The United States of America

Author(s):  
Peter Dombrowski ◽  
Simon Reich

The study of American grand strategy is dominated by historians who describe former grand strategies, and international relations scholars who prescribe what it should be. In contrast to either approach, this chapter has three components: First, it identifies the national cultural influences, the key elements of the mythic “American Creed,” that provide the emblematic foundations of contemporary American grand strategy. Second, it describes the historical evolution of the institutional mechanisms that both formulate and implement American grand strategy, and how those institutions actually operate in the modern era. And third, relating these elements, it explains the parameters of American grand strategic planning—how it operates in practice. This includes an overt reliance on military instruments and a conscious sensitivity to field conditions in implementation that may undermine the most grand strategic designs. The chapter concludes by contemplating the prospects for continuity and change in American grand strategy.

Author(s):  
Fredrik Logevall

This chapter assesses how grand American grand strategy has been. If the containment followed by the United States in the Cold War is the most successful, or at least most celebrated, grand strategy the United States has ever pursued, it is worthy of a closer look. This chapter considers two foundational writings from the early Cold War: George Kennan's “X” Article, published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 (under the pseudonym “X”), which laid out the containment policy—that is to say, the containment of Soviet power—and National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) of April 1950. Both of these documents are held to have played major roles in shaping the grand strategy that helped the United States deal successfully with the Soviet threat and ultimately win the Cold War. Each has indeed been referred to as the “blueprint” for US policy in the struggle. The chapter then addresses a second question: How much does grand strategy matter in the context of American history? History suggests that grand strategies do not alter the trajectory of great-power politics all that much. In the case of the United States, even radically imperfect strategies have not fundamentally affected its rise and fall.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (58) ◽  
pp. 544
Author(s):  
Manoel De Queiroz Pereira CALÇAS ◽  
Ruth Maria Junqueira De Andrade Pereira e SILVA ◽  
Thiago Munaro GARCIA

RESUMO Objetivo: O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a propositura da identificação de critérios objetivos de fixação da remuneração judicial; traçar uma evolução histórica do conceito de empresa, relacionando a distinção entre o papel do antigo síndico e a figura do administrador judicial; pesquisar os parâmetros da legislação brasileira, acompanhado da posterior referência ao direito estrangeiro e analisar casos brasileiros e a inconstância dos valores fixados a título de remuneração. Metodologia: A metodologia eleita seguiu uma abordagem indutiva por meio de um procedimento histórico, monográfico e comparativo, por meio do qual buscou-se analisar a legislação adotada pela Colômbia, Itália, França e Estados Unidos da América para refletir-se sobre a necessidade de adotar parâmetros mais específicos no que concerne à justa e adequada fixação da remuneração do administrador judicial na recuperação judicial. Resultados: Considerando o levantamento dos dados em torno da problemática sugerida neste artigo, a fixação da remuneração do administrador deve seguir critérios objetivos de modo a viabilizar a função social da empresa e o soerguimento desta, sem que ocorra o enriquecimento sem causa do auxiliar da Justiça. Contribuições: A principal contribuição deste estudo reside no apontamento de soluções que reflitam diretamente na manutenção dos empregos dos trabalhadores, protegendo-se os interesses dos credores, de modo a preservar a empresa e sua função social, além de promover o estímulo à atividade econômica. Palavras-chave: Recuperação judicial; falência; administrador; remuneração; razoabilidade. ABSTRACT Objective: To analyze the proposal for the identification of an objective criteria for setting judicial compensation; to trace a historical evolution of the company concept, relating the distinction between the role of the former liquidator and the figure of the judicial administrator; to research the parameters of Brazilian law accompanied by the subsequent reference to foreign law; and to analyze Brazilian cases and the inconsistency of the values set as compensation. Methodology:The chosen methodology followed an inductive approach by way of a historical, monographic and comparative procedure searching to analyze the legislation adopted by Colombia, Italy, France and the United States of America to reflect on the need to adopt parameters more specific regarding the fair and adequate setting of the compensation of the judicial administrator in the judicial recovery. Results: Considering the data survey on the issues suggested in this paper, the setting of the administrator's compensation must follow objective criteria in order to make the company's social function and uplift without the unjust enrichment of the Justice assistant. Contributions: The main contribution of this study lies in pointing out solutions that directly reflect the maintenance of workers' jobs and protect the interests of creditors in order to preserve the company and its social function, in addition to promoting the stimulus to economic activity. Keywords: Judicial reorganization; bankruptcy; administrator; compensation; reasonability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-127
Author(s):  
Tiago de Melo Cartaxo

Abstract Canada and the United States of America are examples of how two constitutional systems in the same region may adopt substantially different solutions in respect of the powers of the head of state. While the United States Founding Fathers opted to follow a republican and presidential path, the Canadian constitutional system developed a framework under the British monarchic background, in part as a rejection of their neighbour country’s federal and constitutional choices. This article proceeds with a comparison between both systems of Northern America, demonstrating that the powers of heads of state may vary, even between countries which were historically influenced by the same constitutional and democratic traditions, but, as a result of a multitude of historical and cultural influences, decided to follow different constitutional pathways.


2021 ◽  
pp. 538-555
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

Is the United States in the midst of a massive grand-strategic reorientation? IR scholarship cannot provide a definitive answer because the sources of grand-strategic change remain poorly understood. This chapter highlights the deficiencies of the existing literature and proposes a new framework for conceiving of and operationalizing grand strategy. This framework distinguishes between two levels of grand strategy. The first level is a state’s orientation toward the international system, while the second level examines subordinate levels of foreign policy behavior: assumptions about current and prospective threats and opportunities, and the availability and relative utility of the tools of national power. The chapter then illustrates how this framework advances the debate about grand-strategic change by setting up a distinction between grand-strategic overhauls (changes to grand strategy’s first level—or changes between grand strategies) and grand-strategic adjustments (changes to grand strategy’s second level—or changes within grand strategies). Theoretically, this distinction illuminates systemic shifts as a necessary but insufficient cause of overhaul, whereas adjustment results from more diverse causes. Empirically, this distinction permits a more nuanced treatment of the co-occurrence of continuity and change, as demonstrated in the chapter’s case study of US grand strategy in the early 1990s. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the implications for the future course of US grand strategy.


Author(s):  
David Milne

This chapter investigates the most ascendant ideas at work in America's rise to become a global power and then a superpower after the end of World War I. Segmenting US foreign policy since 1919 by “grand strategy” would seem to require grand simplification. Even those administrations commonly identified as practicing quintessential grand strategy appear more inchoate when approached from the protagonists’ perspectives at the time. To give one such example, the sequence of foreign policy innovations that the United States spearheaded from 1945 to 1949 were collectively possessed of considerable foresight. But they were also a series of strategies advocated by various actors at different times with motives that do not necessarily reduce to a mono-strategic essence. Even in regard to post-1945 US foreign policy, a period that has been sub-divided by many distinguished scholars, it is difficult to identify clearly demarcated grand strategies that provide overarching clarity. The chapter focuses on the ascendant ideas that have informed policymaking, shaped public discourse, forced other ideas into decline, and that can perhaps even be identified as “representative” of particular eras.


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (04) ◽  
pp. 9-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Porter

Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War? Despite shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the costs of the war in Iraq—circumstances that ought to have stimulated at least a revision—the United States remains committed to a grand strategy of “primacy.” It strives for military preponderance, dominance in key regions, the containment and reassurance of allies, nuclear counterproliferation, and the economic “Open Door.” The habitual ideas of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, or the “Blob,” make U.S. grand strategy hard to change. The United States' military and economic capabilities enable the U.S. government to pursue primacy, but the embedded assumptions of the Blob make primacy the seemingly natural choice. Thanks to the Blob's constraining power, alternative grand strategies based on restraint and retrenchment are hardly entertained, and debate is narrowed mostly into questions of execution and implementation. Two cases—the presidency of Bill Clinton and the first year of the presidency of Donald Trump—demonstrate this argument. In each case, candidates promising change were elected in fluid conditions that we would expect to stimulate a reevaluation of the United States' commitments. In each case, the Blob asserted itself successfully, at least on the grand strategic fundamentals. Change in grand strategy is possible, but it would require shocks large enough to shake the assumptions of the status quo and a president willing to be an agent of change and prepared to absorb the political costs of overhauling Washington's traditional design.


2020 ◽  
pp. 37-60
Author(s):  
Chas W. Freeman

This chapter focuses on the People’s Republic of China’s “grand strategy” in world affairs. Grand strategiy, for all powers, is rooted in the nation’s past and its historical evolution. As such, this chapter traces the various historical and cultural sources of China’s contemporary approach to the world. It argues that China has a deep sense of greatness—but also wounded pride. In particular, different sources of China’s traditions, encounters with the West, border insecurities, and preoccupation with the United States. The author argues that China’s relations with the United States are reaching a critical, and dangerous, point.


2021 ◽  
pp. 619-636
Author(s):  
Peter Dombrowski

The other contributions in this volume take seriously the proposition that having a universal grand strategy is essential for a great power. This chapter considers three alternative propositions: (1) that in many cases grand strategy in a classic sense is not achievable given bureaucratic and political impediments, (2) that all great powers do not require a grand strategy, and, (3) that under some circumstances, the great power can thrive by pursuing calibrated grand strategies depending on both region and threats. The first proposition will build upon the work of scholars (Jervis 1998; Metz 1997) who have argued that the United States and other countries often “muddle through” both strategic formulation and implementation. The second considers arguments about the process of developing grand strategies, such as those advanced by Ionut Popescu (2017) who advocate focusing on “emergent strategies” as understood by scholars studying business corporations. The final proposal builds upon my own research (Reich and Dombrowski 2018) that argues that it is impossible to implement one coherent grand strategy: there are six variants and the United States has inevitably pursued many if not all of them simultaneously in the post–Cold War era. Inverting top-down formulations, the choice of any one strategy in a theater of (potential) conflict is contingent upon the nature of the threat, the actors, and the potential conflicts as interpreted by senior political and military leaders, and the bureaucratic environment in which they operate. In the end, this chapter offers both conceptual and substantive challenges to traditional understandings of grand strategy.


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