The Chinese Armed Forces and the Challenges of Globalization

Author(s):  
Andrea Ghiselli

How did the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) react to the securitization act initiated by the civilian leadership? This chapter shows that the PLA was relatively hesitant to accept a more inclusive understanding of security beyond traditional territorial defense, and therefore of a broader role for itself in China’s peacetime foreign policy. The PLA’s approach to non-traditional missions was similar to that of other countries’ armed forces, as they did not look favorably on so-called interventionist uses of force. It was in the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan crisis that the position of the PLA changed in an unequivocal way and the soldiers’ attitude towards the expansion of their peacetime portfolio became very similar to that of the civilians. While the soldiers’ natural desire to contribute to the security of the people played an important role in this process, it is important to emphasize how crucial the establishment of a causal link between non-traditional security threats and inter-state conflict was in the debate within the PLA.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Nan LI

The fear of political vulnerability stemming from an over-reliance on the military for containing COVID-19 led the civilian leadership to deploy the level and type of military support that were deliberately measured and technically specialised; the timings of this support were also carefully planned. The concern about COVID-19 causing significant infections among PLA (People’s Liberation Army) ranks that may hamper PLA response to the perceived external security challenges also proved to be premature.


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Juliette Genevaz

This article examines the role played by the political indoctrination of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during China’s socio-economic reforms of 1987–2007. This period was a time of political transition during which the Chinese Communist Party transformed its ideology from a focus on revolution to a self-proclaimed unrivalled single-party regime. This article looks at how the party conveyed this ideological change to the armed forces. One of the four PLA general headquarters/departments, the PLA General Political Department (中国人民解放军总政治部), was responsible for the indoctrination of servicemen and -women. Examining the work of this agency over the 20 years following its major ideological effort in 1987, this article challenges the dominant literature according to which political indoctrination hinders military professionalization. The crux of this argument is that the General Political Department’s purpose behind indoctrination of the armed forces was not only to assert party control but also to build esprit de corps. Based on a series of previously untapped periodicals published by the General Political Department, this analysis contributes to understanding processes of authoritarian resilience in the contemporary Chinese state.


Author(s):  
Andrea Ghiselli

How did the issue of sending the armed forces abroad and the defence of interests overseas enter and evolve in the Chinese foreign policy debate? The analysis in Chapter 1 of the speeches and documents released by the Chinese leaders and government institutions reveals three interconnected and important changes that have happened since the late 1980s. First, from Jiang Zemin’s New Security Concept to Xi Jinping’s Comprehensive National Security, the management of non-traditional security issues has consistently been the main driver behind the expansion of Chinese military activities overseas. Second, non-traditional security issues abroad changed from being seen as diplomatic opportunities to be considered, especially after the evacuation from Libya of almost 36,000 Chinese nationals, as threats to the regime’s legitimacy and China’s national security. Third, as overseas non-traditional security crises started to be perceived as threats, the orders from the civilian leadership to the foreign policy bureaucracy and, especially, the armed forces to prepare to play a larger role in peacetime foreign policy became increasingly urgent and clear.


1987 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 572-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul H. B. Godwin

Introduction Since the late 1970s, when the current programmes seeking to modernize China's defence establishment began, issues of military doctrine, strategy and operations have remained at the forefront of China's quest for a defence capacity capable of being ranked among the world's great powers. As the Chinese leadership contemplated defence modernization, they could not but recognize the Janus-like quality of their armed forces. One face looked back on the people's war traditions that served them so well and for so long, while the other faced the complexities of conventional and strategic nuclear warfare and deterrence in the latter part of the 20th century.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 380
Author(s):  
Alice Langley Hsieh ◽  
Angus M. Fraser

Subject Scenarios for a coup against President Xi Jinping. Significance The COVID-19 pandemic has damaged President Xi Jinping’s image, prompting speculation that rivals could seek to topple him. There is no sign of dissent among other senior leaders, but coups are an endemic feature of authoritarian systems and so cannot be ruled out. Impacts A violent power grab would be almost impossible unless China were to fall into total disorder. The People’s Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party, would be a key political actor in any leadership dispute. High-level purges weaken the ruling party’s legitimacy by undermining its claim to infallibility. A radical new direction is unlikely under a new leader; state capitalism, overseas acquisitions and assertive foreign policy would continue.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 939-942
Author(s):  
Victor V Apollonov

Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a meeting with delegates of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) during the last session of the National People's Congress (NPC), demanded the introduction of scientific discoveries and innovative technologies in the army. Xi Jinping noted that new technologies are the key to modernizing the Armed Forces. The Chinese leader discussed with the military how to achieve the goals set in the field of national defense and army development and the implementation of the 13th five-year plan for the development of the armed forces. It is safe to say that Laser Weapons (LW) are on the agenda of China/1/


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