Because Without Cause

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Lange
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Scientific Explanations ◽  
Physical Necessity ◽  
Explanatory Priority ◽  
Causal Laws

This chapter investigates non-causal scientific explanations that work by describing how the explanandum involves stronger-than-physical necessity by virtue of certain facts (“constraints”) that possess some variety of necessity stronger than ordinary causal laws possess. In particular, the chapter offers an account of the order of explanatory priority in explanations by constraint. It examines several important examples of explanations by constraint, distinguishing their natural kinds. It gives an account of the sense in which constraints are modally stronger than ordinary causal laws and an account of why certain deductions of constraints exclusively from other constraints possess explanatory power whereas others lack explanatory power.

Reasons First

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Common Currency ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
The World ◽  
Explanatory Priority

The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts—that reasons in that sense come first. Reasons First systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology—about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. And he shows that along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge.

Generalization, similarity, and Bayesian inference

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua B. Tenenbaum ◽  
Thomas L. Griffiths
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Decay Function ◽  
Ideal Case ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Realistic Situation ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Universal Law ◽  
The Ideal

Shepard has argued that a universal law should govern generalization across different domains of perception and cognition, as well as across organisms from different species or even different planets. Starting with some basic assumptions about natural kinds, he derived an exponential decay function as the form of the universal generalization gradient, which accords strikingly well with a wide range of empirical data. However, his original formulation applied only to the ideal case of generalization from a single encountered stimulus to a single novel stimulus, and for stimuli that can be represented as points in a continuous metric psychological space. Here we recast Shepard's theory in a more general Bayesian framework and show how this naturally extends his approach to the more realistic situation of generalizing from multiple consequential stimuli with arbitrary representational structure. Our framework also subsumes a version of Tversky's set-theoretic model of similarity, which is conventionally thought of as the primary alternative to Shepard's continuous metric space model of similarity and generalization. This unification allows us not only to draw deep parallels between the set-theoretic and spatial approaches, but also to significantly advance the explanatory power of set-theoretic models.

Aristotelian Intellectual Intuition, Basic Beliefs and Naturalistic Epistemology

1998 ◽  
pp. 88-93
Author(s):  
James B. Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
General Applicability ◽  
Naturalistic Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Intuition ◽  
The World ◽  
Inductive Inferences ◽  
Hilary Kornblith ◽  
Basic Beliefs

I first argue that Aristotelian intellectual intuition (recognizing archai through epagoge and seeing their truth by recognizing their explanatory power through nous) generates basic beliefs which are not inferred — inductively or deductively — from other beliefs. Both involve synthetic intuitive insight. Epagoge grasps a connection and nous sees its general applicability. I next argue that such beliefs are properly basic by adapting an argument made by Hilary Kornblith. According to Kornblith, the world is objectively divided into natural kinds. We humans perceive the world divided into natural kinds. There is empirical evidence suggesting that we divide the world not only as it is objectively divided, but in making inductive inferences, that is, in inferring that an object will have certain properties on the basis of its having others. This grounds the reliability of (certain) inductive inferences. But the leading principles (in Peirce’s sense) of these inferences are basic beliefs generated through intellectual intuition. Hence intellectual intuition generates certain properly basic beliefs.

The Explanatory Power of Ethnomethodology

1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (7) ◽  
pp. 573-574
Author(s):  
JAMES LULL
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power

The Explanatory Power and Status of Power and Status

1979 ◽  
Vol 24 (10) ◽  
pp. 748-750
Author(s):  
K. T. STRONGMAN
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power

Comparison of Examinees’ and Doctors’ Judgement of Health Status Using Data in an AMHTS

1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (01) ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Y. Sekita ◽  
T. Ohta ◽  
M. Inoue ◽  
H. Takeda
Keyword(s):  
Health Status ◽  
Discriminant Analysis ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Subjective Symptom ◽  
Health Conditions ◽  
Testing System ◽  
Multiple Discriminant Analysis ◽  
Canonical Axis ◽  
Using Data

SummaryJudgements of examinees’ health status by doctors and by the examinees themselves are compared applying multiple discriminant analysis. The doctors’ judgements of the examinees’ health status are studied comparatively using laboratory data and the examinees’ subjective symptom data.This data was obtained in an Automated Multiphasic Health Testing System. We discuss the health conditions which are significant for the judgement of doctors about the examinees. The results show that the explanatory power, when using subjective symptom data, is fair in the case of the doctors’ judgement. We found common variables, such as nervousness, lack of perseverance etc., which form the first canonical axis.

Explanatory Power for Medical Expert Systems: Studies in the Representation of Causal Relationships for Clinical Consultations

1982 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 127-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. W. Wallis ◽  
E. H. Shortliffe
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Prototype System ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Medical Expert ◽  
Comprehensive Knowledge ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Medical Expert Systems ◽  
Explanation System ◽  
Systems Studies

This paper reports on experiments designed to identify and implement mechanisms for enhancing the explanation capabilities of reasoning programs for medical consultation. The goals of an explanation system are discussed, as is the additional knowledge needed to meet these goals in a medical domain. We have focussed on the generation of explanations that are appropriate for different types of system users. This task requires a knowledge of what is complex and what is important; it is further strengthened by a classification of the associations or causal mechanisms inherent in the inference rules. A causal representation can also be used to aid in refining a comprehensive knowledge base so that the reasoning and explanations are more adequate. We describe a prototype system which reasons from causal inference rules and generates explanations that are appropriate for the user.

Freedom Indices and Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Malaysian Evidence

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ying Tay Lee ◽  
Devinaga Rasiah ◽  
Ming Ming Lai
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Press Freedom ◽  
Capital Asset Pricing ◽  
Capital Asset ◽  
Cross Sectional

Human rights and fundamental freedoms such as economic, political, and press freedoms vary widely from country to country. It creates opportunity and risk in investment decisions. Thus, this study is carried out to examine if the explanatory power of the model for capital asset pricing could be improved when these human rights movement indices are included in the model. The sample for this study comprises of 495 stocks listed in Bursa Malaysia, covering the sampling period from 2003 to 2013. The model applied in this study employed the pooled ordinary least square regression estimation. In addition, the robustness of the model is tested by using firm size as a controlled variable. The findings show that market beta as well as the economic and press freedom indices could explain the cross-sectional stock returns of the Malaysian stock market. By controlling the firm size, it adds marginally to the explanation of the extended CAP model which incorporated economic, political, and press freedom indices.

Metaphor and Intertextuality: A Cognitive Approach to Intertextual Meaning-Making in Metafictional Fantasy Novels

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary-Anne Shonoda
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Meaning Making ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Cognitive Poetics ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Mapping Model ◽  
Fantasy Novels ◽  
Narrative Functions ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Metaphoric Expression

Scholars in children's literature have frequently commented on the humorous and ideological functions of intertextuality. There has however, been little discussion of the cognitive processes at work in intertextual interpretation and how they provide readers with more interpretive freedom in the meaning-making process. Drawing on research from the field of metaphor studies and the interdisciplinary area of cognitive poetics, this article suggests that the interpretation of foregrounded intertextuality is analogous to the interpretation of metaphoric expression. Current models of metaphor interpretation are discussed before I outline my own intertextuality-based variant. The cross-mapping model developed is then applied to literary intertexts in Inkheart and cultural intertexts in Starcross in order to show how the model might work with intertexts of varying degrees of specificity and that serve different narrative functions. The explanatory power of the cross-mapping model is not limited to cases where elements in the primary storyworld can be directly matched with those in the intertext, but extends to instances that involve a recasting of the intertext and thus retelling as in Princess Bride.

Science and Dialectics in the Philosophies of Deleuze, Bachelard and DeLanda

Paragraph ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Williams
Keyword(s):  
Gilles Deleuze ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Gaston Bachelard ◽  
Contemporary Science

This article charts differences between Gilles Deleuze's and Gaston Bachelard's philosophies of science in order to reflect on different readings of the role of science in Deleuze's philosophy, in particular in relation to Manuel DeLanda's interpretation of Deleuze's work. The questions considered are: Why do Gilles Deleuze and Gaston Bachelard develop radically different philosophical dialectics in relation to science? What is the significance of this difference for current approaches to Deleuze and science, most notably as developed by Manuel DeLanda? It is argued that, despite its great explanatory power, DeLanda's association of Deleuze with a particular set of contemporary scientific theories does not allow for the ontological openness and for the metaphysical sources of Deleuze's work. The argument turns on whether terms such as ‘intensity’ can be given predominantly scientific definitions or whether metaphysical definitions are more consistent with a sceptical relation of philosophy to contemporary science.

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