Usage, structure, scientific explanation, and the role of abstraction, by linguists and by language users

2010 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation

Faith and Science in Russian Literature

2019 ◽  
pp. 59-72
Author(s):  
Teresa Obolevitch
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Russian Literature ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Lev Tolstoy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Spiritual Unity

Chapter 6 shows the presence of the topic of the relationship between faith and science in the thought of the most influential literature figures, such as Fedor Dostoevsky and Lev Tolstoy. Although Dostoevsky stressed the role of faith, his account by no means was a mere fideism. Dostoevsky respected natural science, even if he definitively marked the limits of the scientific explanation. Hence, he strove for an integral attitude embracing faith and reason in a single spiritual unity. By contrast, Lev Tolstoy was concerned about the absolute comprehensibility and rational obviousness of Christian truths, yet denied the significance of natural science.

scholarly journals The Role of Mathematical Tools in Scientific Phenomenon Explanation – A Guarantee of Reliability or a Pillar of False Credibility?

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Drekalović
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Special Position ◽  
Social Sciences And Humanities ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Scientific Phenomenon

Ever since its beginnings, mathematics has occupied a special position among all sciences, natural, as well as social sciences and humanities. It has not only provided a role model in terms of methodology, particularly when it comes to natural sciences, but other sciences have always relied on mathematics extensively both in their development and for solving various open questions. The beginning of the 21st century foregrounded the issue of the so-called explanatory role of mathematics in science. However, the reference literature features only a few examples as illustration of this role. This paper aims at showing that those examples, even though they are used for illustrating precisely the same purpose, also illustrate various explanatory scopes which mathematical tools can reach within a scientific explanation. Some of these examples also show how mathematics, unfortunately, provides false credibility to scientific explanations.

scholarly journals Use of Stylistic Coloring in Literary Text (Based on Works A. Osmonov)

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-621
Author(s):  
Z. Alymbaeva ◽  
N. Baizakova
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Literary Text

This research has aim to determine the nature of stylistic means in texts of outstanding poet A. Osmonov give a scientific explanation of the features and essence, value, place and role of language tools with stylistic coloring.

Scientific Explanation

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Skow
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Causal Theories

This chapter argues that the notion of explanation relevant to the philosophy of science is that of an answer to a why-question. From this point of view it surveys most of the historically important theories of explanation. Hempel’s deductive-nomological, and inductive-statistical, models of explanation required explanations to cite laws. Familiar counterexamples to these models suggested that laws are not needed, and instead that explanations should cite causes. One theory of causal explanation, David Lewis’s, is discussed in some detail. Many philosophers now reject causal theories of explanation because they think that there are non-causal explanations; some examples are reviewed. The role of probabilities and statistics in explanation, and their relation to causation, is also discussed. Another strategy for dealing with counterexamples to Hempel’s theory leads to unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher's unificationist theory is presented, and a new argument against unificationist theories is offered. Also discussed in some detail are Van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory, and Streven’s and Woodward’s recent theories of causal explanation.

scholarly journals Does Philosophy Require De-Transcendentalization? Habermas, Apel, and the Role of Transcendentals in Philosophical Discourse and Social-Scientific Explanation

2019 ◽  
pp. 11-30
Author(s):  
Anna Michalska
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Communicative Action ◽  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Social Actions ◽  
Validity Claims ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Mutual Action ◽  
The Ideal

The heritage of transcendental philosophy, and more specifically its viability when it comes to the problematic of the philosophy of social sciences, has been a key point of dissensus between Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. Whereas Apel has explicitly aimed at a transcendental-pragmatic transformation of philosophy, Habermas has consequently insisted that his formal pragmatics, and the theory of communicative action which is erected upon it, radically de-transcendentalizes the subject. In a word, the disagreement concerns whether transcendental entities have any substantial role to play in philosophical discourse and social-scientific explanations. My aim is to reconstruct how Apel establishes a connection between transcendentals, qua the ideal communicative community and the possibility of non-objectifying self-reflection. As I shall demonstrate, the principles that transcendental pragmatics sees as underlying social actions are not to be understood in a strictly judicial way, as “supernorms.” Rather, they should be conceptualized and used as a means for action regulation and mutual action coordination. Against this backdrop, I show that the concept of the ideal community provides the necessary underpinnings for Habermas’ schema of validity claims and the project of reconstructive sciences.

scholarly journals Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing ultimate questions

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-228
Author(s):  
Javad Darvish Aghajani ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
Natural Event ◽  
Full Explanation ◽  
Ultimate Question ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
First Time ◽  
Theory Ladenness

A typical scientist has no responsibility other than to explain how a natural event occurred. However, when a philosopher asks about the conditions under which a scientist’s explanation is true, he is, in fact, raising an ultimate question, the concept which Karl Popper used for the first time. Answering this question requires that no elements are neglected in the explanation, and no significant factors in the explanation are overlooked. In other words, in explainingphenomenon, at any level of its explanation, there should be no remainder. These requirements can be achieved through the full explanation. In the present article, by drawing on concepts such as theory-ladenness of observation, underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the role of models and metaphors in developing a scientific theory, it is illustrated thatcomplete explanation includes both a scientific explanation and personal explanation. A personal explanation comprises mental properties such as belief, desire, and intention, which are irreducible to physical properties. Therefore, we cannot provide a personal explanation while restricting ourselves to scientific methods. Consequently, it is argued in this article first, the personal explanation is irreducible to a scientific explanation. Second, the personal explanation is inevitable in order to provide a full explanation. Third, (methodological) naturalists claim that the ultimate judgment of what is natural and unnatural is possible only by scientific inquiry. Finally, accepting these three premises entails the inability of a naturalist to answer ultimate questions.

scholarly journals The Philosophy of Science

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Research Area ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Current State ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Common Vision

Philosophy of science studies the methods, theories, and concepts used by scientists. It mainly developed as a field in its own right during the twentieth century and is now a diversified and lively research area. This book surveys the current state of the discipline by focusing on central themes such as confirmation of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanation, causality, the relationship between science and metaphysics, scientific change, the relationship between philosophy of science and science studies, the role of theories and models, and unity of science. These themes define general philosophy of science. The book also presents subdisciplines in the philosophy of science dealing with the main sciences: logic, mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, cognitive science, linguistics, social sciences, and economics. Although it is common to address the specific philosophical problems raised by physics and biology in such a book, the place assigned to the philosophy of special sciences is much more unusual. Most authors collaborate on a regular basis in their research or teaching and share a common vision of philosophy of science and its place within philosophy and academia in general. The chapters have been written in close accordance with the three editors, thus achieving strong unity of style and tone.

Magnitudes

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-71
Author(s):  
Christopher Peacocke
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Seven Principles ◽  
Analogue Computation ◽  
Scientific Laws

A new realistic account of an ontology of extensive magnitudes is developed, formulated in Seven Principles. The principles are defended by the role of magnitudes in scientific explanation and in counterfactuals. Scientific laws can be formulated using this ontology of magnitudes. A metaphysics-first view of the perception of magnitudes is then defended by using this metaphysics of magnitudes. The metaphysics-first treatment permits explanation of features of the perception of extensive magnitudes. Notions of analogue computation, analogue representation, and analogue content are explained using this apparatus. Deployment of the resulting theory allows the development, against Kuhn, of a case for the objectivity of analogue perceptual content.

The Oxford Handbook of Schopenhauer

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Visual Arts ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Aesthetic Experience ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
The Sublime ◽  
Central Claim

This collection of thirty-one essays written by contemporary Schopenhauer scholars has six sections: (1) Influences on Schopenhauer, (2) Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics of Will and Empirical Knowledge, (3) Aesthetic Experience, Music, and the Sublime, (4) Human Meaning, Politics, and Morality, (5) Religion and Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, and (6) Schopenhauer’s Influence. Some of the issues addressed concern the extent to which Schopenhauer adopted ideas from his predecessors versus how much was original and visionary in his central claim that reality is a blind, senseless “will,” the effectiveness of his philosophy in the field of scientific explanation and extrasensory phenomena, the role of beauty and sublimity in his outlook, the fundamental role of compassion in his moral theory, the Hindu, Christian, and Buddhistic aspects of his philosophy, the importance of asceticism in his views on how best to live, how pessimism and optimism should be understood, and his impact on psychoanalysis, as well as upon music, the visual arts, and literature. The collection is an internationally constituted work that reflects upon Schopenhauer’s philosophy with authors from a variety of backgrounds, presently working in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, England, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Scotland, Spain, and the United States.

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