Frogs, Mules, and Life after Maytag

Author(s):  
Chad Broughton

It Was a cold evening in early December 2006, and Tracy Warner had just returned home from Willits Primary School. Ryan had just sung in the “Winter Wonderland” musical there. Christmas lights dotted F Street, adding some warmth to her modest block in the heart of Monmouth, Illinois. She looked like a new woman, and, judging by her smile, she knew it. The jeans and T-shirt—the uniform of the anxious, soon-to-be-unemployed line worker and picketer of a couple years earlier—had been replaced by a red V-neck sweater, silk blouse, and an aura of confidence. She was wrapping up four fall semester classes and a journalism internship at the school’s news­paper, the Western Courier. She had done this while raising Ryan and frantically looking for a job. She was set to graduate on the following Saturday from Western Illinois University. The dream Warner had dreamt a thousand times while piecing together refrigerator doors on the Maytag line for over fifteen years was coming true. “Look at this,” she said, handing me an essay. “It’s a paper on Rawls’ theory of justice. He said that we have to stand behind a veil of ignorance to make fair decisions.” Her reference fit the moment. John Rawls’ 1971 Theory of Justice poses a hypothetical world in which all societal roles are shuffled behind a metaphorical “veil of ignorance.” Behind this veil, one does not know to what role he or she will be assigned in the new social order. It is only from there, Rawls argues, can one truly judge the fairness of various social roles and relations. The CEO, for instance, would have to experience the lives of workers he put out of work. Warner still saw Ralph Hake as a great villain—and it was not just because of the factory closing and the gutting of her working life as well as the working lives of her friends and co-workers. Warner had embraced the changes as best she could, and she and Ryan would find a way to survive.

Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  

Starting in a paper where he defines his constructivist notion of morality (1980), Rawls begins - at least explicitly - to grow apart from Kant, one of his major mentors up to the moment, especially regarding that first original support given in A Theory of Justice. At the same time, he reveals himself as sympathizing with the political philosophy of John Dewey. In order to accomplish this microproject where he makes explicit the changes affecting his theory, he resorts to a reasoning based on the supposedly variants that, according to Rawls, are present in constructivism. Out of this new version of moral constructivism, he begins drifting apart from the rigorous Kantianism the first community voices had began to criticize in him in the 70’s.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the actual history of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the valuation distortions that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”


Etyka ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?


Author(s):  
R.Yu. Belkovich ◽  
S.V. Vinogradov

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.


2018 ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Yasmin Díaz Saldes

Los sentimientos morales, un elemento articulador de la justicia como imparcialidadMoral feelings, an articulating element of justice as impartialityOs sentimentos morais, um elemento articulador da Justiça como imparcialidade ResumenLa noción de sujeto que subyace en la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls, es un elemento fundamental para la propuesta de justicia como imparcialidad, pues se trata de un sujeto concebido a partir de la noción kantiana de persona moral. Esto significa que el sujeto es capaz de autodeterminarse y, en función de esta autodeterminación, la comunidad política debe garantizar las condiciones para que pueda desarrollar su proyecto de vida. En tanto, la propuesta de la justicia como imparcialidad es una propuesta de sociedad liberal, que busca garantizar las libertades básicas del individuo y establecer las condiciones de posibilidad de una comunidad política pluralista, por medio de la articulación de principios de la justicia reconocidos y valorados por todos los integrantes de la sociedad, de manera que la estabilidad de la comunidad política radica en la fidelidad a los principios articuladores del orden social. Esta fidelidad se consigue por medio de lo que Rawls denomina el “sentido de la justicia”. AbstractThe notion of subject that underlies the theory of justice by John Rawls is a fundamental element for proposing justice as impartiality, since it is a subject conceived from the Kantian notion of a moral person. This means that the subject is capable of self-determination and, in function of this self-determination, the political community must guarantee conditions so he or she can develop a life project. Meanwhile, the proposal of justice as impartiality is a proposal of a liberal society, seeking to guarantee individual basic freedoms and establish conditions of possibility for a pluralist political community through the articulation of principles of justice recognized and valued by all members of society, so that the stability of the political community lies in the fidelity to the articulating principles of social order. This fidelity is achieved through, what Rawls calls, a “sense of justice.”ResumoA noção de sujeito que subjaz na teoria da justiça de John Rawls, é um elemento fundamental para a proposta de justiça como imparcialidade, pois se trata de um sujeito concebido a partir da noção kantiana de pessoa moral. Isto significa que o sujeito é capaz de autodeterminar-se e, em função desta autodeterminação, a comunidade política deve garantir as condições para que possa desenvolver seu projeto de vida. Assim, a proposta da justiça como imparcialidade é uma proposta de sociedade liberal, que busca garantir as liberdades básicas do indivíduo e estabelecer as condições de possibilidade de uma comunidade política pluralista, por meio da articulação de princípios da justiça reconhecidos e valorados por todos os integrantes da sociedade, de maneira que a estabilidade da comunidade política radica na fidelidade aos princípios articuladores da ordem social. Esta fidelidade alcança-se por meio do que Rawls denomina o “sentido da justiça”.


1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Phillips

The difference principle of John Rawls is viewed as a modest reconstitution of the Pareto test for maximization of total welfare. The author illustrates through use of utility analysis that the difference principle for redressing inequities requires the least redistribution of the several options available to persons in Rawls' initial position. Furthermore, the Rawlsian framework is placed in a broader notion of equity which calls into question whether Rawls' theory adequately addresses the problem of absolute as opposed to relative advantages to the least advantaged. Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it entirely. This complete equality is always slipping through the people's fingers at the moment when they think to grasp it, fleeing as Pascal says, in an eternal flight; the people grow heated in search of this blessing, all the more precious because it is near enough to be seen but too far off to be tasted.


ARTMargins ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-76
Author(s):  
Angela Harutyunyan

Abstract The essay inquires about the historical condition of representation in our present while invoking the modern experience of the sublime and landscape as the medium of that experience. Can the sublime as the experience of the subject confronted with the very limits of representation be extended to our late capitalist conditions of mediatized representations? What constitutes “a landscape” as the site of the experience of the sublime in late capitalism? The essay addresses these questions through a renewed discussion of Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility” (1936) by focusing on the discussion of the aura and the decay of the aura in relation to landscape. In the wake of the failure of a transformative praxis to bring about a new social order, the technologically hyper-mediated engagement of man with nature under the conditions of extreme alienation and reification results in the production of the aesthetics of destruction experienced as “supreme pleasure”. In the age of the atomic bomb and technological hyper-mediation, the singularity of the moment of the experience of the sublime is multiply reproduced. The essay ends with an analysis of Werner Herzog’s 1992 film Lessons of Darkness as an example of rendering cinematically the aura’s survival under the conditions of its decay in the burning oil fields of Kuwait. Capitalism’s “desert of the real”, as the vast desert in Kuwait in Herzog’s film, is precisely the landscape in relation to which the subject attempts to represent that which evades representation (the event, nature, capitalism, and so on).


MELINTAS ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Alfensius Alwino

Through the history of philosophy, the theme of justice has become a very important topic. Thinkers of the theories such as utilitarianism, intuitionism, eudaimonism, perfectionism, liberalism, communitarianism, and socialism have discussed the theme. As French philosopher Alain Badiou has pointed out, the central of political studies from the time of Plato to the present day is justice. The question is what is justice? For John Rawls, justice is the supreme virtue of human. In <em>A Theory of Justice</em>, Rawls asserts that justice is the first priority in social institutions, as is truth in the system of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is not true, so the laws and institutions, however efficient and neat, must be reformed or removed if it is unfair. Rawls criticizes the theory of justice in Lockean liberalism and Marxian socialism. Both theories of justice are very strong colouring the landscape of debate on the roots of thinking about justice. For Rawls, liberalism that accentuates basic freedoms can create inequality between people who have better abilities with less fortunate people. Similarly, socialism which accentuates equality ignores basic freedoms. The two theories of justice are considered ideological in the sense that there are hidden interests behind the jargons of freedom and equality. Rawls then develops an abstract theory of justice, in which the participants depart from a veil of ignorance, so that they are free of any interest and ambition. Here they might build a cooperative contract in a society governed by the principles of justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Yuancai Zheng

<p>Administrative organizations are mainly responsible for managing the specific administrative affairs and promoting economic and social development. The practice of fairness and justice in modern administration plays an important role as a weathervane. Therefore, the study and application of principles in <em>A Theory of Justice</em> by John Rawls is of great significance for administrative organizations to protect citizens’ legitimate rights and interests, as well as to construct a good social order.</p>


Author(s):  
Eguzki Urteaga

RESUMENReconstrucción teórica de nuestras intuiciones a propósito de la justicia social, la Teoría de la justicia de John Rawls debía tomar en consideración a los más desfavorecidos a través del principio de diferencia que reparte los bienes de manera equitativa. Para Rawls, la objetividad moral está garantizada por la experiencia del posicionamiento original, caracterizada por el velo de ignorancia. Amartya Sen cuestiona ese planteamiento criticando el índice de los bienes básicos. Este artículo explicita lo que está en juego en este debate y desarrolla las aportaciones de la teoría de las capacidades a la reflexión contemporánea sobre las desigualdades socioeconómicas.PALABRAS CLAVERawls – Sen – teoría – pobreza – capacidadABSTRACTIn his theoretical reconstruction of our intuitions about social justice, John Rawls’s Theory of justice intended to take into consideration the worst-off due to the difference principle that distributes the goods in an equal way. For Rawls, the moral objectivity is guaranteed by the experience of the original position, characterized by the veil of ignorance that conceals particular interests. But, Amartya Sen has criticized this theory and specially the index of basic goods. This article states explicitly what is at stake in this debate and develops the contributions of the theory of capabilities to the contemporary reflection on the economic and social inequalities.KEYWORDSRawls - Sen - theory - poverty - capability


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