Free Speech and the Embodied Self

Author(s):  
Japa Pallikkathayil

Democratic theories of free speech hold that the right to free speech is grounded in the nature of collective self-governance. The legitimacy of imposing laws on those who disagree with them depends on giving all citizens an equal right to participate in the lawmaking process, including the right to express their opposition. Ronald Dworkin argues that views of this kind are in tension with hate speech regulation. If we forbid the expression of prejudice, we undermine the legitimacy of laws protecting minority groups. The aim in this chapter is to diffuse the tension Dworkin sees between a democratic justification of the right to free speech and hate speech regulation. This is done by developing an account of how our bodily rights constrain the right to free speech.

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Tim A. Pilgrim

This paper uses history, law, and First Amendment theory to examine the concepts of political correctness, free speech, and hate speech in a search for a solution of how best to deal with hate speech incidents that occur in the university campus community. The paper notes the American tendency toward tyranny of the majority as noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s and then proceeds to examine the double-edged sword of free speech. By guaranteeing freedom of speech we promote the right to shout down ethnic and other minority groups; by providing penalties against those who use it to shout others down we make society less free. This paper suggests a different answer: promote more speech expressed in community meetings conducted in an atmosphere that is safe and encouraging for all to express their views.


Author(s):  
Rodney A. Smolla

This personal and frank book offers an insider's view on the violent confrontations in Charlottesville during the “summer of hate.” Blending memoir, courtroom drama, and a consideration of the unhealed wound of racism in our society, the book shines a light on the conflict between the value of free speech and the protection of civil rights. The author has spent his career in the thick of these tempestuous and fraught issues, from acting as lead counsel in a famous Supreme Court decision challenging Virginia's law against burning crosses, to serving as co-counsel in a libel suit brought by a fraternity against Rolling Stone magazine for publishing an article alleging that one of the fraternity's initiation rituals included gang rape. The author has also been active as a university leader, serving as dean of three law schools and president of one and railing against hate speech and sexual assault on US campuses. Well before the tiki torches cast their ominous shadows across the nation, the city of Charlottesville sought to relocate the Unite the Right rally; the author was approached to represent the alt-right groups. Though the author declined, he came to wonder what his history of advocacy had wrought. Feeling unsettlingly complicit, the author joined the Charlottesville Task Force, and realized that the events that transpired there had meaning and resonance far beyond a singular time and place. Why, he wonders, has one of our foundational rights created a land in which such tragic clashes happen all too frequently?


Author(s):  
Anushka Singh

On 1 February 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, mob violence erupted on campus with 1,500 protesters demanding the cancellation of a public lecture by Milo Yiannopoulos, a British author notorious for his alleged racist and anti-Islamic views.1 Consequently, the event was cancelled triggering a chain of reactions on the desirability and limits of freedom of expression within American democracy. The Left-leaning intellectuals and politicians were accused of allowing the mob violence to become a riot on campus defending it in the name of protest against racism, fascism, and social injustice. In defending the rights of the protesters to not allow ‘illiberal’ or hate speech on campus, however, many claimed that the message conveyed was that only liberals had the right to free speech....


Author(s):  
Rodney A. Smolla

This chapter introduces the task force created by Governor Terry McAuliffe in Richmond, Virginia that are tasked to study the racial violence in the city of Charlottesville during the summer of 2017. It mentions the violence in Richmond that claimed the life of Heather Heyer when a white supremacist, James Alex Fields Jr., slammed his speeding car into a crowd of counter-protesters confronting a “Unite the Right” rally. This chapter explains the work of the task force, which requires them to deeply investigate the constitutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and the rules of engagement governing what society could or could not do when confronted with racial supremacist groups rallying in a city. It also describes the famous free speech case called Virginia vs. Black involving vicious racist hate speech. The case involved a cross-burning rally of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in rural western Virginia in 1998 and a second cross-burning incident in Virginia Beach in the yard of an African American, James Jubilee.


Author(s):  
Liang Lawrence

This chapter examines the place of the right to freedom of speech and expression within Indian constitutionalism. After reviewing the classical normative arguments for free speech, it considers how the domain of speech is related to colonial continuity, sedition, and public order. It discusses the scope of Article19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution with respect to free speech, as well as the Indian Supreme Court’s successes and failures in its efforts to expand the domain of speech. It explores the democracy argument as the primary justification used by the courts in free speech cases, and its consequences. Finally, it looks at the standards for determining reasonableness, hate speech, and obscenity, and argues that the idea of a deliberative democracy must be supplemented with the concept of agonistic politics to enrich and strengthen the free speech tradition that has evolved in the past six decades.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Vanessa Haggie

<p>Hate speech legislation involves a fundamental conflict with the right to freedom of expression. However, it is a conflict that can be justified in a constitutional framework in which free speech is not paramount and can be balanced against other rights and freedoms. This paper discusses the concept of “hate speech” legislation, the conflict between freedom of expression and hate speech censorship, and ways in which these seemingly-incompatible concepts might be harmonised. It considers, drawing on legislation and case law from other jurisdictions, and in light of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, the possibility of extending such legislation to protect gender and sexual minorities in New Zealand, and suggests a potential framework for such legislative change. Any provision concerning hate speech must avoid overreaching into the realm of free expression. As a result, ‘hate speech’ should be clearly defined and narrowly focussed in scope, as words or matter which “exposes or tends to expose to hatred or contempt” the minority group at which the protection is aimed. In New Zealand’s constitutional/rights framework, this limitation on freedom of expression can be justified as reasonable and appropriate. While hate speech legislation does create a conflict with freedom of expression, to protect hate speech at the risk of perpetuating harm, discrimination, marginalisation and silencing is not appropriate. It sends the message that the voice of hate speakers is worth more than that of minorities, and undervalues the dignity and social assurance of those minority groups as valued members of society.</p>


Author(s):  
Jonathan Riley

John Stuart Mill is a liberal icon, widely praised in particular for his stirring defense of freedom of speech. A neo-Millian theory of free speech is outlined and contrasted in important respects with what Frederick Schauer calls “the free speech ideology” that surrounds the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and with Schauer’s own “pre-legal” theory of free speech. Mill cannot reasonably be interpreted to defend free speech absolutism if speech is understood broadly to include all expressive conduct. Rather, he is best interpreted as defending an expedient policy of laissez-faire with exceptions, where four types of expression are distinguished, three of which (labeled Types B, C, and D) are public or other-regarding, whereas the fourth (labeled Type A) is private or self-regarding. Types C and D expression are unjust and ought to be suppressed by law and public stigma. They deserve no protection from coercive interference: they are justified exceptions to the policy of letting speakers alone. Consistently with this, a moral right to freedom of speech gives absolute protection to Type B public expression, which is “almost” self-regarding. Type A private expression also receives absolute protection, but it is truly self-regarding conduct and therefore covered by the moral right of absolute self-regarding liberty identified by Mill in On Liberty. There is no need for a distinct right of freedom of expression with respect to self-regarding speech. Strictly speaking, then, an expedient laissez-faire policy for public expression leaves the full protection of freedom of private expression to the right of self-regarding liberty.An important application of the neo-Millian theory relates to an unjust form of hate speech that may be described as group libel. By creating, or threatening to create, a social atmosphere in which a targeted group is forced to live with a maliciously false public identity of criminality or subhumanity, such a group libel creates, or significantly risks creating, social conditions in which all individuals associated with the group must give up their liberties of self-regarding conduct and of Type B expression to avoid conflict with prejudiced and belligerent members of society, even though the libel itself does not directly threaten any assignable individual with harm or accuse him or her of any wrongdoing of his or her own. This Millian perspective bolsters arguments such as those offered by Jeremy Waldron for suppressing group libels. America is an outlier among advanced civil societies with respect to the regulation of such unjust hate speech, and its “free speech ideology” ought to be suitably reformed so that group libels are prevented or punished as immoral and unconstitutional.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3.1) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Daniel Allington

This article focuses on antisemitic and racist content in the Urban Dictionary: a global top-1000 website built upon user-generated content. It argues that the Urban Dictionary’s founding principles have directly facilitated the site’s exploitation as a platform for the dissemination of antisemitic hate speech and white supremacist ideology. These principles can be seen as typifying the free speech absolutism that became dominant within the US tech industry during the 1990s. However, the right to free expression cannot reasonably be taken to exempt internet companies from responsibility for content whose publication they facilitate. The article concludes by arguing that websites such as the Urban Dictionary are essentially publishers, and that the solution to the problem of their indulgence of big-ots may be for those who do not wish to be associated with bigotry to refrain from doing business with institutions that publish content that they consider abhorrent. Keywords: alt-right, antizionism, brand contamination, definitions, dictionaries, free speech, Urban Dictionary, user-generated content, Web 2.0


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Devanshu Sajlan

This article analyzes the Indian hate speech law from the perspective of social media. Recent research shows extensive use of caste-based hate speech on Facebook, including derogatory references to caste-based occupations such as manual scavenging. This article attempts to examine whether the Scheduled castes / Scheduled Tribes (SC / ST) Prevention of Atrocities Act is equipped to deal with online hate speech against Dalits. The jurisprudence around the applicability of Atrocities Act to caste-based hate speech has been analyzed. After the said analysis, the applicability of ‘International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)’ to caste- based discrimination has been studied. Thereafter, the standard of proof for prosecuting hate speech under Indian domestic law has been compared with ICERD to analyze whether Indian domestic law is in compliance with international standards. The article further analyzes whether caste-based hate speech ought to be regulated only when there is incitement to violence or hatred, or it can also be regulated when it violates the right to dignity of Dalits. At the same time, the article also briefly examines whether such prosecution would be in violation of global free-speech standards.


Author(s):  
Sandra Fredman

This chapter assesses the theories justifying freedom of speech (Section II). Section III considers how free speech is protected by human rights instruments. The absence of an express limitation clause in the US First Amendment contrasts with other jurisdictions, which permit justifiable limitations. Sections IV–VII consider how courts have dealt with the most burning issues confronted in all of these jurisdictions: whether freedom of speech protects subversive speech, pornography, and hate speech. Where the limits of liberal tolerance lie remains a challenge for courts. While the harm principle provides a starting point, much depends on how speech is seen to cause harm. Section VIII asks whether the right-bearer includes not just the speaker, but also the recipient of speech and assesses the role of freedom of information. The chapter concludes that freedom of speech should go further than curbing State power to censor speech, creating conditions of genuine equality.


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