The Chinese Armed Forces and the Challenges of Globalization

How did the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) react to the securitization act initiated by the civilian leadership? This chapter shows that the PLA was relatively hesitant to accept a more inclusive understanding of security beyond traditional territorial defense, and therefore of a broader role for itself in China’s peacetime foreign policy. The PLA’s approach to non-traditional missions was similar to that of other countries’ armed forces, as they did not look favorably on so-called interventionist uses of force. It was in the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan crisis that the position of the PLA changed in an unequivocal way and the soldiers’ attitude towards the expansion of their peacetime portfolio became very similar to that of the civilians. While the soldiers’ natural desire to contribute to the security of the people played an important role in this process, it is important to emphasize how crucial the establishment of a causal link between non-traditional security threats and inter-state conflict was in the debate within the PLA.

Guarding the Interest Frontiers

The Chinese government’s changing understanding of the relationship between non-traditional security issues and foreign policy, that is, the same process behind the awareness of the necessity to protect the interest frontiers, has driven and shaped China’s military footprint in Africa and the Middle East since the 1990s. Hence, it is not surprising that the quantity, the type, and the ways that Chinese military assets have been deployed there started to change as Chinese policymakers became more convinced of the necessity to use military tools to support the efforts to protect the lives and assets of Chinese nationals and firms. A Chinese multidimensional security architecture has emerged in recent years with the newly opened base in Djibouti at its center. The presence of Chinese soldiers changed from being country- to subregion-focused and from single- to multipurpose-oriented. Yet, this chapter also shows how two key issues—the difficulties of acting through the United Nations and technical and legal uncertainties—have shaped this process.

The Problems of Knowledge in Policymaking

Securitization does not happen in a vacuum. Key functional actors can play a very important role in helping the securitizing actor to understand the nature of the threat to the referent object. In foreign policy, this is particularly true when the policymakers are not familiar with the issue at hand and, therefore, there is ample room for other actors to influence them. This chapter, however, shows that the Chinese foreign policy bureaucracy and the community of experts was only partially able to do aid this securitization. These findings emerge from an examination of the development of the Chinese diplomatic system in terms of regional expertise, personnel, resources, and political standing. As for the scholars in Chinese universities and think tanks, they lacked either the skills or the influence to warn the government about the risks brewing in North Africa and the Middle East. At most, they were able to shape the government’s response to the crisis in those regions only after it took place.

Chinese Public Opinion and the Interest Frontiers

Although it is not as decisive a factor as it is in Western democracies, the space for Chinese public opinion to influence foreign policy has grown over the years thanks to the population’s greater access to the Internet, the diversification of the media, and the simple fact that today’s Chinese leaders are not revolutionary heroes. While domestic public opinion cannot shape the country’s foreign policy on issues related to China’s “core interests”—the commanding role of the Chinese Communist Party and the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty—the situation is different when the discussion is less sensitive. The Chinese approach to North Africa and the Middle East is one of those topics. Hence, this chapter looks at how online Chinese public opinion influenced the domestic narrative on protecting the country’s overseas interests. It exposes a contested environment where the actions and the narrative put forward by policymakers were often under pressure as Chinese citizens favored a more muscular approach to defending the country’s overseas interests.

The Chinese Government, the Idea of Security, and Foreign Policy

How did the issue of sending the armed forces abroad and the defence of interests overseas enter and evolve in the Chinese foreign policy debate? The analysis in Chapter 1 of the speeches and documents released by the Chinese leaders and government institutions reveals three interconnected and important changes that have happened since the late 1980s. First, from Jiang Zemin’s New Security Concept to Xi Jinping’s Comprehensive National Security, the management of non-traditional security issues has consistently been the main driver behind the expansion of Chinese military activities overseas. Second, non-traditional security issues abroad changed from being seen as diplomatic opportunities to be considered, especially after the evacuation from Libya of almost 36,000 Chinese nationals, as threats to the regime’s legitimacy and China’s national security. Third, as overseas non-traditional security crises started to be perceived as threats, the orders from the civilian leadership to the foreign policy bureaucracy and, especially, the armed forces to prepare to play a larger role in peacetime foreign policy became increasingly urgent and clear.

Conclusion

The perception that other states are more centralized and better organized than they actually are, as Robert Jervis (1976, 319–42) pointed out in his classic Perception and Misperception in International Politics, is a common phenomenon in international relations. Today, one of the most widely shared myths about China is how its political model is unique because it has succeeded in completing large-scale projects, from building the longest bridge in the world to lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, in a quick and effective way. Dazzled by those achievements, regardless of their actual success, both supporters and detractors often take them as evidence of China’s capacity to play the long game, to work out and execute complex strategies. After all, when so much time has been spent, so many sacrifices made, so many resources consumed, there must be a plan. Every headline, every announcement, every statement about the next big project reinforces this myth. Myths like this appear useful and are easily accepted because they help us to simplify reality and justify our actions. They conveniently spare us having to look at what lies beneath the surface. This is why they are created and why they are dangerous when they are used as foundations for political arguments at times of growing tensions in international affairs....

From Deng’s Reforms to Libya

How and why did the Chinese human and economic footprint develop in some of the most unstable regions in the world like North Africa and the Middle East? As shown in Chapter 3, it happened as part of China’s integration with the world economy. Over time, from Jiang Zemin’s Go Global strategy to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, a strong political support for this allowed for the loosening of the framework that regulates where Chinese companies can carry out what kind of business. Against this background, the presence of Chinese companies in North Africa and the Middle East begun to develop driven by the necessity to secure access to energy and other natural resources. Then, it expanded to include the flow of goods from China to European, North Africa, and Middle Eastern markets. Yet, Chinese companies failed to understand that the growing freedom to act came with the responsibility to secure the success and, most importantly, security of their operations overseas. This is why they were unprepared when the Arab Spring broke out and, therefore, China’s interest frontiers emerged.

Diverse Threats, Diverse Responses

As the Chinese leadership became more aware of the threats to the country’s interests overseas, this chapter shows that the different agencies under their control started to change and adapt. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the first to undergo significant change as great efforts were made to establish and strengthen the consular protection system, the Chinese Communist Party set up the Central National Security Commission in order to improve inter-agency coordination to respond to non-traditional security threats overseas. Even state-owned companies tried to adapt to the new situation and, in an interesting twist, they attempted (and failed) to lobby the government in order revise and expand the legislation. Naturally, the People’s Liberation Army, too, had to change. The analysis of the institutional and doctrinal evolution of the Chinese military reveals the marked sophistication of the thinking about Military Operations Other Than War overseas and the growing preparation to carry them out in the post-2011 period.

Introduction

This Introduction presents China’s nascent strategy to protect its overseas interests, eventually via military means, as a major change in the country’s international orientation. As is the case for other great powers in history, it is a fundamental test for the sustainability of China’s rise. In order to shed light on this issue, this chapter brings securitization theory in, introducing its origin and latest developments, in order to avoid some of the problems that the plague the literature on China’s foreign and security policy. In particular, it is explains why it is important to focus on the role of non-traditional security threats to Chinese interests in North Africa and the Middle East. Against this background, the Introduction concludes with an outline of each chapter, providing an overview of their main content and findings.