Committees Type and the Expertise Model of Party Personnel

Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen

This chapter introduces the typology of committee types: high policy, public goods, and distributive. It develops the theory of party personnel strategy, consisting of two models political parties may use: the expertise model and the electoral–constituency model. The chapter derives testable premises for the expertise model, which states that parties assign legislators according to individual attributes (e.g., occupation, gender, and local electoral experience) that signal a background relevant to the type of committee on which they serve. The chapter argues that parties of the left and right will tend to differ in which committee types they emphasize, even in the same electoral system, according to their issue ownership. It summarizes the thirteen parties on their tendencies to have legislators with each of the key individual attributes.

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Haruo Nakagawa

Akin to the previous, 2014 event, with no data on voter ethnicity, no exit polls, and few post-election analyses, the 2018 Fiji election results remain something of a mystery despite the fact that there had been a significant swing in voting in favour of Opposition political parties. There have been several studies about the election results, but most of them have been done without much quantitative analyses. This study examines voting patterns of Fiji’s 2018 election by provinces, and rural-urban localities, as well as by candidates, and also compares the 2018 and 2014 elections by spending a substantial time classifying officially released data by polling stations and individual candidates. Some of the data are then further aggregated according to the political parties to which those candidates belonged. The current electoral system in Fiji is a version of a proportional system, but its use is rare and this study will provide an interesting case study of the Open List Proportional System. At the end of the analyses, this study considers possible reasons for the swing in favour of the Opposition.


Author(s):  
Hoolo Nyane

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more.  It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system.  This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system.  When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho.  In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-684
Author(s):  
Johannes Krause

Despite the 2020 reform of Germany’s national parliament voting law, the debate about a robust voting system has not ended . Träger and Jacobs have convincingly shown that Naun­dorf’s suggestion to introduce a parallel voting system creates more problems than it solves, and thus more far-reaching approaches have to be considered . One way to stop the Bunde­stag from growing is to reject the two vote-system . Comparable to the system of Thuringia’s local elections, with open lists and three votes per voter, both the standard size of the Bun­destag can be safely adhered to and at the same time a personalized proportional represen­tation can be maintained . Among other advantages, the voters would have greater influence on the personalized composition of the Bundestag . In particular, reservations on the part of the political parties could stand in the way of such a sustainable solution to the ongoing problems with the German electoral system .


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 309-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances Millard

Latvia’s highly distinctive proportional electoral system owes its origins to Latvia’s 1922 Constitution and the new democracy’s electoral legislation of 1919 and 1922. Latvia’s unique feature lies in its preference system, offering the voters the opportunity to judge each candidate on their party’s list. Although the system appears to maximise responsiveness to voters’ preferences, in practice this promise remained unfulfilled and the representative quality of parliament was questionable. This was in large measure because of the capacity of candidates to stand in multiple constituencies. In 2009 amendments to the electoral law altered this key provision. This change clearly made a difference, but it could not resolve fundamental problems of Latvia’s political process in general and its political parties in particular.


Author(s):  
Alenka Krašovec ◽  
Tomaž Krpič

Under the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Slovenia, after elections, coalition governments have formed. However, the coalition partners have also adopted a ‘dropping out from government’ strategy between elections, which in some cases has led to minority governments. This has occurred despite a frequent use of several conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution mechanisms. One such mechanism, coalition agreements, are mostly understood in terms of policy agreements. After each election in the period 1992–2000, the leading party, the LDS, signed a coalition agreement with each coalition partner. Since 2013, such coalition agreements include a mechanism of explicitly stating in coalition agreements that certain issues are to be avoided. Regardless, governments termination in majority cases happened due to different (policy or personal) conflicts within the government. Early in the period, government coalitions were ideologically mixed. This was characteristic for governments under LDS leadership from 1992 to 2004, while after the 2004 elections, the governmental coalitions were much more ideologically homogenous. Alternation between like-minded ideological coalitions (centre-left or centre-right) took place. Simultaneously, the main lines of conflict changed. In the 1990s, initially a mostly ideological cleavage between ‘transformed’ and ‘newly established’ political parties was present, while after the 2004 elections, the economic cleavage became more salient. All parliamentary parties, except the Slovenian National Party, have at least briefly participated in governments, while the Democratic Party of Retired Persons have been since the mid-1990s the party with the biggest coalition potential. Since 2011, small parties have received pivotal roles in coalition formation. Generally speaking, participation in the government has not been electorally rewarding for the political parties.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Fabio Wolkenstein

In addition to summarizing the book’s main themes as described, this Introduction places special emphasis on connecting the problem animating the book—the apparent incapacity of contemporary parties to mediate between citizens and the state—to current political developments in established Western democracies, showing that the issues the book addresses are not only of academic interest but also directly relevant to ongoing public debates about the state and health of representative democracy. Chief amongst the themes foregrounded here is the rise of so-called ‘populist’ parties on the left and right of the political spectrum, as well as the re-branding of established political actors as ‘movements’ (think, e.g. of Emmanuel Macron’s La République en Marche). These phenomena are interpreted as part of a larger ‘revolt against intermediary bodies’—meaning first and foremost a rebellion against political parties. The Introduction suggests that this ‘revolt’ brings with it only a temporary shift in how representative politics looks, without actually reversing the disconnect between parties and voters or compelling established political parties to give up their privileges and de-colonize the institutions of the state. This argument sets the stage for the book’s core contention that more thought has to be put into finding ways to reconnect political parties with society.


Author(s):  
Margaret Arnott ◽  
Richard Kelly

This chapter discusses the role of smaller parties in the law-making process. General elections in the UK are conducted with an electoral system which militates against the representation of smaller political parties, particularly those having no strong support at the regional level. However, events at Westminster over the last decade have increased the prominence of smaller parties in the operation of parliamentary business. The chapter first considers the role of small parties in the UK Parliament, committees and legislation, as well as their participation in backbench debates before examining how the political and electoral context of Parliament, especially in the twenty-first century, has affected the representation of smaller parties and the ways in which reforms to parliamentary procedure since the 1980s have enhanced the role of the second opposition party. It suggests that Parliament today offers more opportunities for smaller political parties to influence debate and policy, but this remains quite limited.


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