Electoral system, political parties and Lok Sabha elections

2018 ◽  
pp. 148-194
Author(s):  
R. K. Tiwari
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral System

2018 Fiji Election Results: Patterns of Voting by Provinces, Rural-Urban Localities, and by Candidates

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Haruo Nakagawa
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
The Political ◽  
Quantitative Analyses ◽  
Election Results

Akin to the previous, 2014 event, with no data on voter ethnicity, no exit polls, and few post-election analyses, the 2018 Fiji election results remain something of a mystery despite the fact that there had been a significant swing in voting in favour of Opposition political parties. There have been several studies about the election results, but most of them have been done without much quantitative analyses. This study examines voting patterns of Fiji’s 2018 election by provinces, and rural-urban localities, as well as by candidates, and also compares the 2018 and 2014 elections by spending a substantial time classifying officially released data by polling stations and individual candidates. Some of the data are then further aggregated according to the political parties to which those candidates belonged. The current electoral system in Fiji is a version of a proportional system, but its use is rare and this study will provide an interesting case study of the Open List Proportional System. At the end of the analyses, this study considers possible reasons for the swing in favour of the Opposition.

The Never-ending Story of Law and Electoral System in Lesotho

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo Nyane
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
2012 Election

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more.  It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system.  This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system.  When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho.  In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.

Minimalinvasiv oder wirksam? Debattenbeitrag zur Novellierung des Bundeswahlrechts vom Oktober 2020

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-684
Author(s):  
Johannes Krause
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Vote System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Standard Size ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
System P ◽  
Voting System ◽  
The Way

Despite the 2020 reform of Germany’s national parliament voting law, the debate about a robust voting system has not ended . Träger and Jacobs have convincingly shown that Naun­dorf’s suggestion to introduce a parallel voting system creates more problems than it solves, and thus more far-reaching approaches have to be considered . One way to stop the Bunde­stag from growing is to reject the two vote-system . Comparable to the system of Thuringia’s local elections, with open lists and three votes per voter, both the standard size of the Bun­destag can be safely adhered to and at the same time a personalized proportional represen­tation can be maintained . Among other advantages, the voters would have greater influence on the personalized composition of the Bundestag . In particular, reservations on the part of the political parties could stand in the way of such a sustainable solution to the ongoing problems with the German electoral system .

Electoral-system change in Latvia and the elections of 2010

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 309-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances Millard
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Unique Feature ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Large Measure ◽  
Preference System ◽  
Electoral Law ◽  
Multiple Constituencies

Latvia’s highly distinctive proportional electoral system owes its origins to Latvia’s 1922 Constitution and the new democracy’s electoral legislation of 1919 and 1922. Latvia’s unique feature lies in its preference system, offering the voters the opportunity to judge each candidate on their party’s list. Although the system appears to maximise responsiveness to voters’ preferences, in practice this promise remained unfulfilled and the representative quality of parliament was questionable. This was in large measure because of the capacity of candidates to stand in multiple constituencies. In 2009 amendments to the electoral law altered this key provision. This change clearly made a difference, but it could not resolve fundamental problems of Latvia’s political process in general and its political parties in particular.

Slovenia

2019 ◽  
pp. 475-521
Author(s):  
Alenka Krašovec ◽  
Tomaž Krpič
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Dropping Out ◽  
The Political ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Frequent Use ◽  
The Government

Under the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Slovenia, after elections, coalition governments have formed. However, the coalition partners have also adopted a ‘dropping out from government’ strategy between elections, which in some cases has led to minority governments. This has occurred despite a frequent use of several conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution mechanisms. One such mechanism, coalition agreements, are mostly understood in terms of policy agreements. After each election in the period 1992–2000, the leading party, the LDS, signed a coalition agreement with each coalition partner. Since 2013, such coalition agreements include a mechanism of explicitly stating in coalition agreements that certain issues are to be avoided. Regardless, governments termination in majority cases happened due to different (policy or personal) conflicts within the government. Early in the period, government coalitions were ideologically mixed. This was characteristic for governments under LDS leadership from 1992 to 2004, while after the 2004 elections, the governmental coalitions were much more ideologically homogenous. Alternation between like-minded ideological coalitions (centre-left or centre-right) took place. Simultaneously, the main lines of conflict changed. In the 1990s, initially a mostly ideological cleavage between ‘transformed’ and ‘newly established’ political parties was present, while after the 2004 elections, the economic cleavage became more salient. All parliamentary parties, except the Slovenian National Party, have at least briefly participated in governments, while the Democratic Party of Retired Persons have been since the mid-1990s the party with the biggest coalition potential. Since 2011, small parties have received pivotal roles in coalition formation. Generally speaking, participation in the government has not been electorally rewarding for the political parties.

13. Small Parties and Law-making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Arnott ◽  
Richard Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
First Century ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Elections ◽  
Parliamentary Procedure ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Law Making

This chapter discusses the role of smaller parties in the law-making process. General elections in the UK are conducted with an electoral system which militates against the representation of smaller political parties, particularly those having no strong support at the regional level. However, events at Westminster over the last decade have increased the prominence of smaller parties in the operation of parliamentary business. The chapter first considers the role of small parties in the UK Parliament, committees and legislation, as well as their participation in backbench debates before examining how the political and electoral context of Parliament, especially in the twenty-first century, has affected the representation of smaller parties and the ways in which reforms to parliamentary procedure since the 1980s have enhanced the role of the second opposition party. It suggests that Parliament today offers more opportunities for smaller political parties to influence debate and policy, but this remains quite limited.

scholarly journals Hacia el estudio de lo preocupante en nuestro régimen de partidos = The worrying state of our party system

2015 ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Óscar Alzaga Villaamil
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Full Control ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Siglo Xix ◽  
Party Funding ◽  
Sociological Studies ◽  
Spanish Legislation

Noting that in sociological studies at European level Spain is almost at the bottom of civic appraisal of its democracy and its political, the study explores the historical roots of poor political representation in the nineteenth century Spanish with management from the Crown Decrees of dissolution of parliament and full control by governments shift elections based on small districts and on a rooted cacique system. The 1977 Law for Political Reform conditioned the electoral system for the Parliament, distorting proportional representation in terms that have come down to us and who have devoted bipartisanship when none of the major parties has a majority depends on the Nationalist forces, they have made great revenues as unique representative map. The Spanish legislation regulating political parties with great precision how the upcoming ban terrorism forces, but hardly develops the constitutional requirements regarding the organization and internal functioning must be democratic, nor on party funding, for what you need to consider the reform of the parties Act 2002.Tras constatar que en los estudios sociológicos de ámbito europeo España se sitúa prácticamente a la cola de valoración ciudadana de su democracia y de sus políticos, el estudio profundiza en las raíces históricas de la mala representación política durante el Siglo XIX español con manejo desde la Corona de los Decretos de disolución de las Cortes y pleno control por los gobiernos del turno de unas elecciones basadas en distritos pequeños y en un arraigados sistema caciquil. La Ley de 1977 para la Reforma Política condicionó el sistema electoral para las Cortes, distorsionando la representación proporcional en términos que han llegado a nuestros días y que han consagrado un bipartidismo que cuando ninguno de los principales partidos tiene mayoría absoluta depende de las fuerzas nacionalistas, que han obtenido grandes réditos de tan singular mapa representativo. La legislación española de partidos políticos regula con gran precisión la forma de prohibir las fuerzas próximas al terrorismo, pero prácticamente no desarrolla los imperativos constitucionales en cuanto a que la organización y el funcionamiento interno deben ser democráticos, ni sobre la financiación de los partidos, por lo que procede abordar la reforma de la Ley de partidos de 2002.

Limits of Electoral Equality and Political Representation

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kostas Chryssogonos ◽  
Costas Stratilatis
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Equal Opportunities ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Normative Standards ◽  
Tyranny Of The Majority

Constitutional limits to the discretion of the legislature in forming the electoral system — Political equality — Equal suffrage — Equal opportunities for political parties — Free expression of popular will — Functionality of the parliament — Concrete normative standards for assessing the constitutionality of an electoral system — Conception of parliamentary democracy emphasising representation of political minorities and protection from ‘tyranny of the majority’

The corruption of popular sovereignty

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Issacharoff
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Mobilization ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Legislative Branch ◽  
Institutional Actors

Abstract Populism marks a departure from the central forms of democratic governance over the past two centuries. As opposed to the primacy of the legislative branch and of institutional actors, most notably political parties, populism tends toward the unilateral authority of a charismatic leader, ruling on the basis of an electoral mandate. This article starts from an understanding of populism as being grounded in political mobilization in disregard of the institutions of governance. Even more centrally, populist leaders try to dismantle institutional constraints to allow for greater individual discretionary power. This article looks to legal vulnerabilities that might allow the institutional framework of democracy to withstand the new populist assault. The central insight is that corruption might prove the means of checking governance by the new breed of caudillos, the strongman rule that stands in opposition to separation of powers limitations on the executive. Two forms of corruption are examined. The first is the attempt to subordinate the electoral system itself. The second is the use of state discretionary authority to push the boundaries of clientelism and ultimately outright corruption. Whereas questions of electoral integrity are more commonly checked by formal constitutional boundaries, the question of ordinary corruption surfaces with regularity under populism. The article offers reasons why this might be the product of a descent from clientelism to cronyism to outright capture of public resources for private gain. In turn, the article offers arguments for how corruption invites review by broader layers of judicial and prosecutorial authorities than constitutional law.

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