Bargaining Leverage and Stakeholder Perceptions

Chapter 6 examines the ways in which pre-strike ballot requirements provide bargaining leverage to unions and, to a lesser extent, employers. The chapter’s analysis of internal union processes and bargaining dynamics suggests that the pre-strike ballot process can provide unions with some benefits, or advantages, in the enterprise bargaining process. First, the process of seeking permission to run a ballot, and the conduct of a subsequent ballot, can increase leverage by escalating the ‘threat’ of industrial action without necessarily having to take the approved action. Second, the pre-strike ballot process can benefit unions by providing an opportunity to engage existing members in the bargaining campaign, and/or recruit new members. There can, however, be adverse consequences for unions—an unsuccessful ballot outcome can severely compromise the union’s credibility; provide evidence of a weak bargaining position; significantly reduce the likelihood of industrial action occurring; favour the employer in the negotiating process; delay the taking of industrial action; or even entirely derail the union campaign. In order to maximize the strategic ‘benefit’ of a pre-strike ballot, unions generally need to invest considerable time and resources to ensure that enough members vote, and vote favourably, in the ballot. Some employers use these processes to their advantage—by, for example, using the time between the application to conduct a pre-strike ballot and the actual ballot actively to try to discourage support for industrial action; trying to disrupt the momentum of the union’s campaign; or exploiting opportunities to oppose applications for pre-strike ballots.