Legacies of Definancialization and Defending Real Economy in China

Confronting the triple trap of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic downturn, and ecological crisis, the Chinese leadership has reiterated that "China puts the people's interests first—nothing is more precious than people's lives." This kind of people-centered governance philosophy is ostensibly meant to protect the lives and health of the people, while defending people's property under the basic system of collective ownership.

“Asia-Pacific Dream” – Chinese Regional Integration Project

In the 21st century, China has significantly strengthened its role in world historical processes. In 40 years of reform and openness, China has not only become a world leader in economic development, it has also become an active player in the world political arena. China began to show greater interest in world development and at the same time began to actively integrate into the world community, seeking to prove the global benefits of cooperation with China. The Chinese leadership believes that China cannot stand aside from world processes and, like the rest of the world, be held hostage to the policies of other countries and bear the brunt of all the negative consequences of such policies. As a result, it was taken a course for active integration with the world community and strengthening China’s participation and influence in world processes. For this purpose, several strategic strategies have been developed to achieve a specific goal, including “going abroad”, “globalizing”, “internationalizing” and others. At the same time, the strengthening of integration processes in the world could not leave the country’s leadership indifferent, so China began to pay more attention to participation in both global and regional integration processes. One such area was China’s accession to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991. These areas have identified three key aspects of the Asia-Pacific Dream concept: development and economic cohesion, the unification of Asia with an emphasis on harmony, mutual benefit and prosperity in the region. The China Asia-Pacific Dream initiative aims to maintain stable and friendly partnerships with neighboring countries in order to build mutual trust. China has identified a number of common challenges that the parties must address in order to build an Asian community. China hopes to work with its partners to create a beautiful region that will lead the world, benefit all parties and bring prosperity to future generations. In this context, the Chinese leadership has identified a number of areas for development for the Asia-Pacific region.

Chinese Reaction and Interpretation of 1991 Events in the Soviet Union

The article is timed to coincide with two anniversaries: centenary of the Communist Party of China, and thirty years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to the author’s idea, these two anniversaries correlate: analysis of the reasons and consequences of the USSR dissolution became one of the factors of current policy of Chinese communists. The article brings light to this coherence. A wide range of Chinese sources and literature regarding 1991 events in the USSR was used for the article. Another feature is the attention to historical context of the late 1980s – early 1990s, analysis of which helps to understand domination of conservative view to the USSR dissolution. The article shows how the Chinese state and party interest in the Soviet experience led to creation of a large bulk of works regarding historical, sociological and culturological aspects of the USSR dissolution. The analysis of the most impactful of these works shows a wide range of views regarding certain aspects (fi rst of all, the role of reforms in the fi nal dissolution of the state) and consensus regarding other aspects (negative role of Mikhail Gorbachev, labelling the dissolution of the USSR and the Communist Party as a ‘catastrophe’). Further analysis of the Soviet experience led to such measures by the Chinese leadership like strengthening of partocracy regime, conducting of media-covered anti-smuggling campaigns, establishing of harsh administrative and security control in areas with ethnic minorities, active counterpropaganda and struggling with foreign information infl uence. Appellation to the negative experience of the USSR and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is using by the Chinese leadership in its propaganda as an argument for unacceptability of any political reforms regarding weakening of the party role.

Ideas, Voice and Attraction

The chapter outlines the evolution of interest in China in the importance of developing ‘soft power’ resources, and what this power was meant to achieve. It then draws a distinction between different dimensions of non-hard power resources, arguing that much of what is done by the Chinese leadership is best thought of as an exercise in nation branding or international political marketing. It is a state led project designed to create a preferred understanding of what China is and what it stands for, and to influence (or even control) the way that China is spoken about and debated in other countries. It also discusses the way in which the soft and the hard come together in the actions and preferences of Chinese consumers, and concludes with a discussion of Chinese ‘crisis diplomacy’, with a specific focus on what was done and said during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020.

Xi’s Post-pandemic Outlook on Asia: Between Guanxi and Mingyun Gongtongti

China’s contest with the global community has entered a delicate phase post the COVID-19 period. While the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the non-responsible act of China in tackling the virus to prevent its spread outside the country, the recent aggression of the Chinese leadership on land and maritime domains in Asia has revealed the long-term international objectives of China’s ambitious foreign policy under Xi Jinping. As China attempts to rebuild its global image and profile post the pandemic and, most importantly, to reorder its global governance approach, Beijing may like to revitalise its focus on its Guanxi (relationship or networks) and Mingyun Gongtongti or ‘the Community with a Shared Future for Humankind’ (CHSF). In other words, China’s approach to Asia may take a new turn without Beijing shying away from its original intentions of dictating the Asian order.

THE HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF THE BALLET "THE WHITE-HAIRED GIRL"

The article is devoted to the history of the creation of the ballet "The White-Haired Girl", which was included among the "exemplary productions" during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The plot of the ballet, based on class contradictions between landowners and peasants, has folklore origins: first it appeared in the novel, then the first national Chinese opera was created, later adapted for cinema and became the basis for the ballet. The ballet "The White-Haired Girl" was commissioned by Chinese leadership. It includes the historical facts of the class struggle and shows the formation of a personality ready to resist exploitation and fight for freedom for all. The ballet's music, composed by Yan Jinxuan, also includes revolutionary folk songs and numbers taken from the opera of the same name. Compared to the opera, the ballet enhances revolutionary features in the characters. The choreography harmoniously combines classical ballet pas with the characteristics of Chinese folk dance and martial arts. The ballet "The White-Haired Girl" is performed with ongoing success since its inception in 1965 to the present day and is rightly considered a "red classic" with a high ideology and artistry.

Second Century of the Communist Party of China and New Bipolarity

Linking the 100th anniversary of the CPC, celebrated in 2021, with long-term goals, the Chinese leadership is talking about the country’s entry into the next stage of development – the stage of the “second century of the CPC.” The 14th plan for the socio-economic development of the country for 2021–2025, adopted in March 2021 and long-range objectives through 2035 are seen as the first steps in a new round of China’s evolution. According to the Chinese leadership, the goals of the first century have been largely achieved. Now China faces more ambitious tasks: 1) achieve socialist modernization by 2035, doubling its GDP per capita to the level of an average developed country; 2) to reach the German or Japanese level of industrial and innovative development by 2050; 3) to ensure the innovative and scientific and technological self-sufficiency of China in order to get away from the current technological dependence on the United States and the West in general, which, in the opinion of the Chinese leadership, poses a threat to the national security of the PRC; 4) to create by 2027 (100th anniversary of the PLA) a strong modern army; 5) Ensure China’s global leadership by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049. The peculiarities of the new 14th five-year plan include the absence of targets for GDP growth rates for 2021–2025. The benchmark will now be set every year. For example, for 2021, this indicator is set in the highly redundant formulation “6 percent or more”. Beijing records the nearing transition from quantitative planning to qualitative planning. The aggravation of relations between China and the United States under the Biden administration and Beijing’s retaliatory, in a new way, actions in almost all areas, from ideology to security and defense, in the near future will change the global balance of power and lead to the formation of a “new bipolarity” implying in the context of globalization, that in addition to the two new planetary “poles” in the world, regional and subregional centers of power will persist and develop, forming, as saying in China, modern “polycentricity”. Against such a background, the “new bipolarity” will be characterized not only by a direct clash of Chinese and American interests, but also by a struggle for dominance, influence, and alliance with the leaders of the “polycentric world.” Within the framework of the “new bipolarity”, the United States is strengthening relations with allies, opposing the “democratic economy” of the West to the “authoritarianism of China”. The concept of financing by the West of the world transport infrastructure of a “democratic sense” as opposed to the “authoritarian” Chinese “Belt and Road” is put forward. In the reciprocal steps of China to attract partners to the “Chinese pole”, the main place is given to Russia, relations with which are characterized as “exemplary” for the whole world. At the same time, there is an opinion among Chinese experts that “excessive rapprochement” with Russia is unprofitable for China, since for Russia, as well as for the United States, China is not only a partner, but also a “strategic competitor.” China has become the main Russian trade and economic partner, in many directions it has turned into an uncontested supplier. At the same time, the “Sino-Russian Comprehensive Partnership in a New Era” contains many tactical and long-term problems.

China's Policy to Ensure Sovereignty in the South China Sea: Who Defends China's Interests

The article provides an overview of the PRC's strategy to ensure sovereignty in the South China Sea, as well as of the subjects responsible for its implementation. In her work, the author attempted to analyze the role of civil, military and administrative bodies in the implementation of measures to establish control over the maritime zone and disputed islands and reefs in the SCS. Since 2013, the Chinese leadership has not only actively modernized the departments involved in ensuring China's maritime interests, but also carried out reforms aimed at centralizing the work and strengthening the interaction of these structures. This tactic has led to the fact that today the consolidation of China in the waters of the SCS, to which it claims, has reached the "point of no return".