How Personal Theories of the Self Shape Beliefs about Personal Continuity and Transformative Experience

2020 ◽  
pp. 52-72
Author(s):  
Sarah Molouki ◽  
Stephanie Y. Chen ◽  
Oleg Urminsky ◽  
Daniel M. Bartels

This chapter summarizes experimental work exploring how individual beliefs about the personally disruptive character of transformative experiences are influenced by intuitive theories of what a self fundamentally is, at the current moment and over time. Judgments of disrupted personal identity are influenced by views of the causal centrality of a transformed trait to a person’s self-concept, with changes in more central features perceived as more disruptive to self-continuity. Furthermore, the type of change matters: unexpected or undesirable changes to personal features are viewed as more disruptive to self-continuity than changes that are consistent with a person’s expected developmental trajectory. The degree to which an individual considers a particular personal change to be disruptive will affect how he or she makes decisions about, reacts to, and copes with this experience.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Alexander Yudkin

For millennia, humans have sought out experiences that dissolve, transcend, or change their sense of self. Such experiences are frequently associated with participation in mass gatherings such as festivals or pilgrimages, and are thought to be epistemically and personally transformative. By weakening the boundary between the self and others, such transformative experiences may lead to enduring changes in moral orientation, such as increased generosity and an expanded circle of moral regard (“moral expansion”). Here we investigated the nature of transformative experiences and their prosocial correlates at multi-day mass gatherings by studying participants before (n = 600), during (n = 1,217), 0-4 weeks after (n = 1,866), and 6 months after (n = 710) they attended a variety of secular, multi-day mass gatherings in the US and UK. Transformative experiences at mass gatherings were self-reported as common, increased over time, and characterized by increased feelings of social connectedness. We observed high levels of generosity at mass gatherings, but generosity onsite was unrelated to transformative experience and did not increase over time. Meanwhile, participants’ moral circle expanded with every passing day spent at mass gatherings, an effect mediated by transformative experience and social connectedness. Immediately and six months following event attendance, self-reported transformative experience persisted and predicted both generosity and moral expansion. The nature of transformative experience and its prosocial correlates did not depend on whether event norms were communal or market-based. These findings characterize the psychological nature of transformative experience at secular mass gatherings and highlight how these experiences may be associated with lasting changes in moral orientation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 009365022199149
Author(s):  
Shan Xu ◽  
Zheng Wang

This study integrates the theory of multiple selves within the theoretical framework of dynamic motivational activation (DMA) to identify the dynamic patterns of multiple self-concepts (i.e., the potential self, the actual self) in multitasking (e.g., primary and secondary activities) in daily life. A three-week experience sampling study was conducted on college students. Dynamic panel modeling results suggest that the self-concepts are both sustaining and shifting in daily activities and media activities. Specifically, the potential and actual selves sustained themselves over time in primary and secondary activities, but they also shifted from one to another to achieve a balance in primary activities over time. Interestingly, secondary activities were not driven by the alternative self-concept in primary activities, but instead, by the emotional experiences of primary activities. Furthermore, the findings identified that multitasking to fulfill their actual self did not motivate people to re-prioritize their potential self later.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rina Saraswati ◽  
Nur Hasanah ◽  
Muhammad Basirun Al Ummah

Introduction: The self-concept is all thoughts, beliefs and faiths that make the person know about him and affect his contact with others. Usually self-concept of pulmonary tuberculosis patients is impaired resulting from physical changes such as becoming physically thinner, paler, frequent coughing, body weaknesses and decrease of physical ability. Based on preliminary studies on eight respondents 75% experiencing body image disorder, 75% self-ideal disorder, 100% self-role disorder, 50% self-esteem disorder.The aim of this researrch is to determine self-concept of pulmonary tuberculosis patients in PKU Muhammadiyah Hospital of Gombong.The present study used descriptive quantitative method with survey approach. The total samples were 31 people taken by purposive sampling technique. The data were taken by questionnaires and analyzed using univariate analysis.The frequency distribution based on the self-concept were less (83.9%), mediocre (9.7%), and good category (6.5%). The body image were less (83.9%), mediocre (9.7%), good (6.5%). The self-ideal were less (90.3%), and mediocre category (9.7%). Personal identity were less (58.1%), enough (22.6%), and good category (19.4%). The self-role were less (54.8%), good (25.8%), and mediocre category (19.4%). Self-esteem were less (51.6%), mediocre (32.3%), and good category (16.1%).The largest percentage of the self-concept, body image, self-ideal, personal identity, self-role, and self-esteem of pulmonary tuberculosis patients was less category. Keywords: self-concept, body image, self-ideal, personal identity, self-role, self-esteem, pulmonary tuberculosis patients 


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
SVEN NYHOLM ◽  
ELIZABETH O’NEILL

Abstract:One of the topics that often comes up in ethical discussions of deep brain stimulation (DBS) is the question of what impact DBS has, or might have, on the patient’s self. This is often understood as a question of whether DBS poses a threat to personal identity, which is typically understood as having to do with psychological and/or narrative continuity over time. In this article, we argue that the discussion of whether DBS is a threat to continuity over time is too narrow. There are other questions concerning DBS and the self that are overlooked in discussions exclusively focusing on psychological and/or narrative continuity. For example, it is also important to investigate whether DBS might sometimes have a positive (e.g., a rehabilitating) effect on the patient’s self. To widen the discussion of DBS, so as to make it encompass a broader range of considerations that bear on DBS’s impact on the self, we identify six features of the commonly used concept of a person’s “true self.” We apply these six features to the relation between DBS and the self. And we end with a brief discussion of the role DBS might play in treating otherwise treatment-refractory anorexia nervosa. This further highlights the importance of discussing both continuity over time and the notion of the true self.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 171-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine E. Amiot ◽  
Roxane de la Sablonniere ◽  
Laura G. E. Smith ◽  
Joanne R. Smith

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Giles

The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. One of the first Western thinkers to argue for the non-existence of the self was David Hume, the 18th century empiricist philosopher who argued that the self was a fiction. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive point of view of personal identity, and by approaching the problem in terms of phenomenology, Buddhist critiques of the notion of the self, and the idea of a constructed self-image. It is concluded that there is no such thing as the self.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyunji Kim ◽  
Arnd Florack

People construct self-representation beyond the experiential self and the self-concept can expand to interpersonal as well as intrapersonal dimensions. The cognitive ability to project oneself onto expanded selves in different time points and places plays a crucial role in planning and decision making situations. However, no research to date has shown evidence explaining the early mechanism of how processing the experiential self-information differs from processing the expanded self-information across temporal, social, spatial, and probability domains. We report novel effects showing a systematic information prioritization towards the experiential selves (i.e., The self that is now, here, and with highest certainty) compared to the expanded selves (i.e., The self that is in the future, at a distant location, and with lower certainty; Experiments 1a, 2, and 3). Implicit prioritization biases lasted over time (Experiment 1b; i.e., 4 months) indicating a trait-like more than a state-like measure of individual differences. Different biases, however, did not consistently correlate with each other (Experiments 1a to 3) suggesting separate underlying mechanisms. We discuss potential links to the basic structure of self-representation and individual differences for implications.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (10) ◽  
pp. 1398-1406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Y. Chen ◽  
Oleg Urminsky ◽  
Daniel M. Bartels

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