Control of State Aid: A policy specific area of EU administrative law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Micheau
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Specific Area ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Public Resources

The regulatory framework of State aid is central to the review of the use of public resources in the European Union. Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines State aid as any aid which may distort competition and affect trade between Member States, by favouring some undertakings or the production of certain goods. The Treaty provisions entrust the Commission with the prevention of aid granted by Member States which could unduly distort competition in the internal market. When applying the Treaty provisions, the Commission not only ensures that the Member States do not provide aid limiting competition and tilting a level playing field, but also defines growth-oriented approaches and shapes policy instruments within the context of subsidization.

scholarly journals Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Market ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Bank Bailouts ◽  
The Eu

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.

scholarly journals Economic Integration, Legitimacy and European Union Enlargement

2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-195
Author(s):  
Andreas P. Kyriacou
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Economic Costs ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
New Members ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
European Union Enlargement ◽  
Eu Membership

Abstract The enlargement of the European Union generates socio-economic costs and benefits for the citizens of new members and as such it is bound to affect their perceived legitimacy of the whole enterprise. The legitimacy of EU accession is likely to be enhanced by the inclusion of compensatory transfers and transition periods in the terms of accession, by the perception that EU membership represents the most favorable terms of exchange available and by the linking of accession to a sustained period of economic growth, a favorable movement in prices, improving relative incomes and the consolidation of a level playing field across new members.

Part V Judicial Review before the Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 Decentralized Judicial Review and Enforcement of EU State Aid Rules

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Market ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Common

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.

China—US Trade War: A Modern Version of the Thucydides Trap

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Yuqing XING
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Chinese Consumers ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Thucydides Trap ◽  
Trade War

China—US trade war looks like a modern version of the Thucydides Trap. The devastating consequences of the trade war can be avoided if China takes the drastic step to open its market to US firms and allow foreign firms to have a level playing field to compete with Chinese firms. It is time that Chinese consumers embrace products “made beyond China”. Strengthening economic cooperation with the European Union (EU) and Japan would give China the leverage to counterbalance the pressure of the United States. China, however, should be ready to offer significant concessions in opening its domestic market too.

Data Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union: An Unequal Playing Field

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-494
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Zell
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Location Based Services ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
The Eu

With the negotiation of its Data Protection Regulation, the European Union seeks to reform an outdated set of laws that has failed to address the evolving data protection challenges inherent in new technologies such as social networks, e-commerce, cloud computing, and location-based services. This article addresses the forthcoming Data Protection Regulation as well as the current state of data protection law in the EU, with a particular focus on Germany. The first part of the article examines Germany's robust data protection framework and the EU's existing authority. The article then raises key issues related to data protection in Germany and the EU—namely, discrepancies in data protection standards and enforcement among EU Member States—as illustrated by recent, high profile cases involving household names like Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon. Through this analysis, the article attempts to explain how and why companies doing business in Germany, but established in other EU Member States, are subject to less stringent data protection standards than German companies. Lastly, the article synthesizes the issues in debate with regard to the draft Data Protection Regulation and offers perspectives on what the Regulation could and should mean for data protection in the EU.

scholarly journals Zagadnienie pomocy publicznej udzielanej na ochronę środowiska – teoria zawodności rynku a polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Piotr Podsiadło
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu

The aim of this article is to present the conditions of admissibility of state aidin the European Union, with particular emphasis on horizontal aid for environmentalprotection. State aid measures can correct market failures and therebycontribute towards achieving common objectives. It should be targeted towardssituations where aid can bring a material improvement that the market cannotdeliver alone. The EU Member States intending to grant environmental or energyaid have to define precisely the objective pursued and explain what is the expectedcontribution of the measure towards this objective.

State aid for employment and competitiveness of the European Union countries - a legal and finance approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr PODSIADLO
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Competition Mechanism ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
New Jobs

Due to the imperfect functioning of labour markets in certain cases, State aid may be an appropriate instrument for creating new jobs and preserving existing ones. Legal regulation of the issue of State aid is an element of the competition mechanism protection, which was recognized in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This paper discusses guidelines for implementation of art. 107–109 of the TFEU, from the point of view of State aid for employment. Statistical analysis was carried out on State aid granted by EU Member States in the period 2001–2018 – from the perspective of its impact on competitiveness of these countries. This should lead to verify the thesis that the amount of State aid granted by EU Member States for employment should be positively correlated with the size of the GDP per capita of these countries.

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