Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Research Programs ◽

Cognitive science, which appears as an articulated group of research programs whose aim is to constitute a science of the mind, raises a number of issues from the point of view of philosophy of science. This chapter will sample the field by dealing with two main topics. The first one is the hypothesis of a modular architecture of the mind, which has occupied cognitive science since more than 30 years. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the foundations and limits of cognitive science, dealing notably with the functionalist framework (in particular, the computational theory of the mind) and the so-called language of thought hypothesis. We conclude by saying a few words about the division of labor among philosophers who are interested in cognition.

On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy ◽

10.5840/wcp20-paideia199819354 ◽

1998 ◽

pp. 32-36

Author(s):

Henrique de Morais Ribeiro

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Body Problem ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Irreducible Elements ◽

Framework Model ◽

Mind And Body ◽

The Mind ◽

Ontological Problem

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

Meaning Redefined

The American Journal of Semiotics ◽

10.5840/ajs201851436 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 34 (1) ◽

pp. 65-86 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Göran Sonesson ◽

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Present Author ◽

Point Of View ◽

Medieval Philosophy ◽

Fundamental Part ◽

Essential Contribution ◽

The Mind ◽

Scholastic Realism ◽

Recurrent Theme ◽

Do So

From the point of view of semiotics, the essential contribution of John Deely consists in having made us all aware of the richness of the Scholastic heritage, and to have explained it to us latter-day semioticians. Even for those, who, like the present author, think that semiotics was alive and well between the dawn of the Latin Age, and the rediscovery of Scholastic realism by Peirce, the notions coined by the Scholastic philosophers are intriguing. To make sense of scholastic notions such as ens reale and ens rationis is not a straightforward matter, but it is worthwhile trying to do so, in particular by adapting these notions to ideas more familiar in the present age. Starting out from the notions of Scholastic Realism, we try in the following to make sense of the different meanings of meaning, only one of which is the sign. It will be suggested that there are counterparts to ens rationis, not only in the thinking of some contemporary philosophers, but also, in a more convoluted way, in the discussion within cognitive science about different extensions to the mind. The recurrent theme of the paper will be Deely’s musing, according to which signs, unlike any other kind of being, form relations which may connect things which are mind-dependent (ens rationis) and mind-independent (ens reale). The import of this proposition is quite different if is applied to what we will call the Augustinian notion of the sign, or to the Fonseca notion, which is better termed intentionality. In both cases, however, mind-dependence will be shown to have a fundamental part to play. Following upon the redefinition of Medieval philosophy suggested by Deely, we will broach a redefinition of something even wider: meaning even beyond signs.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.001.0001 ◽

2012 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Cognitive Anthropology ◽

Profound Influence ◽

Recent research across the disciplines of cognitive science has exerted a profound influence on how many philosophers approach problems about the nature of mind. These philosophers, while attentive to traditional philosophical concerns, are increasingly drawing both theory and evidence from empirical disciplines — both the framing of the questions and how to resolve them. However, this familiarity with the results of cognitive science has led to the raising of an entirely new set of questions about the mind and how we study it, questions which not so long ago philosophers did not even pose, let alone address. This book offers an overview of this burgeoning field that balances breadth and depth, with articles covering every aspect of the psychology and cognitive anthropology. Each article provides a critical and balanced discussion of a core topic while also conveying distinctive viewpoints and arguments. Several of the articles are co-authored collaborations between philosophers and scientists.

On Concepts, Modules, and Language

10.1093/oso/9780190464783.001.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Language Production ◽

Language Of Thought ◽

Computational Theory Of Mind ◽

Computational Theory ◽

Noam Chomsky ◽

Jerry Fodor ◽

Language And Vision ◽

Cognitive Revolution ◽

First Time

What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science’s most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Newly commissioned chapters by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, Randy C. Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor’s contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. This is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts his view of modularity with that of Fodor’s; Bever discusses the nature of consciousness, particularly regarding language perception; Garrett reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel proposes what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be; and Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor’s views on conceptual nativism. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, to discuss their work in relation to that of Fodor’s, who is responsible for advancing many of cognitive science’s most important hypotheses. This volume—for students and advanced researchers of cognitive science—is bound to become one of the classics in the field.

Meaningful Relations

10.5771/9783896659934 ◽

2021 ◽

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Media Studies ◽

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Body Problem ◽

Point Of View ◽

Sense Making ◽

Critical View ◽

Enactive Cognitive Science ◽

Mind And Body ◽

This collection of works is a contribution to the current debates on the mind-body-problem. It discusses how mind and body make contact in sense-making processes from the point of view of enactive cognitive science and 4E approaches to cognition. It also offers a critical view on non-representational approaches to cognition. The book covers sociology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, computer science and HRI, media studies, literature and cognitive science. It offers cutting-edge research both for students and for junior and senior researchers in the fields mentioned above.

Semiosis is cognitive niche construction

Semiotica ◽

10.1515/sem-2018-0092 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 (228) ◽

pp. 3-16

Author(s):

Pedro Atã ◽

João Queiroz

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Niche Construction ◽

Point Of View ◽

Niche Construction Theory ◽

Cognitive Niche ◽

Active Externalism ◽

Cognitive Niche Construction ◽

Biology Research

AbstractHere we describe Peircean post-1903 semiosis as a processualist conception of meaning, and relate it to contemporary active externalism in Philosophy of Cognitive Science, especially through the notion of cognitive niche construction. In particular, we shall consider the possibility of integrating (a) the understanding of “semiosis as process” within Peirce’s mature semiotics with (b) an elaboration of the concept of cognitive niche from the point of view of niche construction theory and process biology research.

El problema de la representación en la filosofía cognitiva

Contrastes Revista Internacional de Filosofía ◽

10.24310/contrastescontrastes.v13i0.1604 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 13 ◽

Author(s):

Juan C. Vélez

Keyword(s):

Artificial Intelligence ◽

Cognitive Science ◽

Point Of View ◽

Cognitive Systems ◽

Behavior System ◽

Andy Clark ◽

The World ◽

RESUMENLa teoría representacional de la mente, basada en el concepto de representación, ha sido muy criticada, especialmente por recientes enfoques en la ciencia cognitiva, provenientes de la Biología y la Inteligencia Artificial. En este trabajo me centro especialmente en el punto de vista de Francisco Varela, quien sugiere la exclusión del término representación en la explicación de los sistemas cognitivos. Muestro que ello no es necesario, y que hay razones para hablar de representaciones en la relación que tenemos con el mundo en términos de conocimiento, por tanto, el antirrepresentacionalismo de Varela es inadecuado. En ese sentido me parece más afortunada la apreciación que hacen de la ciencia cognitiva y la filosofía de la mente Andy Clark y Pascual Martínez-Freire, y ésta es la postura que defenderé en contra de Varela.PALABRAS CLAVEMENTE, REPRESENTACIÓN, COGNITIVISMO, CONDUCTA, SISTEMAABSTRACTThe representational theory of the mind, based on the concept of representation, has been very criticized, specially by recent approaches to cognitive science, originated from Biology and Artificial Intelligence. In this work I focus my attention specially on the point of view of Francisco Varela, who suggests the exclusion of the term representation in the explanation of cognitive systems. I show that it is unnecessary, and that there are reasons to talk about representations in the relation that we have with the world in terms of knowledge, and therefore, Varela’s antirepresentacionalism is inadequate. In that connection the appreciation that Andy Clark and Pascual Martínez-Freire do of cognitive science and the philosophy of the mind seems more fortunate to me, and this is the position that I will defend against Varela.KEYWORDSMIND, REPRESENTATION, COGNITIVISM, BEHAVIOR, SYSTEM

Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive Science

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0001 ◽

2012 ◽

Author(s):

Richard Samuels ◽

Eric Margolis ◽

Stephen P. Stich

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

First Order ◽

Psychological Phenomena ◽

Broad Field ◽

Core Concepts ◽

High Level ◽

This chapter offers a high-level overview of the philosophy of cognitive science and an introduction toThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The philosophy of cognitive science emerged out of a set of common and overlapping interests among philosophers and scientists who study the mind. We identify five categories of issues that illustrate the best work in this broad field: (1) traditional philosophical issues about the mind that have been invigorated by research in cognitive science, (2) issues regarding the practice of cognitive science and its foundational assumptions, (3) issues regarding the explication and clarification of core concepts in cognitive science, (4) first-order empirical issues where philosophers participate in the interdisciplinary investigation of particular psychological phenomena, (5) traditional philosophical issues that aren’t about the mind but that can be informed by a better understanding of how the mind works.

The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism

10.3366/edinburgh/9781474412094.003.0010 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ronald Hoinski ◽

Ronald Polansky

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Modern Science ◽

Michael Polanyi ◽

Contemporary Philosophy ◽

The Face ◽

Human Desire ◽

The Mind ◽

Theoretical Science

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.

The Science in Hume's Science of Man

Journal of Scottish Philosophy ◽

10.3366/jsp.2020.0276 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 18 (3) ◽

pp. 257-271

Author(s):

Tamás Demeter

Keyword(s):

Comparative Analysis ◽

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Dynamic Theory ◽

Newtonian Dynamic ◽

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism.