Brexit and EU Institutional Balance

Author(s):  
Uwe Puetter

The chapter focuses on the implications of Brexit on the EU inter-institutional balance, and inter-state relations, and argues that not much change is to be expected here. According to Puetter, the UK already dramatically reduced its engagement inside the EU institutions. It isolated itself within the European Council and it was the only Member State together with Hungary to vote against the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President in 2014. The UK lost influence in the European Parliament as a result of David Cameron’s decision to take the Conservative party out of the European Peoples’ Party. Brexit may make room for greater roles for countries like Italy and Spain, yet, the German–French axis will probably remain dominant. Puetter suggests that the inter-institutional equilibrium within the EU will not change. Brexit is unlikely to shift the balance from the European Council back towards the European Commission.

Management ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 473-487
Author(s):  
Andrzej Czyżewski ◽  
Sebastian Stępień

Summary The objective of the paper is to present the results of negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-2020, with particular emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy. Authors indicate the steps for establishing the budget, from the proposal of the European Commission presented in 2011, ending with the draft of UE budget agreed at the meeting of the European Council on February 2013 and the meeting of the AGRIFISH on March 2013 and then approved by the political agreement of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Council on June 2013. In this context, there will be an assessment of the new budget from the point of view of Polish economy and agriculture.


Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


Subject The possible economic impact of the EU investment plan (the 'Juncker Plan'). Significance The EU investment plan launched by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker just over a year ago has made a slow start. This will encourage doubts that have existed since the scheme's inception about its operation and likely impact. Impacts Even by 2020, the EU economy will still probably require every effort to boost growth and make up for lost investment. Given continuing strong demand for high-grade bonds and equity investments, it should be possible to achieve the fundraising target. The plan could become a vehicle for Chinese investment into the EU: China is talking of 5-10 billion euros in future investments. The geographical distribution of funded projects could be politically sensitive within the EU. The plan could come under scrutiny during the UK EU referendum campaign; UK projects may come too late to have an impact before the vote.


2021 ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Carlos Espaliú Berdud

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received:  03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021


IG ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Nicolai von Ondarza

The Brexit negotiations constituted unchartered political and institutional territory for the European Union (EU). This analysis shows how a new institutional approach enabled the EU-27 to present an unusually united front. The “Barnier method” is characterised by five elements: a strong political mandate from the European Council, a single EU negotiator based in the European Commission in the person of Michel Barnier, very close coordination with the Member States and the European Parliament, and a high degree of transparency. Lessons can also be drawn from this for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations and the EU’s relations with other third countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Edoardo Bressanelli ◽  
Nicola Chelotti ◽  
Wilhelm Lehmann

Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the European Parliament (EP). The most direct consequence is the withdrawal of the 73-member strong UK contingent and the changing size of the political groups. Yet, the impact of Brexit is also felt in more oblique ways. Focussing on the role and influence of the EP in the EU–UK negotiations, and of the British delegation in the EP, this article shows that the process, and not just the outcome of Brexit, has significant organisational implications for the EP and its political groups. Moreover, it also showcases the importance of informal rules and norms of behaviour, which were affected by Brexit well ahead of any formal change to the UK status as a Member State. The EP and its leadership ensured the active involvement of the EP in the negotiating process—albeit in different ways for the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship—and sought to minimise the costs of Brexit, reducing the clout of British members particularly in the allocation of legislative reports.


Subject Proposed reform of the EU comitology procedure. Significance The little-known ‘comitology’ procedure plays a key role in EU regulation. In recent years, this process has been breaking down as member-state expert representatives in comitology committees often abstain from voting, forcing the European Commission to take controversial decisions on its own (and accept any blame for them). In response, the Commission has proposed reforms that would pressure member states to take a position on (and hence political ownership of) controversial regulatory decisions. Impacts Government representatives, interest-group representatives and corporate lobbyists will be most affected by comitology reform. Despite adding transparency and avoiding blame-shifting to Brussels, the reforms would probably not help the EU’s image with citizens. The European Parliament might demand -- as part of any final reform package -- an increase in its involvement in the comitology process.


IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-327
Author(s):  
Martin Selmayr

The executive of the European Union (EU) is currently led by two Presidents: the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council. This double Presidency is the result of a compromise between the supranational and the intergovernmental schools of thoughts at the European Convention 2002/2003. However, in practice, the interplay of the two Presidents and their competencies, which are not always clearly separated by the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, occasionally leads to inefficiencies or even conflict in the external representation of the EU. This is why former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed, on 13 September 2017, to merge the functions of the two Presidents by always electing the President of the Commission as President of the European Council. The article explains the rationale of the Juncker proposal, which has the potential to make the EU easier to understand for its citizens and more efficient geopolitically, while overcoming the artificial distinction between national and European interests in the leadership of the Union. The current debate about the future of the EU and its more effective positioning in global affairs appears to be a good moment to look again at the Juncker proposal, which could be implemented without the need to change the Treaties.


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