The Knowledge View of Justification and Excuse

Author(s):  
Jessica Brown

This chapter criticizes the conception of evidence to which the infallibilist is committed—a factive conception of evidence on which knowledge is sufficient for evidence. As is well known, this view has the counterintuitive result that certain pairs of subjects who are intuitively equally justified, e.g. a person and a BIV, are not equally justified. Defenders of this view of evidence have attempted to reply to this objection by distinguishing whether a belief is justified from whether the subject is blameless or excused for holding it. They endorse the knowledge view of justification according to which a belief is justified if and only if it meets the fundamental norm of belief which they take to be knowledge. This chapter argues against the knowledge view of justification that it has difficulty explaining the propositional and graded senses of justification. It also argues that the knowledge view of justification fails to provide an adequate account of blameless belief.

1904 ◽  
Vol 72 (477-486) ◽  
pp. 462-486 ◽  

While I was at Plymouth in July, 1902, Mr. W. Garstang suggested that I should investigate the origin of the nematocysts found in Æolids. He pointed out that no adequate account of their development had been published, and that the view held by some that they were derived from the Coelenterate prey of the Æolids had never been properly tested. In looking up the literature of the subject, I came across Strethill Wright’s abstract in the ‘Microscopical Journal,’ mentioned below, which convinced me of the advisability of a thorough examination of the question from this point of view before attempting to work out the development of the nematocysts in the Æolids themselves, especially as the few observations I had already made seemed to point in the same direction.


1970 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-123
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov

In this paper I would like to defend three interconnected claims. The first stems from the fact that the definition of substance dualism recently proposed by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of the doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for genuine substance dualism, as distinct from quasi-dualisms, and provide a definition for genuine substance dualism that I consider more appropriate than Zimmerman’s. The second is that none of the currently proposed forms of substance dualism are able to provide a satisfactory account of conscious subjectivity. To support this claim I present two arguments, the first against Cartesian Dualism, the other against Emergent Dualism. The third, I believe, derives from the two just mentioned: if the dualistic arguments against the ability of physicalist theories to provide a sound account of the unity of the subject of consciousness are persuasive enough, then, in order to acquire a more adequate account of the unity of the conscious subject, we will have to look more closely at such forms of quasi-dualism as spiritualism or a broadly Aristotelian view of human persons.  


MELINTAS ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 169
Author(s):  
Yulius Tandyanto

<p>For some contemporary thinkers, traditional and modern metaphysical systems were not considered as an adequate account, for they might have abolished the ontological difference. Such circumstances might have taken place because metaphysics was thought of as circumscribing by considering the whatness of any phenomena in form of, or oder of, the same, i.e. substance, essence or first cause. Jean-Luc Marion moves further and suggests phenomenological accounts that culminate in the givenness and the saturated phenomenon – ideas which open the possibilites to overcome the inadequacy of metaphysics. With the phenomenological third reduction, Marion shows that givenness already presents itself which is anterior to the dichotomy between essence and existence. This phenomenology of givenness enables phenomena to appear by itself in the saturated phenomena. In a paradoxical way, he shows that the constituting subject had already been constituted. Phenomenology, therefore, allows the subject to describe any phenomena in the form of, or order of, the other such as Marion proposed. Considering the contexts, this article may serve as an introduction to the notion of givenness and the saturated phenomenon.</p>


Africa ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Wilson

Opening ParagraphThough the Tsimihety tribe is the subject of three monographs by Molet (1953, 1956, 1959) and a number of papers by various authors (e.g. Mattei, 1938; Magnes, 1953), its social structure has not yet been adequately described. Indeed, there is no adequate account of the social structure of any Malagasy group, although Ottino's (1963) analysis of aspects of Vezo social structure is very illuminating. The primary aim of this paper therefore is to describe two of the major features of Tsimihety social structure—kinship and descent. As there are facets of Tsimihety kinship and descent that have some bearing on recent discussion of these topics, a secondary aim is to contribute, in a minor way, to that discussion.


Phronimon ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Owo Aleke

Since the “elimination of the subject” from truth discourse by Frege, by identifying the subject—or rather the subjective—with the private and personal, philosophical investigations of truth have consciously or unconsciously truncated the role of the knowing subject in the quest for truth. The neglect of the subject has turned the exploration of truth into logical, semantic, conceptual or linguistic analysis of the truth predicate. The consequence of this is that some philosophers tend to treat truth as if it does not really matter; as is shown by their deflationary attitude towards truth or even the total denial of truth. Despite the prevalent elimination of the subject from truth discourses, two thinkers that acknowledge the importance of the subject in the exposition of the concept of truth are Martin Heidegger and Bernard Lonergan. In this paper I explore their positions and argue that Heidegger’s situating of the centrality of Dasein in relation to truth in disclosedness—as the basic state of Dasein’s ontological constitution—is inadequate. Following Lonergan, I argue that an adequate account of the centrality of the role of the subject can only be situated in the cognitional acts of the subject within the context of the human quest for knowledge, and that the pivotal cognitional act is the act of judgment.


Utilitas ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-260
Author(s):  
Henry Sidgwick

Sidgwick's first explicit statement of the utilitarian position, in an essay presented to the Metaphysical Society in 1873, provides a lucid overview of the errors to be avoided and the terms to be clarified in any adequate account of the subject. As a précis of the comprehensive treatment of utilitarianism that would soon appear in The Methods of Ethics, this essay should serve as a useful guide to that work.


PMLA ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1320-1327
Author(s):  
Colbert Searles

THE germ of that which follows came into being many years ago in the days of my youth as a university instructor and assistant professor. It was generated by the then quite outspoken attitude of colleagues in the “exact sciences”; the sciences of which the subject-matter can be exactly weighed and measured and the force of its movements mathematically demonstrated. They assured us that the study of languages and literature had little or nothing scientific about it because: “It had no domain of concrete fact in which to work.” Ergo, the scientific spirit was theirs by a stroke of “efficacious grace” as it were. Ours was at best only a kind of “sufficient grace,” pleasant and even necessary to have, but which could, by no means ensure a reception among the elected.


1966 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 363-371
Author(s):  
P. Sconzo

In this paper an orbit computation program for artificial satellites is presented. This program is operational and it has already been used to compute the orbits of several satellites.After an introductory discussion on the subject of artificial satellite orbit computations, the features of this program are thoroughly explained. In order to achieve the representation of the orbital elements over short intervals of time a drag-free perturbation theory coupled with a differential correction procedure is used, while the long range behavior is obtained empirically. The empirical treatment of the non-gravitational effects upon the satellite motion seems to be very satisfactory. Numerical analysis procedures supporting this treatment and experience gained in using our program are also objects of discussion.


1966 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 159-161

Rule: I'd like at this point to bring up the subject of cables and wireways around the telescope. We've touched upon this twice during previous sessions: the cable wrap up problem, the communications problem, and data multiplexing problem. I think we'll ask Bill Baustian if he will give us a brief run down on what the electrical run problems are, besides doubling the system every year.


Paleobiology ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 6 (02) ◽  
pp. 146-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Oliver

The Mesozoic-Cenozoic coral Order Scleractinia has been suggested to have originated or evolved (1) by direct descent from the Paleozoic Order Rugosa or (2) by the development of a skeleton in members of one of the anemone groups that probably have existed throughout Phanerozoic time. In spite of much work on the subject, advocates of the direct descent hypothesis have failed to find convincing evidence of this relationship. Critical points are:(1) Rugosan septal insertion is serial; Scleractinian insertion is cyclic; no intermediate stages have been demonstrated. Apparent intermediates are Scleractinia having bilateral cyclic insertion or teratological Rugosa.(2) There is convincing evidence that the skeletons of many Rugosa were calcitic and none are known to be or to have been aragonitic. In contrast, the skeletons of all living Scleractinia are aragonitic and there is evidence that fossil Scleractinia were aragonitic also. The mineralogic difference is almost certainly due to intrinsic biologic factors.(3) No early Triassic corals of either group are known. This fact is not compelling (by itself) but is important in connection with points 1 and 2, because, given direct descent, both changes took place during this only stage in the history of the two groups in which there are no known corals.


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