scholarly journals Deduction of Freedom vs Deduction of Experience in Kant’s Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80
Author(s):  
Valeriy E. Semyonov
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Transcendental Reduction ◽  
Methodological Basis ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Intelligible World ◽  
Critical Methods

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction of pure concepts of understanding (deduction of experience) and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason (deduction of freedom). The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental (formal) idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”.

Freedom and Obligation

2021 ◽  
pp. 71-99
Author(s):  
Owen Ware
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Sensibility ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Intelligible World

This chapter has three aims. First, it gives an overview of the reception of Kant’s project of moral justification up to the twentieth century, showing that Kant’s first readers detected no great rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. A consensus that Kant reversed or rejected the argument of Groundwork III only takes shape in 1960. Second, this chapter returns to the details of Groundwork III and argues that Kant appeals to the idea of an intelligible world to warrant our possession of a free will. Third, this chapter argues that, while the second Critique is mostly continuous with Kant’s earlier argument, it goes further by including a theory of moral sensibility.

From Deduction to Deed: Kant's Grounding of the Moral Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sussman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Intelligible World ◽  
Supreme Principle

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents the moral law as the sole ‘fact of pure reason’ that neither needs nor admits of a deduction to establish its authority. This claim may come as a surprise to many readers of his earlier Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the last section of the Groundwork, Kant seemed to offer a sketch of just such a ‘deduction of the supreme principle of morality’ (GMS 4: 463). Although notoriously obscure, this sketch shows that Kant hoped to base the moral law in the freedom that rational agents can claim as members of the ‘intelligible world’ that transcendental idealism makes available to us. In contrast, the second Critique abandons all aspirations of deriving morality from more basic notions of freedom and practical rationality.

OS POSTULADOS DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA PURA E O CRISTIANISMO

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (135) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Gabriel Almeida Assumpção
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Highest Good ◽  
Immortality Of The Soul ◽  
Kantian Morality

Resumo: A leitura da Crítica da Razão Prática permite perceber que a moral kantiana não consiste em mero formalismo, abrindo espaço para uma discussão sobre os fins morais. O fim último a que o ser racional cuja vontade é determinada pela lei moral se propõe a produzir é o conceito de sumo Bem, ligação sintética a priori entre virtude como causa e felicidade moralmente condicionada como efeito. Ciente das dificuldades para a produção do objeto proposto, Kant recorre aos postulados da razão prática pura (liberdade, imortalidade da alma e existência de Deus) e estabelece um contraponto entre o cristianismo e escolas pagãs da antiguidade que não aceitariam tais pressuposições (na visão de Kant), os estóicos e os epicuristas. Buscamos mostrar, com o presente estudo, a fecundidade do diálogo entre Kant e o cristianismo, bem como o esforço kantiano de tentar fazer jus a diferentes dimensões do ser humano: tanto a afetividade quanto a moralidade.Abstract: Reading the Critique of Practical Reason enables us to realize that Kantian morality is not mere formalism, but is rather an opening to discuss moral ends. The ultimate goal of the rational being, whose will is determined by moral law, is the concept of the Highest Good, the a priori synthetic connection between virtue as a cause and a morally conditioned happiness as an effect. Aware of the difficulties related to the proposed object, Kant resorts to the postulates of practical reason (freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God) and counterpoints Christianity with two ancient pagan schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans, which, according to the philosopher, would not accept such assumptions. The present study aims to show there is a fecund dialogue between Kant and Christianity, as well as the author’s attempt to do justice to the following dimensions of the human being: affectivity and morality.

Spontaneity and Self-Consciousness in theGroundworkand the B-Critique

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (7) ◽  
pp. 936-955
Author(s):  
Yoon Choi
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
First Time

AbstractAccording to some influential readings of theGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and the significance of such self-consciousness is irremediably at odds with the Critical theory, and thus roundly and rightly rejected in the second edition of theCritique of Pure Reasonand theCritique of Practical Reason. This paper argues, on the contrary, that theGroundworkcan be read as articulating for the first time the account of self-consciousness and spontaneity that Kant goes on to develop in the B-Critique, especially the B-Transcendental Deduction.

scholarly journals On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Disputatio ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (30) ◽  
pp. 151-169
Author(s):  
Marilia Espirito Santo
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Subject

Abstract The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Structural Description ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
The World ◽  
Empirical Realism

This chapter presents a straightforward structural description of Immanuel Kant’s conception of what the transcendental deduction is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it. The ‘deduction’ Kant thinks is needed for understanding the human mind would establish and explain our ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to something we seem to possess and employ in ‘the highly complicated web of human knowledge’. This is: experience, concepts, and principles. The chapter explains the point and strategy of the ‘deduction’ as Kant understands it, as well as the demanding conditions of its success, without entering into complexities of interpretation or critical assessment of the degree of success actually achieved. It also analyses Kant’s arguments regarding a priori concepts as well as a posteriori knowledge of the world around us, along with his claim that our position in the world must be understood as ‘empirical realism’.

The Experience of Discipline Reformatting: Culturology on the Basis of Orthodox Anthropology

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 105-140
Author(s):  
Svetlana V. Lourie
Keyword(s):  
Research Methodology ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Scientific Language ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
Methodological Basis ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
General Scientific

Philosophy always lies at the heart of any science, regardless of how non-ideological and positivistic it claims to be; and the structure, conceptual apparatus and research methodology depend on it, whether the scientists acknowledge it or not. It is all primarily in general scientific paradigm. It so happens that key axioms, both theoretical and methodological, of modern science are materialistic. The case is that even if any scientist would like to abandon those doubtful axioms, he would continue to think along those lines as the very scientific language and scientific thought are based on them, otherwise instead of science we’ll get just an assortment of value judgments. To abandon materialistic scientific language will require sufficient efforts. Such paradigms as “created world”, the presence of “immortal origin” in a human being, etc, can’t be rationally proved, as well as, for example, phylogenesis; but they work none the worse as science methodological basis. The science won’t become any less scientific, if it is built on different basis but with adhering to scientific methodology, some specific cognitive modus of science. At the same time, the scientific language itself should be renewed. Thus we’ll try to remodel culturology. This article is a fragment of a big project, started at the initiative of the author with the goal of reformatting culturology on the basis of Orthodox patristic anthropology.

Instrumental Means for Managing the Rational Behavior of Self-Organizing Autonomous Intelligent Agents

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 171-180
Author(s):  
V. B. Melekhin ◽  
M. V. Khachumov
Keyword(s):  
Intelligent Agents ◽  
Environmental Changes ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Operating Conditions ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Purposeful Behavior ◽  
Problem Solvers ◽  
Boundary Estimates ◽  
Self Learning ◽  
Self Organizing

We formulate the basic principles of constructing a sign-signal control for the expedient behavior of autonomous intelligent agents in a priori undescribed conditions of a problematic environment. We clarify the concept of a self-organizing autonomous intelligent agent as a system capable of automatic goal-setting when a certain type of conditional and unconditional signal — signs appears in a problem environment. The procedures for planning the expedient behavior of autonomous intelligent agents have been developed, that imitate trial actions under uncertainty in the process of studying the regularities of transforming situations in a problem environment, which allows avoiding environmental changes in the process of self-learning that are not related to the achievement of a given goal. Boundary estimates of the proposed procedures complexity for planning expedient behavior are determined, confirming the possibility of their effective implementation on the on-board computer of the automatic control system for the expedient activity of autonomous intelligent agents. We carry out an imitation on a personal computer of the proposed procedures for planning purposeful behavior, confirming the effectiveness of their use to build intelligent problem solvers for autonomous intelligent agents in order to endow them with the ability to adapt to a priori undescribed operating conditions. The main types of connections between various conditional and unconditional signal — signs of a problem environment are structured, which allows autonomous intelligent agents to adapt to complex a priori undescribed and unstable conditions of functioning.

scholarly journals The Need for Transdisciplinarity in Higher Education in a Globalized World

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Basarab Nicolescu
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Body ◽  
First Century ◽  
Human Being ◽  
New Production ◽  
Transmission Of Knowledge ◽  
Integral Education ◽  
New Type ◽  
The University ◽  
Globalized World

A viable education can only be an integral education of the human being. Transdisciplinary education is founded on the inexhaustible richness of the scientific spirit which is based on questioning and of the refusal of all a priori answers and all certitude contradictory to the facts. At the same time, it revalues the role of the deeply rooted intuition, of the imaginary, of sensitivity, and of the body in the transmission of knowledge. It is only in this way that the society of the twenty-first century can reconcile effectivity and respect for the potentiality of every human being. The transdisciplinary approach will be an indispensable complement to the disciplinary approach because it will mean the emergence of continually connected beings, who are able to adapt themselves to the changing exigencies of professional life, and who are endowed with permanent flexibility which is always oriented towards the actualization of their interior potentialities. If the University intends to be a valid actor in sustainable development it has first to recognize the emergence of a new type of knowledge: transdisciplinary knowledge. The new production of knowledge implies a necessary multidimensional opening of the process of learning: towards civil society; towards cyber-space-time; towards the aim of universality; towards a redefinition of the values governing its own existence.

Kant's Justification of Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Ware
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Critical Methodology ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Historical Contextualization ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Moral Normativity ◽  
Moral Requirements

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document