Introduction

Author(s):  
Miikka Ruokanen

The debate between Luther and Erasmus was basically about to what degree, if any, a sinner can freely prepare him/herself for the reception of divine grace. When rejecting the bull of Pope Leo X, Luther had used an exaggerating deterministic or necessitarian theological language which alarmed Erasmus. Erasmus concentrated on the application of God’s grace into the human situation “from below”; Luther, on the contrary, focused on the theocentric nature of grace “from above.” Erasmus promoted the commonly accepted rational view of Late Medieval Catholic soteriology: “to those who do what they can God does not deny his grace,” God’s justice requires that he necessarily grant grace to anyone who freely prepares him/herself to receive it, while Luther spoke the language of Biblical realism: Although human will is free in relation to the natural world, the human being is captivated by the overwhelming power of unfaith, sin, and Satan, being incapable of changing his/her ultimate psychic orientation. In his criticism Luther rehabilitated Augustine’s teaching on the radical limits of human freedom and on the Pneumatological dynamism of divine grace, the view neglected in Medieval theology. Research on Luther’s The Bondage of the Will has not recognized the strong Pneumatological and Trinitarian accent of his theology. Instead, the contradiction between Luther and Erasmus has been explained in philosophical terms such as free will, determinism, necessity, and predestination; this has not revealed the true nature of the profoundly theological conflict between the two “forms of Christianity.” The work at hand makes critical comments on Luther research of the last hundred years and launches the task of a detailed and thorough systematic-theological analysis of the major treatise of Luther.

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fida Mohammad

In this article I shall compare and contrast Ibn Khaldun’s ideas aboutsociohistorical change with those of Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim. I willdiscuss and elaborate Ibn Khaldun’s major ideas about historical andsocial change and compare them with three important figures of modemWestern sociology and philosophy.On reading Ibn Khaldun one should remember that he was living in thefourteenth century and did not have the privilege of witnessing the socialdislocation created by the industrial revolution. It is also very difficult tocategorize Ibn Khaldun within a single philosophical tradition. He is arationalist as well as an empiricist, a historicist as well as a believer inhuman agency in the historical process. One can see many “modem”themes in his thinking, although he lived a hundred years beforeMachiavelli.Lauer, who considers Ibn Khaldun the pioneer of modem sociologicalthought, has summarized the main points of his philosophy.’ In his interpretationof Ibn Khaldun, he notes that historical processes follow a regularpattern. However, whereas this pattern shows sufficient regularity, itis not as rigid as it is in the natural world. In this regard the position ofIbn Khaldun is radically different from those philosophies of history thatposit an immutable course of history determined by the will of divineprovidence or other forces. Ibn Khaldun believes that the individual isneither a completely passive recipient nor a full agent of the historicalprocess. Social laws can be discovered through observation and datagathering, and this empirical grounding of social knowledge represents adeparture from traditional rational and metaphysical thinking ...


Author(s):  
Richard A. Muller

Grace and Freedom addresses the issue of divine grace in relation to the freedom of the will in Reformed or “Calvinist” theology in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century with a focus on the work of the English Reformed theologian William Perkins, and his role as an apologist of the Church of England, defending its theology against Roman Catholic polemic, and specifically against the charge that Reformed theology denies human free choice. Perkins and his contemporaries affirmed that salvation occurs by grace alone and that God is the ultimate cause of all things, but they also insisted on the freedom of the human will and specifically the freedom of choice in a way that does not conform to modern notions of libertarian freedom or compatibilism. In developing this position, Perkins drew on the thought of various Reformers such as Peter Martyr Vermigli and Zacharias Ursinus, on the nuanced positions of medieval scholastics, and on several contemporary Roman Catholic representatives of the so-called second scholasticism. His work was a major contribution to early modern Reformed thought both in England and on the continent. His influence in England extended both to the Reformed heritage of the Church of England and to English Puritanism. On the Continent, his work contributed to the main lines of Reformed orthodoxy and to the piety of the Dutch Second Reformation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 109-114
Author(s):  
A. Yе. Shevchenko ◽  
S. V. Kudin

The article explores the variety of theoretical approaches to legal interpretation. It has been determined that the variety of approaches to legal interpretation is due to the complexity of the nature of the origin of this phenomenon, the conditions for the development of post-non-classical science, and the recent influence of the paradigm of comparism, which assumes pluralism of opinions and ideas in legal research. It was found that in modern science there are four traditional theoretical approaches to the essence of legal interpretation. It has been determined that the content of the first approach is revealed within the framework of legal hermeneutics through a number of categories. The essence of the second approach (formal dogmatic or static) is expressed in the fact that the subject of interpretation must strictly and rigorously follow the letter of the law, establish only the meaning of the normative legal act, which the lawmaking body enshrined in it at the time of the publication of the act. That is why normative legal acts cannot, through interpretation, adapt to the changing economic, social, political, cultural internal and external conditions of public life. It is proved that the essence of the dynamic theoretical approach lies in the fact that the subject of legal interpretation adapts the normative legal act to the changes that occur in various social relations. It was found that there is a contradiction between the dynamic and static approaches in legal interpretation, which is reflected in the traditionally called objective and subjective theories of interpretation. According to the subjective theory, the purpose of legal interpretation is to establish the «will of the legislator», and according to the objective theory – to establish the «will of the law». It has been substantiated that the essence of the activity approach is that interpretation is considered as a special kind of legal activity aimed at understanding and clarifying the content of legal texts. The authors of this article point out that in order to establish the true nature of legal interpretation, the methodological foundations of the study should be presented much broader and more diverse, and not be limited only to traditional approaches. When studying it, a comprehensive, integrative approach is needed, which, based on the relevance of interdisciplinary relationships, would include logical, language (linguistic), philosophical, sociological, psychological, axiological (value), ethical, legal, historical, economic, political, mathematical and other substantiation of legal interpretation. Keywords: diversity, theoretical approach, legal interpretation, interpretive practice, integrative approach


2021 ◽  
pp. 67-80
Author(s):  
Maciej Giaro

The paper elaborates the problem of the passive side of capacity to act which consists in the ability to receive (or to be an addressee of) the will declarations. Given the absence of an explicit regulation in the Polish civil code, the passive side of capacity to act has lost its attribute of a doctrinal evidence. However, the capacity to act should not be understood in a popular way limiting this concept to its active side only. Such an understanding generates in fact a grievous gap in the Polish civil law.


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


2016 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-94
Author(s):  
Michael Bräutigam

AbstractAdolf Schlatter (1852–1938) found himself time and again caught in the crossfire between the opposing camps of fundamentalist Pietism and liberal historical-criticism. This article suggests that Schlatter, by avoiding the pitfalls of both extremes, provides a unique way of uniting faith and scientific criticism through his creative reinterpretation of classic attributes of scripture, namely, (1) inspiration as organic and historic-pneumatic, (2) unity as Christocentric, (3) scriptural authority as evoking discipleship, (4) infallibility as relational-volitional, and finally, (5) perspicuity as catholic. In times where there still seems to exist a big gap between ‘evangelical’ and ‘scientific’ approaches to scripture, Schlatter's focus on scripture not only as a means to know God (Erkenntnismittel), but primarily as a means to receive God's grace (Gnadenmittel), remains valuable, helping us to do away with possible misunderstandings and stereotypes and enabling us to recalibrate our perspective on scripture.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (03) ◽  
pp. 415-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred G. Cuzán

ABSTRACTDrawing on more than 500 elections from around the world, this article presents five empirical laws of politics. Four of these laws span democracies and dictatorships, and one sets a boundary between the two. In both regimes the governing party or coalition represents a minority of the electorate. In democracies this minority usually represents a plurality that amounts to about one third of the electorate. Judging by the outcome of the first free elections in regimes undergoing a transition, there is reason to believe that in dictatorships the minority is much smaller. Even as they have an advantage over the opposition, the incumbents experience an erosion of support over time. In democracies this leads to alternation in office, which in turn ensures that across many elections about two-thirds of the electorate gets to see its favorite party or coalition in government from time to time. In dictatorships, during long periods in office, support for the ruling party shrinks to insignificance. Also in democracies, it is rare for incumbents to receive more than 60 percent of the vote, and itneverhappens twice within the same spell in government. This appears to be a reliable indicator that differentiatesalldemocracies frommostdictatorships. The conclusion is inescapable—the dictatorial “passion for unanimity” and illusion of “organic unity” notwithstanding, the state is a plurality. The will of the electorate emerges as a result of competition among political parties.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-93
Author(s):  
Ryszard Kilanowicz

The liturgy of the Church is an expression of his life with Christ, it uses natural signs such as: wine, water, light, fire, smoke, oil, salt, and ash. It is through Christ, that they are given new meaning. This meaning is to glorify God and sanctify man. The sacramental ordinances are determined by ecclesiastical law which follows the nature and life of the Church. The ordinances of the Church, through the visible, direct us to the invisible. Behind what is visible there is no action or God's grace. These signs of God's presence are symbols, which St. Augustine calls the encounter between God and man in the world of signs and symbols, a Sacrament. The sacraments of the Church are graces given by God to man for his sanctification. In sacramental rites, the Church can change form, but never in essence and matter. The matter of the sacrament of marriage is between a woman and a man. The rites of the sacrament of marriage, were announced in 1969, are used in Poland, however, it has been adapted to the new Code of Canon Law of 1983. Jesus instituted the sacrament of marriage. Marriage should be celebrated at Holy Mass and is characterized by unity and indissolubility. During the rites of the sacrament of marriage, the Church then asks what is the will of the person is for getting married. The couple then join their right hands and place the wedding rings on each other’s ring finger. The effects of the sacrament of marriage, which express the Rites of the Sacrament of Marriage, are: marriage community, grace and family. The liturgy with the sacrament of marriage speaks of the sanctity of marriage through the beauty of its celebration.


Author(s):  
Eben Nel

The recent judgment in Hanekom v Voigt 2016 1 SA 416 (WCC) is evaluated in the light of the traditional understanding of the testamentary trust. It is evaluated from both a testamentary disposition and a trust law perspective, with the aim of determining whether the Hanekom matter has touched a particular nerve in the will versus trust debate as far as the trust mortis causa is concerned. From this judgment, the importance of differentiating between the spheres of testamentary law and trust law, to ensure legal certainty, became clear. The court submitted that the mere fact that a trust happens to be of testamentary origin should not influence the evaluation of the validity of the amendment of the trust instrument. The court underlined the dynamic nature of the trust figure in referring to it as a "supple, living institution." The nature of the powers vested in the Master of the High Court, both as far as the appraisal of the trust instrument and the appointment of trustees are concerned, is also considered in the judgement. In evaluating the facts of the case, the court recognised the applicability of the Oudekraal principle as it has been developed in the field of administrative law. The writer comes to the conclusion that, while the Hanekom case does illustrate some legal challenges in the last will and testament environment, it also offers a number of valuable lessons for will-drafters. The approach by the court is encouraging, as it shows some sensitivity for the true nature of the testamentary trust. The confirmation by the court that a testamentary trust is in the first instance a trust and not a will per se is to be welcomed, and is a true and realistic reflection of the nature of the institution.


2011 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 164-185
Author(s):  
Vincent Blok ◽  

In the twentieth century, the concept of the will appears in bad daylight. Martin Heideg-ger for instance criticizes the will as a movement of reducing otherness to sameness, dif-ference to identity. Since his diagnosis of the will, the releasement from a wilful manner of thinking and the exploration of the possibility of non-willing has become a prevalent issue in contemporary philosophy. This article questions whether this quietism is still possible in our times, were we are confronted with climate change and the future of mankind is fundamentally threatened. On the one hand, the human will to 'master‘ and 'exploit‘ the natural world can be seen as the root of the ecological crisis, as Heidegger observed. On the other hand, its current urgency forces us to evaluate the releasement of the will in contemporary philosophy. Because also Heidegger himself attempted to develop a proper concept of the will in the onset of the thirties, we start our inquiry with Heidegger‘s phenomenology of the will in the thirties. Although Heidegger was very critical about the concept of the will later on, we are not inclined to reject the concept of the will as he did eventually. In this article we show that Heidegger's criticism of the will is not phenomenologically motivated, and we will develop a proper post-Heideggerian concept of willing. Finally the question will be answerd whether this proper concept of willing can help us to find a solution for the ecological crisis.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document