Rehabilitation

2019 ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

This chapter returns to the question who invented what in central banking. The review confirms broader and earlier origins of central banking, with particularly the early banks in Barcelona, Genoa, Naples, Venice, Amsterdam, and Hamburg having all made major contributions and actually having developed all central bank operations that would prevail until the early twentieth century (except discounting trade bills). The Bank of England invented the private ownership model based on a joint stock company, which became the template for most central bank creations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but has been considered outdated since the mid twentieth century. Moreover, it had the largest balance sheet amongst all central banks in the eighteenth century. The chapter ends with a list of 15 major current central bank topics which all can be traced back to before 1800, showing how relevant the study of early central banking remains.

2019 ◽  
pp. 155-171
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

This chapter summarizes the roles of the various central bank operations in the pre-1800 world, what one can conclude on the overall economics and business model of early central banking, and what this implies in terms of overall balance sheet and risk management approach. The ‘alchemical quest’ of early central banking included in particular the universal challenge of bank balance sheet management to achieve significant liquidity, maturity, and credit transformation while preserving bank funding stability also in future stress situations at a high level of confidence. Section 6.1 reviews again in one context the key balance sheet positions of early central banks and the associated economic functions and market operations. Section 6.2 systematically compares the operations of the major early central banks and reviews their balance sheet structures and relative sizes.


2019 ◽  
pp. 108-135
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

This chapter recalls the economic rationale of central bank lending to private borrowers (Section 4.1) and argues that the recent literature has often underestimated the importance of such lending by early central banks, without this implying that central banks were really competing with ‘commercial’ banks (Section 4.2). Finally, it illustrates pre-eighteenth-century awareness of the subject by reviewing the literature of the time (Section 4.3). Lending of central banks to private borrowers had a number of advantages relevant as of the first centuries of central banking: (1) providing an option for granular asset diversification and expansion, allowing thereby also to increase the monetary base; (2) generating income with limited risks; (3) improving the availability and pricing of loans for private debtors; (4) anchorizing the central bank in society. Lending to private borrowers took in particular the form of Lombard and discount operations.


The main responsibility of the central banks is to implement monetary policies. In this framework, they define interest rates and the amount of the money in the financial system. Hence, it can be said that central banks have the critical role in the development of the financial system. Because of this situation, it is obvious that central banks should satisfy some requirements, such as independence, in order to contribute to the effectiveness of the financial systems. Parallel to this aspect, this chapter aims to understand the role of the central banks in the financial system. In this context, the purpose and historical background of the central banking are explained. In addition to this situation, the subject of the central bank independence is identified as well. In the final aspect, important accounts in the analytical balance sheet of the central bank are defined.


Author(s):  
Forrest Capie

Central banks date from the late nineteenth century but the great majority from the twentieth century. They are institutions whose principal purpose is to provide stable monetary and financial conditions, though their functions have varied over time. Claims made for the banks’ powers have often been greater than was merited. This chapter sets out how central banks’ responsibilities arose and how they have been fulfilled. It gives particular attention to something that was almost lost sight of in recent years that of their traditional responsibility for financial stability. Other aspects of central banking are then discussed: the role they might have in supervision/regulation; central bank co-operation has played; and the meaning and desirability of central bank independence.


2019 ◽  
pp. 136-154
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

The recent central banking literature often argues that the LOLR function would be the key feature defining a ‘modern’ central bank. This chapter argues that this view may appear too radical (despite the enormous benefits of the LOLR) as the appearance of the LOLR does not change the nature of central banking (which is primarily associated with the issuance of central bank money). After providing an overview of the roles of central banks for financial stability, the chapter focuses on one early LOLR episode, namely the measures of the Hamburger Bank, Bank of Amsterdam and Bank of England in the European debt crisis of 1763. It is shown that in particular the Hamburger Bank acted as systemic lender of last resort, comparable to what modern central banks did in 2008.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.


Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pilkington

The natural interest rate was the most important variable of monetary economics in the twentieth century. It has lingered in the background of economic policymaking, dictating the terms of debate for economic policy in general, and central bank policy in particular. The central banks pledge that if economists have enough faith in this unseen entity, we all will be the recipients of economic grace.


Author(s):  
Simon James Bytheway ◽  
Mark Metzler

This chapter details how Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, in partnership with Benjamin Strong of the FRBNY, turned ad hoc wartime cooperation into a formal agenda. The paired ideas that national central banks should be autonomous, and that they should cooperate with each other, were first spelled out in a private “manifesto” that Norman circulated among fellow central bankers in 1921. Central bank cooperation was internationally recognized as a principle at the 1922 Genoa Conference, and it was also put into practice. Cooperation between central banks began primarily as informational cooperation, which includes not only the sharing of information but also the sharing and propagation of worldviews. An international network of central banks thus developed out of the war, as did the world's first truly coordinated system of international monetary policy. In these and other ways, financial globalization surged to a new level in the 1920s.


2014 ◽  
pp. 1284-1302
Author(s):  
Yıldız Özkök

Today, Central Banks' primary target is to maintain the price stability. In that context, through their monetary policy, they intervene in the money market with different tools. The Analytical Balance Sheet was created upon summing up and offsetting Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in order to represent specific monetary aggregates. By means of that, CBRT aims to make the balance sheet more understandable and simple. In this chapter, firstly the sub items of the Analytical Balance Sheet are explained; secondly, the economic crises of Turkey during 2000-2009 is mentioned; finally, effects of these crises on the CBRT's Analytical Balance Sheet, changes in monetary aggregates which are Currency Issued, Reserve Money, Monetary Base, and Central Bank's Money, and in this context structure of the monetary policy of the CBRT in this period is analyzed.


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