Relational Contracts

Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg

Chapter 54 concerns relational contracts. Classical contract law was implicitly based on a paradigm consisting of a bargain made between strangers transacting on a perfect market, and focused on the static instant of contract formation, rather than dynamic processes such as the evolution of a contractual relationship. Relational-contract theory rejects the stranger-in-a-perfect-market paradigm and the static conception of contract law. Instead, it is based on a paradigm of a contractual transaction between actors who are in an ongoing and dynamic relationship. The identification of relational contracts as an economic and sociological entity is desirable. However, a theory of relational contracts requires the formulation of a body of legal rules applicable to, and only to, relational contracts. This is a place to which relational-contract theory has not gone and cannot go.

Yuridika ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 469
Author(s):  
Akhmad Budi Cahyono

Default is something that often occurs in contractual relationship. It can be not perform its obligations in the contract in all or in a part, performing its obligations but not in accordance with was agreed, performing its obligations but not in time, and performing something that is prohibited in the contract. Due to default, the injured party may claim compensation and / or terminate the contract. The problem is, the Indonesian Civil Code does not specify how a contract can be terminated in case of default. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comparative study in other countries in terms of how a default can terminate the contract. The British which adopt common law tradition where jurisprudence is the main source of law is the right choice for conducting comparative studies. Countries with common law traditions have detailed legal rules based on jurisprudence. As in Indonesia, according to British contract law, defaults also can terminate the contract. However, unlike in Indonesia, according to British contract law, termination due to a default is only allowed in the event that the default is very serious. The very serious forms of default will be elaborated and become a part of the discussion in this paper.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.G. Allen

Abstract This article explores ‘smart contracts’ from first principles: What they are, whether they are properly called ‘contracts’, and what issues they raise for national contract law. A ‘smart’ contract purports to record contractual promises in language which is both intelligible to human beings and (ultimately) executable by machines. The formalisation of contracting language that this entails is, I argue, the most important aspect for lawyers—just as important as the automation of contractual performance. Rather than taking a doctrinal approach focused on the presence of traditional indicia of contract formation, I examine the nature of contracts as legal entities created by words and documents. In most cases, smart contracts will be ‘wrapped in paper’ and nested in a national legal system. Borrowing from the idiom of computer science, I introduce the term ‘contract stack’ to highlight the complex nature of contracts as legal entities incorporating different ‘layers’, including speech acts by the parties in both natural and formal languages as well as mandatory legal rules. It is the interactions within this contract stack that will be most important to the development of contract law doctrines appropriate to smart contracts. To illustrate my points, I explore a few issues that smart contracts might raise for English contract law. I touch on the questions of illegality, jurisdiction, and evidence, but my focus in this paper is on exploring issues in contract law proper. This contribution should be helpful not only to lawyers attempting to understand smart contracts, but to those involved in coding smart contracts—and writing the languages used to code them.


Author(s):  
Prince Saprai

This chapter introduces the dominant philosophical account of contract law: the ‘promise theory’. According to the promise theory, promise plays a ‘foundational’ or special normative role in the justification of contract law rules and doctrines. This chapter explains that the book’s purpose is to debunk the promise theory and its foundationalist assumptions. It provides an overview of the main argument of the book, which relies on showing that the promise theory obscures or underplays the role that other values and normative concerns have in shaping contract law rules and doctrines. Contract law is the product of ‘normative pluralism’, and this chapter explains how that theme is approached in the book in the following three interrelated contexts: contract theory, legal doctrine, and transnational trends toward the harmonization of contract law. The central claim of the book is introduced as a plea to move away from a ‘top-down’ theory of contract law such as the promise theory and toward a distinctly republican or ‘bottom-up’ approach to contract law that focuses on justifying the legal rules and doctrines we find in particular jurisdictions at particular times.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chapin F. Cimino

Modern contract law scholarship embraces a particularly strange contradiction. On one hand, most legal scholars accept the core insight of what is called relational contract theory: most commercial contracts involve repeat players who seek to maximize wealth while still maintaining cooperative relationships. On the other hand, many of these same contract scholars believe that there is nothing contract law could or should do about it. They contend that contract law and legal theory are better off ignoring this insight, rather than trying to respond to it. This Article brings these disparate lines of contract scholarship together by introducing new information that could dramatically change how legal scholars make sense of relational contract theory. It turns out that while legal scholars have largely discounted the importance of relational contract theory, another community of scholars—working in organizational theory, marketing, and strategic management—have studied, tested, and developed its insights. As a result, they have not only empirically confirmed the presence of relational behaviors in modern contracting, but they have begun to discover the sort of data that might make it possible to better account for the economic effects of relational contracting behavior in both legal theory and contract law doctrine. This literature demonstrates that it is possible to operationalize the insights of relational contract theory in an interdisciplinary way that respects both the need for a methodologically rigorous framework and the complex nature of economic behavior. In this Article, I argue that contract law scholars should set out on that same course.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey D. Michler ◽  
Steven Y. Wu

We appraise the current status of relational contract theory, along with associated empirical studies, with the goal of providing an orientation to the field to economists who may not have expertise in contract theory. We begin with a theoretical discussion focusing mainly on intuition and the usefulness of the theory for conceptualizing applied agricultural contracting problems. We also discuss current theoretical challenges and the current state of empirical research on relational contracts. We conclude by discussing potentially fruitful areas for future research.


Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Zhong Xing Tan

Abstract This paper explores the promise of pluralism in the realm of contract law. I begin by identifying and rejecting conceptual strategies adopted by monistic and dualistic approaches. Turning towards pluralism, I evaluate three versions in contemporary literature: pluralism across contracting spheres and types, pluralism through consensus and convergence, and pluralism through localised values-balancing and practical reasoning. I suggest embracing some pluralism about contract pluralism, by using these models to construct a framework of ‘meta-pluralism’, where at the macro-level, we are concerned with plural spheres of contracting activity; at the meso-level, a variety of trans-substantive interpretive concepts that receive some measure of juristic consensus; and at the micro-level, practical reasoning through particularistic analysis of case-specific considerations. I illustrate the meta-pluralistic framework through a case study on the varieties of specific performance, and explain how the proposed pluralistic framework enriches our understanding of the nature of contract.


Author(s):  
Dan HAN

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.According to relational contract theory, the parties in a marriage and family should not only respect the independence and autonomy of the parties, but also shape the unity of the parties. This constitutes a paradox of modern marriage and family. Contractual intimacy can be expressed in many forms, and can even be expressed freely without form. However, the phenomena of marriage and family life are by no means merely contracts of relations; they are just as much about ideas as about facts.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 69 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Margaret Jane Radin

This book examines standardized form contracts, also known as boilerplate. In the past, “contract” was interpreted as a bargained-for exchange transaction between two parties who each consent to the exchange. Bargained-for exchange represents contract in a world of voluntary agreement—World A (for Agreement). Standardized form contracts, on the other hand, belong to World B (for Boilerplate). World B doesn't fit the theory, the rationale, of contract law. This book explores judicial oversight of boilerplate through the legal doctrines of unconscionability and voidness as against public policy, among others. It also considers the problem of boilerplate rights deletion schemes as well as attempts to bring such schemes under the aegis of traditional contract theories. This chapter provides an overview of worlds A and B as well as varieties of World B contracts, boilerplate as a method of contract formation, and two problems arising from boilerplate: normative degradation and democratic degradation.


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