Persons as Biological Processes

Author(s):  
Anne Sophie Meincke

Human persons exist longer than a single moment in time; they persist through time. However, so far it has not been possible to make this natural and widespread assumption metaphysically comprehensible. The philosophical debate on personal identity is rather stuck in a dilemma: reductionist theories explain personal identity away, while non-reductionist theories fail to give any informative account at all. This chapter argues that this dilemma emerges from an underlying commitment, shared by both sides in the debate, to an ontology that gives priority to static unchanging things. The claim defended here is that the dilemma of personal identity can be overcome if we acknowledge the biological nature of human persons and switch to a process-ontological framework that takes process and change to be ontologically primary. Human persons are biological higher-order processes rather than things, and their identity conditions can be scientifically investigated.

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (28) ◽  
pp. 7361-7366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae Young Choi ◽  
Qi Qiao ◽  
Se-Hoon Hong ◽  
Chang Min Kim ◽  
Jae-Hee Jeong ◽  
...  

Cell death-inducing DFF45-like effector (CIDE) domains, initially identified in apoptotic nucleases, form a family with diverse functions ranging from cell death to lipid homeostasis. Here we show that the CIDE domains of Drosophila and human apoptotic nucleases Drep2, Drep4, and DFF40 all form head-to-tail helical filaments. Opposing positively and negatively charged interfaces mediate the helical structures, and mutations on these surfaces abolish nuclease activation for apoptotic DNA fragmentation. Conserved filamentous structures are observed in CIDE family members involved in lipid homeostasis, and mutations on the charged interfaces compromise lipid droplet fusion, suggesting that CIDE domains represent a scaffold for higher-order assembly in DNA fragmentation and other biological processes such as lipid homeostasis.


2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-116
Author(s):  
Sherwood O. Cole

As a supplement to Van Leeuwen's excellent article on evolutionary psychology, the present article expands upon the importance of our embodied nature (i.e., biological processes) to a consideration of the ethics of human gender relations. An attempt is made to demonstrate that biological processes are important to the interpretation, formulation, and behavioral implementation of any ethical system of human sexual relations based upon Biblical teachings. Two examples of the importance of biology to implementing behavioral ethics (homosexuality and heterosexual offenses) are briefly discussed. Finally, it is suggested that we need to accept the importance of our biological nature without accepting the assumptions of evolutionary psychology and that only a “holistic” view adequately reflects our created nature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-288
Author(s):  
Mariana Córdoba ◽  
María José Ferreira Ruiz ◽  
Fiorela Alassia

In this paper we will briefly explain the context in which the appropriation of 500 children occurred during the most recent Argentinian dictatorship, in order to analyze the political demand of identity restitution of these people. We will describe the phenomenon of restitution that took place thanks to the strategy of Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and we will analyze both the role of genetics on the restitution as well as some criticisms to a notion of biological identity considered to emerge from it. We will situate those criticisms in the philosophical debate over personal identity. The main purpose of this paper is to offer two arguments against an alleged genetic notion of personal identity. Firstly, a theoretical argument presents reasons on the basis of contemporary biological knowledge and, secondly, a practical argument refers to the productive role of biotechnologies. Finally, we will discuss some problems that arise from the criticisms themselves in order to give reasons for a defense of the restitution demand.


Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

How are we to imagine a situation in which I am simultaneously yet severally multiple subjects? Many contemporary writers on personal identity have said that one can imagine a scenario involving the fission of a person, a situation where as a result of division what was up to that moment a single person subsequently continues as two distinct people. One solution to the challenge of multiple embodiment is to defend the view that persons are individuals of a special sort, higher-order individuals somewhat akin to kinds. And yet the deeper issue is not metaphysical but phenomenological, and it isn’t a puzzle about the multiple embodiment of a single person but about a person’s simultaneous embrace of multiple first-person positions. Pessoa introduces the term ‘intersection’ as a philosophical term of art to denote the unified phenomenology of a doubled, interwoven experiential state. In one place he gives, as an example, the hypnagogic state. While the hypnagogic state occurs spontaneously, Pessoa claims that states of ‘intersecting sensation’ can also be brought about through the conscious exercise of guided attention. Yet Pessoa abandoned his experiments in intersectionist poetry, and his view seems to have undergone a shift. I wonder if he recognized that the force of the idea behind simultaneous subject plurality, that is, the experiential possibility to be in multiple subject positions simultaneously yet severally, is not fully realized in the concept of an emulsified experience.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (21) ◽  
pp. 6065-6070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sohini Chakrabortee ◽  
Can Kayatekin ◽  
Greg A. Newby ◽  
Marc L. Mendillo ◽  
Alex Lancaster ◽  
...  

Prion proteins provide a unique mode of biochemical memory through self-perpetuating changes in protein conformation and function. They have been studied in fungi and mammals, but not yet identified in plants. Using a computational model, we identified candidate prion domains (PrDs) in nearly 500 plant proteins. Plant flowering is of particular interest with respect to biological memory, because its regulation involves remembering and integrating previously experienced environmental conditions. We investigated the prion-forming capacity of three prion candidates involved in flowering using a yeast model, where prion attributes are well defined and readily tested. In yeast, prions heritably change protein functions by templating monomers into higher-order assemblies. For most yeast prions, the capacity to convert into a prion resides in a distinct prion domain. Thus, new prion-forming domains can be identified by functional complementation of a known prion domain. The prion-like domains (PrDs) of all three of the tested proteins formed higher-order oligomers. Uniquely, the Luminidependens PrD (LDPrD) fully replaced the prion-domain functions of a well-characterized yeast prion, Sup35. Our results suggest that prion-like conformational switches are evolutionarily conserved and might function in a wide variety of normal biological processes.


This book outlines the principles of neural science that mediate personality and describes what is currently known about how these biological processes are impaired in individuals with personality disorders. What sets this book apart from others is that it focuses particularly on the neurobiology of disturbed personality. Personality disorders have a high prevalence, and these disorders cause a substantial amount of human suffering and harm, not only to the individuals and families directly affected but also to the population at large. Second, these disorders are known to have a heritability rate that is generally in excess of 50%, strongly suggesting that the behavioral disturbances caused by personality disorders have a significant biomedical etiology. However, with the exception of borderline personality disorder, little is known about the biological nature of personality and personality disorders and the effective treatment of the latter. The principles of the basic biological nature medical disorders have served well as the foundation in other disciplines in medicine and psychiatry but have received relatively little attention in the areas of personality, temperament, and personality disorders.


2020 ◽  
pp. 99-126
Author(s):  
Nancy S. Jecker

Chapter 4 explores the metaphor of life as a story and shows how it serves as a corrective for midlife bias by keeping attention directed to the whole of human life. It delineates epistemological, ontological, and normative components of narrative. Narrative framing of medical decisions incorporates the whole story of a person’s life (integrity); manages claims of the self at distinct time slices to serve the whole, temporally extended self (prudence); and lends itself to treating each life stage equally (fairness). In cases involving surrogate decision-making for people with dementia, narrative understanding directs us to a person’s complete life. It avoids basing decisions on a single moment (time slice) when an advance directive was executed. Rather than equating personal identity with a mature, midlife self, narrative conceptions of personal identity regard all life stages as constitutive of identity.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerson Reuter

In its core, this book represents a defense of the thesis that we are essentially biological creatures of the species Homo sapiens - and not essentially persons. This thesis has consequences for the problem of personal identity. An important aspect of its defense – and the book's second central line of argumentation – is, therefore, to substantiate that ours are the diachronic identity conditions of biological beings. Attempting to reach both argumentation goals, one has to overcome some obstacles, from motivating an appropriate ontological framework via explaining the concept of the animate being to demonstrating that essentialism is still a viable option today. In this way, a picture gradually emerges which places us humans, as living beings among other living beings, in a biological world, without, however, playing down that we are, at least typically, also persons with a rich spiritual life.


Author(s):  
Thomas Baldwin

Identity is a basic concept which concerns the way in which the world divides up at one time into different things which are then reidentified despite change over the course of time until they cease to exist. Important debates concern the relation between identity and similarity, between something’s identity and the kind of thing it is, how far identity is fixed by human interests, and especially whether identity over time is really coherent. But the special focus of philosophical debate has long been the topic of personal identity—how far this is distinct from that of our bodies and how far it is determined by our self-consciousness. Recent discussions have also emphasized the importance of our sense of our own identity, which perhaps gives a narrative unity to our lives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.


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