Between Law and Revolution
Although the origins of the theory of constituent power are generally placed in the French Revolution, the different legal and institutional implications associated with it in late 18th-century France are seldom explored. This chapter engages in such an exploration by focusing on two institutions that were rejected by Sieyès: the imperative mandate and (decision-making) primary assemblies. Part I focuses on Sieyès’ proposals about constitution-making and constitutional reform after 1789. Part II of the chapter examines the role of citizen instructions in late 18th-century France. Sieyès saw citizen instructions as radically inconsistent with the very idea of representation; they were abolished very early in the Revolution. In so doing, it will be shown, French revolutionaries altered in fundamental ways not only the relationship between electors and representatives, but the very nature of what counts as an exercise of constituent power. Part III focuses on the role of primary assemblies during the more radical stages of the French Revolution (namely, 1792–1793). The approach to primary assemblies found in both in the Constitution of 1793, as well as in the Girondin Draft Constitution, reflected in important ways Rousseau’s conception of those entities as a key mechanism of democratic constitutional change. This approach to constitutional change will be contrasted with that of Sieyès, who saw primary assemblies as the site for the exercise of the much more modest ‘commissioning power’, the power to elect those seen as capable of identifying the nation’s constituent will.