class division between the upper class (civilian politicians) and the lower class (the military and common people). This, coupled with the use of the military as agents of repression to safeguard colonial interests, created a popular dislike and negative image of colonial armies. State militaries went on to become destabilizing forces in political processes across the region. After independence, United Kingdom maintained a fluctuating presence in its former colonies due to its imperial past and strategic interests. In French West Africa, Africans were recruited from French colonies into the French army serve France’s military interests. African soldiers played diverse roles in their countries’ struggles for independence, which led to the military’s having a central role in the politics of postindependence Francophone states. France’s Africa policy differs from that of other former colonial powers in terms of its postindependence engagements with former colonies. In other parts of West Africa, Portuguese colonialism contributed to the creation of a central role for national liberation forces, which metamorphosed into postindependence military and political actors, with destabilizing consequences.

The Democratizer Army Paradox: The Role of the Algerian Army in Impeded Democratization

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1033-1047
Author(s):  
Furkan Halit Yolcu
Keyword(s):  
Process Tracing ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.

scholarly journals MILITARY ELITE AND RIGHT CLASS: NETWORK RELATIONSHIP TO THE POWER

2017 ◽  
pp. 147-151
Author(s):  
Michael Tsoorupa
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Neutral Position ◽  
Ruling Class ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Elite ◽  
General Line ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Transformation ◽  
The Military

The revolutionary transition of power to democratic forces after the "dignity revolution" in 2014 in Ukraine did not indicate the absence of contradictions within the new ruling class, because patriotic and devotion to democratic transformation are not the only condition for the consolidation of the ruling class. The democratic theory of the elite, which corresponds to the essence of the designated form of government, recognizes the existence of a select minority (elite) in each of the social spheres, which owns intellectual and voluntary law, not leadership. The relations between the elites are not stable, but on the contrary may become exacerbated in the fractured periods of history In the countries of "young democracy", the relationship between the political and military elite is controversial lace of relations, because the military elite represents a closed "group of interests" in politics, so it can move from supporting the ruling class to a strong opponent of relations. Even the neutral position of the military elite includes a variant of interference in political processes of power scale. Revolutionary changes on Ukraine's path to European integration may have been deeply embedded in the formation of a new military elite that has tempered itself in the armed struggle with the Russian-separatist forces, was engaged in joint exercises, and most importantly, in business cooperation with representatives of the military elites of the West, which have a long tradition Serious interaction with the ruling class. Taking into account that social and political processes in Ukraine can be compared with developing countries, the whole set of contradictory relations between the political and military elite in our country should be directed to the general line of constitutional-legal civil-military relations.

Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries

1989 ◽  
Vol 45 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 154-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veena Kukreja
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Other ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The World ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Students of civil-military relations, particularly those in the developing countries, admit having to work on myopic assumptions, meagre data, sloppy conceptualization and inelegant explanations. The relative newness of this area of studies could be one reason for this. The study of civil-military relations in the narrow sense referring mainly to military coups and interventions, has attained importance after World War II. But the study of civil-military relations in the broader perspective of multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting non-military organizations and political personages and interests on the other, has begun to draw academic interest only in the last two decades or so. In the twentieth century, the armed forces, being an universal and integral part of a nation's political system, no longer remain completely aloof from politics in any nation. If politics is concerned, in David Easton's celebrated words, with the authoritative allocation of values and power within a society, the military as a vital institution in the polity can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds, at least for legitimate influence as an institutional interest group with a stake in the political decision-making. The varying roles the military may play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence by means of recognized channels inherent in their position and responsibilities within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the forms of illegitimate overt military intervention in politics. This paper seeks to attempt an overview of the existing scholarship on civil-military relations; second, it examines civil-military relations in the world with special reference to major political systems of the world; third, it surveys the literature on civil-military relations in general, and finally, it attempts to develop a general, complex, and hopefully fruitful causal model for analyzing the dynamics of civil-military relations; exploring implications for future research on civil-military relations.

scholarly journals EL PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO MILITAR EN ARGENTINA (2003-2013): REFLEXIONES EN TORNO AL GOBIERNO POLÍTICO DE LA DEFENSA

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Anzelini ◽  
Iván Poczynok
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
First Time ◽  
Core Problem

The national defense policy of Argentina has experienced advances and regressions since the democratic return in 1983. This result has been connected to the dynamics that civil-military relations have inherited from the dictatorial period. The necessity to subordinate the Armed Forces dominated the defense agenda during most part of the democratic period, constituting the core problem of this jurisdiction.The democratic governments implemented various initiatives that underpinned the civil control of the Armed Forces and that also caused, from a normative point of view, what has been characterised as a “basic consensus”. These measures restricted the autonomy of the men in uniform, whether through the demilitarization of civil functions or through the specific delimitation of the martial responsibilities.The habilitation of the spaces required for the exercise of the political administration of the jurisdiction did not necessarily implied, however, that civilians have fully developed this task. The performance of the democratic authorities in the area of defense had its ups-and-downs. At times, these deficiencies were associated to the very restraints of the domestic political conjuncture; at others, they resulted from the planning of the specific agenda of the sector, though.This paper studies the performances of the Ministry of Defense demarches during 2003-2013. The analysis focuses on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector; punctually, on the relative responsibilities of the military strategic planning. In this frame, the demarches of ministers José Pampuro (2003-05), Nilda Garré (2005-10) and Arturo Puricelli (2010-13) are resorted to.The temporal cutout of the study object assumes that a battery of unprecedented measures were implemented. For the first time since the return of democracy, for example, an effective debate on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the defense policy was addressed. Nevertheless, for reasons that are object of analysis during this article, the empowerment process of the political conduction survived along with ambiguities and retrogressions that, during the same period, made the absence of solid consensus regarding the results of the sectorial agenda evident.

scholarly journals Civil-Military Relations in Asia

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurel Croissant
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Single Case ◽  
The Political ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The social science literature on civil-military relations—a concept that encompasses the entire range of interactions between the military and civilian society at every level—falls into a sociological and a political science strand. The former is concerned primarily with the military as a social organization and the social functions of military systems, as well as the ways in which these factors have changed over time. The political science strand, in contrast, more narrowly focuses on political-military relations, that is, the structures, processes, and outcomes of the interactions between the institutions and organizations of the political system, on the one hand, and the armed forces and their members, on the other. As is the case with other continents, the study of civil-military relations in Asia is both normative and positive, often within the same work. While normative contributions ask what “good” civil-military relations should look like, positive analyses seek to describe and explain the actual relationship between the soldier and the state in Asia, examine the effects of military coups and military rule on other political or socioeconomic activities, and predict the consequences of political-military relations for the persistence and performance of political regimes. Perhaps as a consequence of the highly diverse cultures, colonial histories, political legacies, and modes of postcolonial governance, single-case studies and small-N comparative analyses dominate the field and systematic intra-regional comparisons and cross-national studies are rare. Since its inception in the 1960s, research on Asian civil-military relations in social science has moved in various directions: as elsewhere, its initial preoccupation was with the role of military institutions in processes of decolonization, modernization, and nation-building. In the 1970s, scholarship moved toward analyzing the origins of military coups d’état and policy consequences of military rule. A second line of research investigated party-military relations in Communist Party regimes, which operated under societal and institutional circumstances that were quite different from those in the non-socialist states. From the late 1980s onward, the so-called third wave of democratization inspired a new generation of civil-military studies, which illuminate the military’s role in the breakdown of authoritarianism and how young democracies struggle with the double challenge of creating and preserving a military that is strong enough to fulfill its functions, but that is subordinate to the authority of democratically elected institutions. In the 2000s, the study of security sector reform has become the most recent addition to the literature. This article is primarily concerned with the political science strand of civil-military research. It focuses on the positive literature and gives priority to research on Southeast Asia and East Asia, but also includes comparative works and collections that illuminate civil-military relations in South Pacific countries.

scholarly journals Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan: An Analysis of PPP Government (2008-2013)

2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 36-49
Author(s):  
Iltaf Khan ◽  
Farman Ullah ◽  
Bakhtiar Khan
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
History Of ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Election Commission

Pakistan adopted a federal democratic system with a parliamentary type of governance. However, the political history of Pakistan reflects a deviation from parliamentary democracy and the least concern towards the institutionalization of its political system. The centralization of power, authoritarianism, the power thirst of political parties and the imbalance of civil-military relations always affected the democratic course of Pakistan. As a result of the 2008 elections, a power transition occurred from the military to the civilians. Pakistan People Party, after assuming power, restored the 1973 constitution to its original shape under the landmark 18th constitutional amendment. It reinforced parliamentary democracy and revisited federalism with complete autonomy for provinces abolishing the concurrent list. Steps were taken to ensure the independence of the judiciary and transparency of the election commission of Pakistan. This paper analyses the political and constitutional development during the PPP led government (2008-2013) and its role in establishing a viable federal democratic system based on participatory governance.

Civil Military Relation and Stabilization in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tughral Yamin
Keyword(s):  
Paper Briefly ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
Stabilization Process ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Salient Points ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Tribal Areas

The importance of civil military relations assumes seminal importance in ensuring the success of all phases of a counter insurgency campaign. In the true tradition of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is the continuation of policy and vice versa; Pakistan Army has been employed as a matter of policy in counter insurgency operations in the erstwhile tribal areas. They have also been used in the stabilization operations to bring about normality in the insurgency ridden areas. In fact the employment of Pakistan Army in the stabilization process defies any previous example in any other country. In all phases of the conflict cycle, the military has worked hand in glove with its civilian counterparts. The civil-military coordination (CIMIC) in the insurgency ridden areas has taken place within the framework of the established ground rules of an organized counter insurgency campaign. It would not be unfair to say that the return to normality in the erstwhile FATA has only been possible because of a well-knit CIMIC architecture. This paper briefly explicates the salient points of the CIMIC aspect of the counter and post-insurgency part of the operations in the conflict zones and highlights the importance of this aspect of dealing with insurgencies.

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