Magnitudes

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-71
Author(s):  
Christopher Peacocke
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Seven Principles ◽  
Analogue Computation ◽  
Scientific Laws

A new realistic account of an ontology of extensive magnitudes is developed, formulated in Seven Principles. The principles are defended by the role of magnitudes in scientific explanation and in counterfactuals. Scientific laws can be formulated using this ontology of magnitudes. A metaphysics-first view of the perception of magnitudes is then defended by using this metaphysics of magnitudes. The metaphysics-first treatment permits explanation of features of the perception of extensive magnitudes. Notions of analogue computation, analogue representation, and analogue content are explained using this apparatus. Deployment of the resulting theory allows the development, against Kuhn, of a case for the objectivity of analogue perceptual content.

In Defense of Perceptual Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Schellenberg
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Relational Understanding ◽  
The Way

Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content. The chapter shows that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with representationalism. Most objections to the thesis that perceptual experience has representational content apply only to austere representationalist accounts, that is, accounts on which perceptual relations to the environment play no explanatory role. By arguing that perceptual relations and perceptual content are mutually dependent the chapter shows how Fregean particularism can avoid the pitfalls of both austere representationalism and austere relationalism. With relationalists, Fregean particularism argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.

Faith and Science in Russian Literature

2019 ◽  
pp. 59-72
Author(s):  
Teresa Obolevitch
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Russian Literature ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Lev Tolstoy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Spiritual Unity

Chapter 6 shows the presence of the topic of the relationship between faith and science in the thought of the most influential literature figures, such as Fedor Dostoevsky and Lev Tolstoy. Although Dostoevsky stressed the role of faith, his account by no means was a mere fideism. Dostoevsky respected natural science, even if he definitively marked the limits of the scientific explanation. Hence, he strove for an integral attitude embracing faith and reason in a single spiritual unity. By contrast, Lev Tolstoy was concerned about the absolute comprehensibility and rational obviousness of Christian truths, yet denied the significance of natural science.

scholarly journals La función explicativa de los modelos en biología

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Diéguez
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Scientific Explanations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Scientific Laws

RESUMENLos modelos científicos son recursos explicativos fundamentales en la ciencia, y particularmente en aquellas ciencias en las que es dudoso que podamos contar con leyes científicas genuinas, como es el caso de la biología (y de las ciencias sociales). La cuestión de cómo explican los modelos ha despertado una gran atención en las últimas décadas y, sin embargo, sigue siendo una cuestión controvertida. Hay muchos tipos de modelos y no es de extrañar, por tanto, que puedan proporcionar explicaciones de los fenómenos de formas muy diversas. Si se puede señalar un rasgo común a todos estos modos diferentes de explicar, es el hecho de que los modelos nos ofrecen una mejor comprensión de los fenómenos. Se argumenta en este trabajo que la noción de ‘comprensión’ aquí implicada no es irremediablemente subjetiva.PALABRAS CLAVEMODELOS BIOLÓGICOS, EXPLICACIÓN CIENTÍFICA, COMPRENSIÓN, LEYES CIENTÍFICASABSTRACTScientific models are basic explanatory resources in science. This explanatory function is especially relevant in biology and social sciences, where it is doubtful the existence of genuine scientific laws. How models can provide scientific explanations has been a widely debated issue in the past decades, but in spite of this fact it remains as a controversial one. There are many kinds of models in biology, so it is not surprising that they provide scientific explanations of phenomena in very different ways. A possible common feature among this diversity is the fact that models give us a better understanding of phenomena. It is argued in this paper that the notion of ‘understanding’ is not irremediably subjective.KEYWORDSBIOLOGICAL MODELS, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION, UNDERSTANDING, SCIENTIFIC LAWS

scholarly journals The Role of Mathematical Tools in Scientific Phenomenon Explanation – A Guarantee of Reliability or a Pillar of False Credibility?

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Drekalović
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Special Position ◽  
Social Sciences And Humanities ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Scientific Phenomenon

Ever since its beginnings, mathematics has occupied a special position among all sciences, natural, as well as social sciences and humanities. It has not only provided a role model in terms of methodology, particularly when it comes to natural sciences, but other sciences have always relied on mathematics extensively both in their development and for solving various open questions. The beginning of the 21st century foregrounded the issue of the so-called explanatory role of mathematics in science. However, the reference literature features only a few examples as illustration of this role. This paper aims at showing that those examples, even though they are used for illustrating precisely the same purpose, also illustrate various explanatory scopes which mathematical tools can reach within a scientific explanation. Some of these examples also show how mathematics, unfortunately, provides false credibility to scientific explanations.

scholarly journals Use of Stylistic Coloring in Literary Text (Based on Works A. Osmonov)

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-621
Author(s):  
Z. Alymbaeva ◽  
N. Baizakova
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Literary Text

This research has aim to determine the nature of stylistic means in texts of outstanding poet A. Osmonov give a scientific explanation of the features and essence, value, place and role of language tools with stylistic coloring.

scholarly journals Should a few null findings falsify prefrontal theories of conscious perception?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Odegaard ◽  
Robert T. Knight ◽  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Essential Role ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Subjective Perception ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Visual Tasks ◽  
Common Misconceptions ◽  
Limited Sensitivity

AbstractIs activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC) critical for conscious perception? Major theories of consciousness make distinct predictions about the role of PFC, providing an opportunity to arbitrate between these views empirically. Here we address three common misconceptions: i) PFC lesions do not affect subjective perception; ii) PFC activity does not reflect specific perceptual content; iii) PFC involvement in studies of perceptual awareness is solely driven by the need to make reports required by the experimental tasks, rather than subjective experience per se. These claims are incompatible with empirical findings, unless one focuses only on studies using methods with limited sensitivity. The literature highlights PFC’s essential role in enabling the subjective experience in perception, contra the objective capacity to perform visual tasks; conflating the two can also be a source of confusion.

Direct Realism and the Extended Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Cognitive Representation ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
The World

Representationalism rightly treats perception as a type of cognitive representation. However, it wrongly proposes that perceptual content determines phenomenal character. Rather, it is the form, not the content, of a perceptual representation that constitutes phenomenal character. For direct realism is true: Perception is that form of cognition in which representation and represented are the same. Other forms of cognition recruit representations that are distinct from what they represent. In contrast, perceptual representation extends the mind's reach into the world by casting the very object perceived in the role of a self-referential demonstrative. By fusing representation and represented perception provides direct acquaintance with what is seen exactly as it is seen to be and thus determines phenomenal character.

Scientific Explanation

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Skow
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Causal Theories

This chapter argues that the notion of explanation relevant to the philosophy of science is that of an answer to a why-question. From this point of view it surveys most of the historically important theories of explanation. Hempel’s deductive-nomological, and inductive-statistical, models of explanation required explanations to cite laws. Familiar counterexamples to these models suggested that laws are not needed, and instead that explanations should cite causes. One theory of causal explanation, David Lewis’s, is discussed in some detail. Many philosophers now reject causal theories of explanation because they think that there are non-causal explanations; some examples are reviewed. The role of probabilities and statistics in explanation, and their relation to causation, is also discussed. Another strategy for dealing with counterexamples to Hempel’s theory leads to unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher's unificationist theory is presented, and a new argument against unificationist theories is offered. Also discussed in some detail are Van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory, and Streven’s and Woodward’s recent theories of causal explanation.

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