Perceived Corruption and Political Participation

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-104
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Campaign Spending

Chapter 5 shifts the focus to the final—and perhaps most important—element of the Court’s behavioral model: political participation. Adopting a broad and comprehensive scale of political participation that includes both voting as well as other forms of engagement, it first estimates the relationships between attitudes toward corruption and trust on participation. The data offer little support for the notion that those who see more corruption and those who are less trusting of government are less likely to participate. Equally important, campaign finance regulations and campaign spending have a minimal influence on political participation. In fact, increased spending appears to coincide with slightly more participation.

The Appearance of Corruption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Political Speech ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Political Opinions ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
The U.S

The sanctity of political speech is a key element of the U.S. Constitution and a cornerstone of the American republic. When the Supreme Court linked political speech to campaign finance in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision, the modern era of campaign finance regulation was born. In practical terms, this decision meant that in order to pass constitutional muster, any laws limiting money in politics must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling state interest. The lone state interest the Court was willing to entertain was the mitigation of corruption. In order to reach this argument the Court advanced a sophisticated behavioral model, one with key assumptions about how laws will affect voters’ opinions and behavior. These assumptions have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. This book takes up the task of identifying and analyzing empirically the Court’s presumed links between campaign finance regulations and political opinions and behavior. In so doing, we rely on original survey data and experiments from 2009–2016 to openly confront the question of what happens when the Supreme Court is wrong, and when the foundation of over forty years of jurisprudence is simply not true.

Gauging (Perceived) Corruption

2021 ◽  
pp. 45-70
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Descriptive Data ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
Minor Problem ◽  
A Minor

Chapter 3 aims to gauge both the reality of, as well as public opinion on, the central issue of corruption. It investigates public opinion on corruption among elected officials, source of corruption, effectiveness of laws and regulations in mitigating corruption, support for campaign finance reforms, etc. The data strongly suggest that people think corruption is rampant despite limited evidence that quid pro quo corruption is anything more than a minor problem. This fundamental attitude has not changed much in the wake of the Citizens United decision. Furthermore, they believe the problem is mostly intractable and that most of the commonly proposed reforms of the campaign finance system will not work. Nevertheless, they still support these reforms. Moving from simple descriptive data to more associational analyses, this chapter also explores the effect of campaign finance laws on campaign spending and then the effect of both on corruption attitudes. The results are not what the Court would have expected.

Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Simon Weschle
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Institutional Factor ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
Us States ◽  
The Us

Abstract Existing research on the revolving door examines why employers hire former politicians. I complement this demand-side approach by demonstrating the importance of the supply-side. In particular, I argue that one important institutional factor that shapes politicians' willingness to leave office for a private sector job is campaign finance legislation. Less restrictive rules increase campaign spending for incumbents, which makes revolving door employment less attractive. Empirically, I use novel data from the US states and a difference-in-differences design to show that the exogenous removal of campaign finance legislation through Citizens United reduced the probability that incumbents left office to work as lobbyists. The supply-side approach provides insights into comparative differences in the prevalence of the revolving door.

The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections

1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary C. Jacobson
Keyword(s):  
Regression Models ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Survey Questions ◽  
Finance Policy ◽  
Campaign Expenditures

Incomplete understanding of the connection between campaign spending and election outcomes has hindered evaluation of enacted and proposed congressional campaign finance reforms. Reanalysis of the 1972 and 1974 House and Senate campaign spending data using both OLS and 2SLS regression models shows that spending by challengers has a much greater impact on the outcome than does spending by incumbents. A similar analysis of the effects of spending on voters' recall of candidates in the 1972 and 1974 SRC surveys supports the explanation that campaign expenditures buy nonincumbents the necessary voter recognition already enjoyed by incumbents prior to the campaign. The 1974 survey questions on Senate candidates indicate that, although the inability to remember candidates' names does not preclude having opinions about them, voters recalling candidates are much more likely to offer evaluative comments, and these more frequently refer to candidates personally. Aware voters offer more negative as well as positive evaluations (though positive outnumber negative); familiarity is not automatically advantageous. And voters' evaluations of candidates strongly influence how they vote. The implications of these findings for congressional campaign finance policy are readily apparent.

Perceived Corruption and Trust in Government

2021 ◽  
pp. 71-82
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Model ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Trust In Government ◽  
Related Notion ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Over Time

Chapter 4 examines the relationship between perceptions of corruption and trust in government. The analysis begins by reviewing variation in levels of trust over time, and proceeds to an estimation of the relationship between perceptions of corruption and trust, as posited by the Court. This chapter also tests the Court’s assumption that states with more substantial campaign finance regulations will evince greater trust in government. Finally, it examines the related notion—implicitly suggested by the Court’s teleology—that lower levels of campaign spending are likely to be associated with greater trust in government. The data are not consistently supportive of this line of reasoning. After accounting for endogeneity, the empirical model shows that perceived corruption does not have a significant impact on trust in government.

What Do Americans Know about Campaign Finance?

2021 ◽  
pp. 28-44
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
The Public ◽  
The One ◽  
Basic Intuition ◽  
Money In Politics

Chapter 2 establishes a baseline by reviewing public opinion concerning money and politics, pre– and post–Citizens United, focusing on what Americans know about money in politics and campaign spending. On the one hand, given that citizens are typically not well informed about politics, it should come as no surprise that they do not know all that much about candidate spending or campaign finance. On the other hand, the public is not completely off base with respect to its sense of money in politics, and this basic intuition is perhaps even sharper in the post–Citizens United era. The data suggest that while Americans know a little bit about campaign finance, there is no systematic correlation between the regulatory environment of the state and how much people in that state know about campaign finance.

Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Witko
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Validity And Reliability ◽  
Simple Measure ◽  
State Statutes ◽  
Do So

Scholars are beginning to consider how state campaign finance regulation influences political behavior and elections, but they lack the systematic measure of these regulations needed to do so. This article describes a simple measure of state campaign finance regulation stringency that is based on state statutes in 2002. Further, this article explains the construction of the measure and assesses its validity and reliability. The index generally confirms qualitative assessments of state campaign finance regulation, and it is correlated with measures of related aspects of state campaign finance regulation, campaign spending, and fundraising.

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