Two Substantively Moorean Responses and the Project of Refuting Skepticism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Brain In A Vat

In this chapter, substantive Mooreanism, according to which one does know that one is not a brain in a vat, is explained, and two main varieties of it are distinguished. Contextualist Mooreanism, (a) on which it is only claimed that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat according to ordinary standards for knowledge, and (b) on which one seeks to defeat bold skepticism (according to which one doesn’t know simple, seemingly obvious truths about the external world, even by ordinary standards for knowledge), is contrasted with Putnam-style responses, on which one seeks to refute the skeptic, utilizing semantic externalism. Problems with the Putnam-style attempt to refute skepticism are identified, and then, more radically, it is argued that in important ways, such a refutation of skepticism would not have provided an adequate response to skepticism even if it could have been accomplished.

2. Scepticism

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain In A Vat

When you start to get self-conscious about what you know, even the simplest fact, something you usually think you could verify at a glance, can start to seem like something you don’t really know. ‘Scepticism’ describes the historical roots of scepticism beginning with the two distinct sceptical traditions: Academic and Pyrrhonian. A central worry of both schools of ancient scepticism concerns the ‘criterion of truth’ or the rule we should use to figure out what to accept, assuming that knowledge requires not just accepting things randomly. Modern approaches to scepticism from philosopher G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell's ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ to Hilary Putnam's Semantic Externalism and the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis are discussed.

Deductive closure principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly Becker
Keyword(s):  
General Principle ◽  
External World ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Rhetorical Device ◽  
Deductive Closure ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Philosophical Questions

The deductive closure principle is based on the thought that one straightforward way to extend one’s knowledge is to competently deduce some proposition from one or more propositions that one already knows. G.E. Moore (1939) appears to presume this in his proof of an external world. Updating Moore’s proof to incorporate the more recent rhetorical device of a brain-in-a-vat (BIV), from his putative knowledge that he has hands and his knowledge that his having hands entails that he is not merely a BIV being fed experiences, through electrodes, of having hands, Moore deduces and therefore claims to know that he is not a BIV. A natural sceptical reply also exploits the idea that one can extend one’s knowledge through deduction. The sceptic will say, for example, that Moore does not know that he is not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV), for if he were his experience would be no different to what it actually is. Moore does know, however, that if he has hands then he is not (just) a BIV. Therefore, Moore does not even know that he has hands, for if he did, he could deduce and come to know that he is not a BIV, but that is not something he can know because, again, his vat experiences would be indistinguishable from normal ones. The idea that knowledge can always be extended through competent deduction from known premises – which implies that knowledge is deductively closed under known entailment – raises at least three philosophical questions. First, what general principle best captures this phenomenon? Due primarily to risk arising from the fallibility of belief-forming processes including deduction, there is reason to question even the most plausible formulations of closure. Second, are there any counterexamples to the principle or constraints on its application? Some philosophers claim that a properly formulated closure principle admits of exceptions, even if deduction is assumed to be infallible. Third, how might a theory of knowledge that upholds a robust (exceptionless) closure principle achieve anti-sceptical results?.

Deductive closure principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Brueckner
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Logical Implication ◽  
Logic Of Knowledge ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Deductive Closure ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Sceptical Hypothesis

It seems that one can expand one’s body of knowledge by making deductive inferences from propositions one knows. The ‘deductive closure principle’ captures this idea: if S knows that P, and S correctly deduces Q from P, then S knows that Q. A closely related principle is that knowledge is closed under known logical implication: if S knows that P and S knows that P logically implies Q, then S knows that Q. These principles, if they hold, are guaranteed by general features of the concept of knowledge. They would form part of a logic of knowledge. An influential argument for scepticism about knowledge of the external world employs the deductive closure principle. The sceptic begins by sketching a logically possible hypothesis, or counter-possibility (for example, that one is a brain in a vat, with computer-induced sense experience) which is logically incompatible with various things one claims to know (such as that one has hands). The proposition that one has hands logically implies the falsity of the sceptical hypothesis. Supposing that one is aware of this implication, the deductive closure principle yields the consequence that if one knows that one has hands, then one knows that one is not a brain in a vat. The sceptic argues that one does not know this: if one were in a vat, then one would have just the sensory evidence one actually has. It follows that one does not know that one has hands. Some philosophers have sought to block this argument by denying the deductive closure principle.

A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Marin Geier
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain In A Vat

This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.

Semantic Pragmatism and A Priori Knawledge (or ‘Yes we could all be brains in a vat’)

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Jackman
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Self ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain In A Vat

Hilary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, he originally introduced his brain in a vat scenario to help illustrate a point about the ‘mind/world relationship.’ In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of a defense of his conception of truth as idealized rational acceptability. Putnam's discussion has already inspired a substantial body of criticism, but it will be argued here that these criticisms fail to capture the central problem with his argument. Indeed, it will be shown that, rather than simply following from his semantic externalism, Putnam's conclusions about the self-refuting character of the brain in a vat hypothesis are actually out of line with central and plausible aspects of his own account of the relationship between our minds and the world.

Pluralist Consequentialist Anti-Scepticism

2020 ◽  
pp. 297-326
Author(s):  
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Absence Of Evidence ◽  
Brain In A Vat

How could it be warranted and rational to accept anti-sceptical hypotheses (I’m not a brain in a vat, There is an external world, etc.) in the absence of evidence supporting such propositions? Crispin Wright has introduced entitlement of cognitive project—a non-evidential species of warrant—as a response to the sceptic. Critics (Pritchard and Jenkins) have argued that Wright-style entitlement is not an epistemic kind of warrant and does not sustain epistemic rationality. This chapter develops a consequentialist alternative to Wright’s proposal. Acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses is epistemically warranted and rational because it maximizes epistemic value. This is argued within an axiological framework that incorporates pluralism about epistemic value or goods. Truth is not the only epistemic good—contra veritic monism, the most widely held view about epistemic value. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the success of the consequentialist approach eliminates the need for Wright-style entitlement.

scholarly journals PATNEMIŠKASIS ANTISKEPTIKAS, VERSIJA 3.00: NAUJI PAVIDALAI – SENI REZULTATAI

Problemos ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys
Keyword(s):  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Original Version ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Brain In A Vat

Straipsnio tikslas – aptarti ir įvertinti epistemologijoje pasitaikančius antiskeptinius argumentus, paremtus kauzaline referencijos teorija. Ypatingas dėmesys skiriamas Hilary Putnamo „smegenų megintuvėlyje“ argumento patobulintam variantui, kurį pasiūlė Olafas Mülleris. Pasak Müllerio, jo patobulintasis argumentas remiasi metafiziškai neutraliais semantinio eksternalizmo ir kabučių panaikinimo (diskvotacijos) principais. Tačiau skrupulingesnė šių principų ir galimybės juos pritaikyti antiskeptinėms reikmėms analizė atskleidžia Müllerio argumentacijos spragas. Jis prieina prie savo išvados supainiodamas sintaksiškai vienodas, tačiau semantiškai skirtingas „smegenų megintuvėlyje“ kalbos, „normalios“ kalbos ir metakalbos ištaras. Müllerio argumento rekonstrukcija ir analizė leidžia tvirtinti, kad jeigu jo prielaidos būtų formuluojamos taip, kad nekliūtų skeptikui, t. y. būtų metafiziškai neutralios, argumentas neįrodytų nieko daugiau nei originalus Putnamo suformuluotas argumentas.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: skepticizmas, Olaf Müller, semantinis eksternalizmas, kabučių panaikinimas, smegenys mėgintuvėlyje.Putnamian Anti-Envattor ver. 3.00: New Features – Same ResultsJonas Dagys SummaryThe paper is devoted to a discussion and critical evaluation of antisceptical arguments in epistemology that are based on causal theory of reference, with the special focus upon the revised version of the Hilary Putnam‘s Brain-in-a-Vat argument presented by Olaf Müller. Müller claims that his argument is based on the metaphysically neutral principles of semantic externalism and disquotation, however more thorough analysis of these principles and of the possibility to use them for antisceptical purposes reveals the flaw in his argument. It seems that Müller reaches his conclusion by confusing the syntactically identical, though semantically distinct utterances in BIV language, non-BIV language, and metalanguage. The reconstruction and analysis of Müller‘s argument shows that his argument, provided that its premises are formulated carefully so as not to beg the question against the sceptic, fails to establish anything more than the original version provided by Putnam.Keywords: scepticism, Olaf Müller, semantic externalism, disquotation, brain-in-a-Vat.

scholarly journals Against (Neo-Wittgensteinian) Entitlements

2020 ◽  
pp. 327-343
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Crispin Wright takes his entitlement strategy to be neo-Wittgensteinian. This chapter argues for two conclusions. First, Wright’s entitlement strategy cannot be neo-Wittgensteinian, properly so-called. Wright explicitly characterizes trust in anti-sceptical hypotheses as epistemically rational. However, properly Wittgensteinian approaches place anti-sceptical hypotheses or so-called hinge propositions (I’m not a brain in a vat, There is an external world, etc.) outside the realm of rational evaluation. Second, Wright-style entitlement is fundamentally flawed because it is unclear what kind of epistemic good it is supposed to be. Since entitlements are non-evidential in nature, they cannot be epistemic goods by virtue of supporting the truth of anti-sceptical hypotheses. They cannot sustain anything worthy of the label “epistemic rationality” either.

Thomas Reid's View of Memorial Conception

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Marina Folescu
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Good Grasp

Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid's notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same is true of memory, and it offers an answer to the question: what type of conception does it employ?

PECULIARITIES OF MANIFESTATION OF MEANING DISSONANCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (10) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Abakumova I.V. ◽  
Grishina A.V. ◽  
Godunov M.V.
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Dissonance ◽  
Personal Development ◽  
External World ◽  
Personal Meaning ◽  
Formation Processes ◽  
Common Mean ◽  
Personal Meanings ◽  
Modern Psychology ◽  
Meaning Systems ◽  
The Subject

Modern psychology considers meaning regulation, as an integral mechanism of personal development. A system of personal meanings develops in the processes of under-standing reality. Due to their polymodality personal meanings cannot be good or bad, but they are not the same. When confronted with unknown situations, the unevenness of the emerging personal meanings can lead to match or mismatch with the existing system of mean-ings. Coincidence, as agreement with a new fact, means meaning consonance. Mismatch, as a mismatch between new and existing information, means meaning disso-nance, as a kind of cognitive dissonance. An analysis of modern psychological literature shows that there are two main plans for the action of meaning dissonances: the dissonance of individual meanings in the implementation of real interactions and the dissonance of common mean-ings during the translation of interpersonal meaning formations. It is proposed to consider that meaning ac-quires a personal coloring due to the processes of both consonance and dissonance positioning of meaning con-structs in the meaning sphere of the subject. The revealed dichotomy of the meaning formation processes shows the possibility of manifestation of meanings bipolarity, which is revealed in the process of transition from the internal to the external world and in collisions with oth-er meaning systems. Then it can be assumed that the ef-fect of meaning dissonance manifests itself in two ways: firstly, in terms of real interactions as a discord of indi-vidual meanings, and secondly, in terms of translation of interpersonal meaning constructs as a dissonance of common meanings. In the course of such an external for-mation, meaning becomes already a personal meaning in the consciousness of a particular person.

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