Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it

2021 ◽  
pp. 11-38
Author(s):  
John Broome
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Verb Phrase ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Popular View

Is there a fundamental feature of normativity, to which other features can be reduced? One defensible view is ‘reason fundamentalism’: that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person has reason to F. (‘F’ stands for any verb phrase, such as ‘run for the bus’ or ‘hope for relief’ or ‘believe Kampala is in Ghana’.) Another defensible view is ‘ought fundamentalism’: that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person ought to F. The popular view that the fundamental feature of normativity is the property of being a reason is not defensible, since that property can be reduced to either of the two relations I have just described. I argue that ought fundamentalism is more credible that reason fundamentalism because it is more faithful to our ordinary normative concepts.

Reason Fundamentalism and What Is Wrong With It

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Broome
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Verb Phrase ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Popular View

Is there a fundamental feature of normativity, to which other features can be reduced? One defensible view is that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person has reason to F. (“F” stands for any verb phrase, such as “run for the bus” or “hope for relief” or “believe Kampala is in Ghana.”) Another defensible view is that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person ought to F. The popular view that the fundamental feature of normativity is the property of being a reason is not defensible, since that property can be reduced to either of the two relations I described. I argue that the second of these views—“ought fundamentalism”—is more credible that the first—“reason fundamentalism”—because it is more faithful to our ordinary normative concepts.

Social Capital and the Demand for Regulation in Russia

2014 ◽  
pp. 77-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Menyashev
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Russian Regions ◽  
Strong State ◽  
Popular View

There is a popular view in Russian studies arguing that underdevelopment of Russian civil society is partly responsible for the failure of liberal idea in Russia. Fragmented society sees no alternative to massive government regulation, that is why support of strong state is so high. If this logic is true, the differences in civicness across urban societies should show up in liberal parties support. This paper estimates this effect using social capital framework and drawing upon the data from Russian regions.

A Realist Perspective on Contemporary "Economic Theory" (Foreword by O. Ananyin)

2006 ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Life Events ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Social Phenomenon ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Neoclassical Theory ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Realist Perspective

The author elaborates on methodological issues of current tendencies in neoclassical theory and demonstrates the necessity of an alternative model of science, which he calls "realist". According to this perspective, constant and regular conjunctions of economic life events should not be the main object of analysis. Rather, the author proposes to consider structures and mechanisms governing events in question. Instead of deductivism, which, as Lawson believes, is a fundamental feature of orthodox economics, the abductive method of economic explanation is proposed that entails investigation of major powers, on which any social phenomenon depends. Society is thereby regarded not as a closed, but rather as an open system.

A Code Mixing Analysis of Javanese Community at Karang Anyar

Metahumaniora ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Merina Devira
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrase ◽  
Verb Phrase ◽  
Code Mixing ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Syntactic Pattern ◽  
The Subject

ABSTRAKTujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menggambarkan tentang faktor-faktor yangmempengaruhi penggunaan code mixing pada komunitas suku Jawa di desa Karang Anyar,Langsa, serta untuk menjelaskan pola sintaks yang terbentuk pada percakapan code mixingtersebut melalui diagaram pohon. Untuk mengumpulkan data, penelitian ini menggunakantiga metode: observasi, rekaman, dan wawancara. Subjek penelitian ini adalah 15 orangbersuku Jawa yang berumur 20-60 tahun. Data dalam penelitian ini adalah rekaman wawancarapara subjek dan rekaman percakapan para subjek yang terdapat tuturan code mixing. Hasildari penelitian ini menunjukkan tentang faktor yang mempengaruhi code mixing di desatersebut dan pola sintaks pada percakapan komunitas Jawa yang mengandung code mixingdalam hal penggunaan fase kata kerja, kata benda, kata bantu, dan kata seru.Kata kunci: code mixing, analisis, komunitas suku Jawa, pola sintaksABSTRACTThe aims of this research are to describe the factors influencing the use of code mixingin the Javanese community at Karang Anyar Village, Langsa, then to describe the syntacticpatterns in the code mixing of conversations uttered in that community by using a treediagram. To collect data, this study used three methods: observation, recording, and interviewmethod. The subjects of this study are 15 people of Javanese community aged 20-60 yearsold. The data in this research are the subject interview recordings and the subjects speechJavanese community at Karang Anyar Village Langsa in which code mixing are found. Theresult of this study showed two findings about the factors influencing the use of code mixing inthe Javanese community and the syntactic pattern in the conversation of Javanese communityin terms of the use of verb phrase (VP), noun phrase (NP), auxiliary, and interjection.Keywords: A Code Mixing, Analysis, Javanese Community, Syntactic Pattern

A ciência e a superação das desigualdades

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-74
Author(s):  
Galileu Galilei Medeiros de Souza
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Rio De Janeiro ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Sao Paulo ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
São Paulo ◽  
Isaac Newton ◽  
Positive Science ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Science Philosophy

Resumo: O artigo é um ensaio sobre como a atividade científica poderia ser influenciada por uma proposta ética voltada para a superação das desigualdades. A questão subjacente a este estudo tematiza a possível contraposição entre a ética, que parece ser inteiramente vinculada à liberdade humana e seus processos de escolha, e a lógica da pesquisa científica, que ainda, pelo menos em visão popular, parece se basear na posse de informações objetivas e na descoberta de leis de regulação da natureza. Será feita uma breve contextualização das aquisições teóricas sobre o sentido da ciência positiva dos últimos séculos, procurando extrair daí as indicações de uma estreita dependência dessa em relação às escolhas humanas, em virtude de sua metodologia dialética.   Palavras-Chave: Ciência positiva. Filosofia da ciência. Dialética. Ética.      Abstract: The article is an essay on how scientific activity could be influenced by an ethics proposal aimed at overcoming inequalities. The question underlying this study discusses the possible contrast between ethics, which seems to be entirely linked to human freedom and choice processes, and the logic of scientific research, which still, at least in a popular view, seems to be based on possession of objective information and discovery of regulatory laws of nature. Will be presented a brief background of theoretical acquisitions on the meaning of positive science of the last centuries, looking to extract the indications of a close dependence of this in relation to human choices, because your dialectic methodology.  Keywords: Positive Science. Philosophy of Science. Dialectic. Ethics. REFERÊNCIASARISTÓTELES, Tópicos. In: _______. Órganon. 2.ed. São Paulo: EDIPRO, 2010, p. 347-543.BLONDEL, M. L’Action (1893): essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une science de la pratique, Paris: Quadrige, 1993.CARNAP, R. A superação da metafísica por meio da análise lógica da linguagem. In: Cognitio, São Paulo, v. 10, n. 2, jul./dez. 2009, p. 293-309.DESCARTES, R. Discurso do Método. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001.DILTHEY, W. Introdução às ciências humanas. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010.FANNING, P. A. Isaac Newton e a transmutação da alquimia: uma visão alternativa da revolução científica. Balneário Camboriú (SC): Livraria Danúbio, 2016.GALILEI, G. Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Galileo Galilei. Antonio Favaro (ed.) Florença: Barbéra, 1928-38, 19 Vols.HESSE, Mary. Revolutions and Reconstruction in Philosophy of Science. Brighton, 1980.HUME, D. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano. In: BERKELEY, G.; HUME, D. Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano; Três diálogos entre Hilas e Filonous em oposição aos Céticos e Ateus; Investigação sobre o entendimento humano; Ensaios morais, políticos e literários. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.KUHN, T. La strututtura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche. Torino: [s.n], 1978.LEVINAS, E. Totalité et Infini. [sl]: The Hague, 1971.MACINTYRE, A. Dopo la virtù: Saggio di teoria morale. Milano: Feltrino, 1988.NEIMAN, S. O mal no pensamento moderno: uma história alternativa da filosofia. Rio de Janeiro: DIFEL, 2003.NIETZSCHE, F. Assim falou Zaratustra. 2.ed., Petrópolis: Vozes, 2008.ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. O que é Filosofia? Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2016.PAGANI, S.M.; Luciani, A. (org.) Os Documentos do Processo de Galileu Galilei. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994.PLATÃO. Teeteto. Tradução de Edson Bini, Bauru/SP: EDIPRO, 2007.POPPER. K. A lógica da descoberta científica. São Paulo: Cultrix, 2001.WHITE, M. O grande livro das coisas horríveis: a crônica definitiva da história das 100 piores atrocidades. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2013. 

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Chodat
Keyword(s):  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Focused Attention ◽  
Literary Works ◽  
High Modernism ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Unique Experience

Literary works since the rise of high modernism have been intensely hostile to abstract generalization, and have focused attention on the unique experience and singular expression. This nominalist impulse—summed up in the cry “show, don’t tell!”—has encouraged a deep wariness toward broad normative concepts: “good,” “bad,” “courage,” “justice,” etc. More than is often recognized, however, this literary skepticism parallels the skepticism toward such concepts in the natural sciences, which accords no place to such abstract “high words” in a world of matter and calculable motions. Against this dual literary and scientific inheritance, the postwar sage offers a “weak realism” about normative concepts and a “reflective” mode of composition: a movement between the particular and the general, art and argument. Such a literary–intellectual project is risky, and opens the sage to charges of sentimentalism. Closely attending to their works, however, suggests that we should avoid entering this protest too quickly.

Normative Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matti Eklund
Keyword(s):  
Positive Answer ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is that a concept is normative if it is in the right way associated with a normative use. Among issues discussed along the way are the nature of analyticity, and there being a notion of analyticity—what I call semantic analyticity—such that a statement can be analytic in this sense while failing to be true. Considerations regarding thick concepts and slurs are brought to bear on the issues that come up.

Nietzsche’s Mountain

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Normative Beliefs ◽  
Normative Concepts

This chapter discusses the convergence claim. This claim argues that, if everyone knew all of the relevant non-normative facts, used the same normative concepts, understood and carefully reflected on the relevant arguments, and was not affected by any distorting influence, we would nearly all have similar normative beliefs. It also discusses some counterpoints to attempts to reconcile some of Friedrich Nietzsche's claims with what most of us believe. Though Nietzsche sometimes denies that suffering is in itself bad, and even suggests that suffering may be in itself good, that was not, in most of his life, what Nietzsche believed. The chapter goes on to discuss further arguments for and against the Convergence Claim.

Essentialism and Logical Consequence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosanna Keefe ◽  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Popular View

According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the essences of logical entities. One might be tempted to extend the view further in using it to tackle fundamental questions surrounding logical consequence. This chapter enquires: how does a view according to which the facts about logical consequence are determined by the essences of logical entities look in detail? Are there any more or less obvious problems arising for such a view? The chapter uncovers a prima facie result in favour of logical pluralism. However, it then goes on to raise some concerns for this result. It argues that, considered generally, it is difficult to see how essence could do all of the requisite work alone. The chapter also shows how considering things from the perspective of disputes between particular rival logics makes an interesting and important difference to the picture of things presented by the essentialist account.

The Value of Rationality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Substantive Theory ◽  
Normative Concept ◽  
Normative Concepts

Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values. Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good. Specifically, rationality is a virtue, while irrationality is a vice. What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational.

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