Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978–87

1987 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 572-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul H. B. Godwin

Introduction Since the late 1970s, when the current programmes seeking to modernize China's defence establishment began, issues of military doctrine, strategy and operations have remained at the forefront of China's quest for a defence capacity capable of being ranked among the world's great powers. As the Chinese leadership contemplated defence modernization, they could not but recognize the Janus-like quality of their armed forces. One face looked back on the people's war traditions that served them so well and for so long, while the other faced the complexities of conventional and strategic nuclear warfare and deterrence in the latter part of the 20th century.

Author(s):  
Andrea Ghiselli

How did the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) react to the securitization act initiated by the civilian leadership? This chapter shows that the PLA was relatively hesitant to accept a more inclusive understanding of security beyond traditional territorial defense, and therefore of a broader role for itself in China’s peacetime foreign policy. The PLA’s approach to non-traditional missions was similar to that of other countries’ armed forces, as they did not look favorably on so-called interventionist uses of force. It was in the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan crisis that the position of the PLA changed in an unequivocal way and the soldiers’ attitude towards the expansion of their peacetime portfolio became very similar to that of the civilians. While the soldiers’ natural desire to contribute to the security of the people played an important role in this process, it is important to emphasize how crucial the establishment of a causal link between non-traditional security threats and inter-state conflict was in the debate within the PLA.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-183
Author(s):  
Stefan Filipov

Abstract The membership of the country in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the professionalization of the Armed Forces and their participation in joint operations put the Bulgarian Army in front of the necessity to comply with the rules for communal-household provision applied in the NATO member states. As the resource constraint of the Military Budget, determined by the economic potential of the country, does not allow the construction of new military infrastructure objects, the current models for modernization, maintenance and utilization of the military infrastructure in the part of the communal-household provision of the Armed Forces are proposed. The implementation of the presented models is in response to solve problems in improving the maintenance and using military infrastructure elements. On the one hand, the applicability of the models requires the development of scientifically-based norms and legislation for the communal-household provision of the servicemen and on the other hand, it responds to the requirements for improving the quality of life of military personnel in the context of continuous structural reforms and transformations


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Juliette Genevaz

This article examines the role played by the political indoctrination of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during China’s socio-economic reforms of 1987–2007. This period was a time of political transition during which the Chinese Communist Party transformed its ideology from a focus on revolution to a self-proclaimed unrivalled single-party regime. This article looks at how the party conveyed this ideological change to the armed forces. One of the four PLA general headquarters/departments, the PLA General Political Department (中国人民解放军总政治部), was responsible for the indoctrination of servicemen and -women. Examining the work of this agency over the 20 years following its major ideological effort in 1987, this article challenges the dominant literature according to which political indoctrination hinders military professionalization. The crux of this argument is that the General Political Department’s purpose behind indoctrination of the armed forces was not only to assert party control but also to build esprit de corps. Based on a series of previously untapped periodicals published by the General Political Department, this analysis contributes to understanding processes of authoritarian resilience in the contemporary Chinese state.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 380
Author(s):  
Alice Langley Hsieh ◽  
Angus M. Fraser

2021 ◽  
pp. 41-58
Author(s):  
Dong Guoqiang ◽  
Andrew G. Walder

This chapter examines how, when the People's Armed Department (PAD) took control of Feng County, factional rivalries in the county were still ill defined, and rebels competed to be the loudest and most militant in denouncing the party secretary and other top county leaders. After the PAD deposed the county's civilian leaders, local rebels began to align themselves for and against the PAD, sharpening the tensions between Paolian and the PAD. The intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops dispatched from Xuzhou sharpened and broadened the emerging factional divisions, making them even more difficult to resolve. The PLA's growing support for Paolian and formation of a “great alliance committee” brought two rebel groups of junior county cadres into an alliance while excluding the vociferously anti-Paolian cadre rebels. This drove a wedge between the two groups of county-level cadres, one that deepened when Paolian later merged with supportive cadre rebels in a large new rebel alliance under PLA protection. Senior county officials also split, with most of them forming an affiliation with either Paolian or Liansi. Whatever the personal motives for their choice of factions, it clearly had the effect of offering protection from attacks by the other mass factions. Cadres in rural communes, however, almost uniformly stood on the side of Liansi.


2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 274-286
Author(s):  
Unsal Sigri ◽  
Ufuk Basar

The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which qualified training was given to trainees of Armed Forces of Bosnia & Herzegovina by trainers of eufor Operation Althea. To that end data were collected from 135 trainees. Differences between trainees’ expectations from and perceptions of training were assessed. Results indicated that training was responsive and empathetic, on the other hand not tangible, reliable and sure enough according to trainees. Findings suggest that in order to create desired effects on trainees, within scope of peacekeeping operations, trainers should be knowledgeable and accurate. In addition, a proper learning atmosphere should be provided.


2021 ◽  
Vol 158 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 111-136
Author(s):  
Witold Lewandowski ◽  
Piotr Fonrobert

Transformations of economies occurring in particular countries reduce the number of manufacturers producing the articles for the armed forces basing exclusively on national capacities of industry and scientific-research background. Consolidation and restructure processes have been used as remedies of defence sector for many years. Some of them are launched by the management boards and the other ones by decisions of majority owners, represented in the case of Poland by the State Treasury. A question arises, if the country defence sector could realise the hopes put on it, in present situation of the national defence industry and with its role in the system of national economy, and selection and quality of offered products, and the level of used technological solutions. Presented paper is an attempt to analyse the state of the Polish defence industry committed by authors representing two different subjects and directly connected with condition and building up the defence potential of Poland.


2010 ◽  
Vol 203 ◽  
pp. 560-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomonori Sasaki

AbstractThis article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 939-942
Author(s):  
Victor V Apollonov

Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a meeting with delegates of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) during the last session of the National People's Congress (NPC), demanded the introduction of scientific discoveries and innovative technologies in the army. Xi Jinping noted that new technologies are the key to modernizing the Armed Forces. The Chinese leader discussed with the military how to achieve the goals set in the field of national defense and army development and the implementation of the 13th five-year plan for the development of the armed forces. It is safe to say that Laser Weapons (LW) are on the agenda of China/1/


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