Growth and the Good Life

2021 ◽  
pp. 57-99
Author(s):  
Jack Bauer

This chapter presents a new framework to integrate two dominant models of the good life: hedonia and eudaimonia. Hedonia emphasizes the primacy of pleasure (e.g., satisfaction and happiness), whereas eudaimonia emphasizes the primacy of meaning (e.g., well-being, meaningfulness, moral virtue, wisdom, growth, and self-actualizing). The two function on different levels of context. Three facets of value facilitate their integration. Value orientation refers to one’s values, motives, and needs. Value fulfillment is the successful enactment of value orientation, typically experienced as hedonic satisfaction or eudaimonic meaningfulness. Value perspectivity (a newly theorized feature of value and a key quality of wisdom) is the degree of complexity and coherence by which value orientations and fulfillments are interpreted. The transformative self emphasizes eudaimonic growth, which emphasizes humane and organismic value orientations. The three facets of value reconfigure into four superordinate categories of goods in life: happiness, love, wisdom, and growth.

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Elaine Graham

AbstractThe so-called 'happiness hypothesis', associated with the work of the economist Richard Layard, has attracted much public debate over recent years. Its main contention is that despite rising levels of material prosperity in the west, incidence of recorded happiness and greater quality of life has not increased accordingly. In considering the major contributory factors to happiness and well-being, however, Layard is not alone in identifying the significance of religious values and participation in religion for positive and enduring levels of happiness. In response, this article critiques some of the evidence correlating religion and well-being, as well as considering the broader and much more vexed question of how far public policy is capable of incorporating questions of belief and value into its indicators of happiness and the good life. Drawing on traditions of virtue ethics as the cultivation of 'the life well-lived', I ask whether specifically Christian accounts of human flourishing and the good life still have any bearing in the wider public domain, and what 'rules of engagement' might need to be articulated in any dialogue between Christian values and the discourse of theology and a pluralist society.


2005 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald P. Strauss ◽  
Carla Fenson

Objective This article is a qualitative approach to understanding how people with craniofacial conditions see quality in their lives and how they understand the components of building a sense of well-being or goodness in their lives. Literary selections from fiction, Web sites, and first-person accounts are examined and categorized into domains and themes to offer some insight into how quality of life is built into the lives of people with craniofacial conditions. Three domains are noted: (1) a personality and psychological domain; (2) a family, work, and social interactive domain; and (3) a cultural and societal domain. Within each domain, a number of themes are noted and discussed. Quotes from affected people and their families are offered to illustrate how they respond to and alter their lives and their world views. Many adults with craniofacial conditions find ways to live with their difference and to succeed using the measures they construct.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 767-780
Author(s):  
Jason R. Raibley

Inspired by Aristotle, Paul Bloomfield holds that all genuine reasons for action are explained in terms of one basic goal: to live a Good Life. But living morally—choosing and performing brave, temperate, just, and wise actions—is necessary (though not sufficient) for the Good Life. Using ideas from Kant and Sidgwick, Bloomfield argues that immorality is inherently self-defeating: in disrespecting others, one disrespects oneself. Moreover, immoralists—who believe that immoral action often conduces to self-interest—operate with a self-defeating conception of happiness. Bloomfield succeeds in explaining why moral virtue and personal well-being are not completely opposed to one another. However, his main arguments against immoralism are unconvincing, because they require controversial claims about essential properties and the logic of attitudes taken towards them. Other arguments against immoralism attribute inessential views to immoralists, or else require controversial assumptions about the relation between valuing and believing good.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 615-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Lewis ◽  
Ryota Kanai ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
Timothy C. Bates

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.


1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-364
Author(s):  
Bi‐Hwan Kim

Joseph Raz Has Long Been Well Known as a Legal philosopher and theorist of practical reason. But it is only in the last decade that he has come to be widely identified as the most prominent defender of a distinctive interpretation of the liberal tradition. Raz wholeheartedly endorses the communitarian view that the individual is a social being, who needs society to establish his/her self-identity and to gain objective knowledge of the good, rather than a self-contained subject abstracted from any specific social experience. Unlike neutralist liberals, such as Rawls and Dworkin, he rejects ‘the priority of right over the good’, stressing the interdependent relationship between right and the good. Yet he remains very much a liberal in his commitment to the value of autonomy (or freedom) and argues powerfully for the desirability (or necessity) of incommensurable plural conceptions of the good life for the well-being of people, as well as for the liberal virtue of toleration, and for their attendant liberal democratic political institutions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (4II) ◽  
pp. 863-879
Author(s):  
Rashida Haq Rashida Haq ◽  
Azkar Ahmed ◽  
Siama Shafique

Since quality of life research is essentially concerned with measuring and monitoring welfare. In order to measure quality of life, one must have a theory of what makes up a good life [Cobb (2000)]. There is a variety of such theories and notions of what constitutes a ‗good life‘ and correspondingly different concepts of welfare and quality of life have been developed. Various approaches and operationalisations are to be distinguished, each of which reveals a different concept of welfare and thus highlights different components and dimensions [Noll (2000)]. Among the various efforts to operationalise welfare in general and the quality of life concept in particular, two contrary approaches are to be distinguished, which define the two extreme positions on a broad continuum of concepts currently available: the Scandinavian level of living approach [Erickson (1993)] and the American quality of life approach [Campbell (1976)]. The Scandinavian approach focuses almost exclusively on resources and objective living conditions, whereas the American approach emphasises the subjective well-being of individuals as a final outcome of conditions and processes.


Author(s):  
Mendiola Teng-Calleja ◽  
Jose Antonio R. Clemente ◽  
Ma. Ligaya Menguito ◽  
Donald Jay Bertulfo

Abstract. This study sought to initiate conversations on the utility of the capability approach and a psychological lens in approximating a living wage. We put forth the concept of capability gap – defined as the difference between what one values and what one perceives as attainable. We used a set of valued domains of a good life that were identified based on well-being indicators in determining capability gaps. Five hundred workers (all breadwinners) belonging to households selected through stratified random sampling from purposively chosen middle- and low-income communities in the Philippines participated in the survey. From the data, we constructed a weighted capability measure that determines the capability gap, weighted by the perceived importance of each of the good life domains. We likewise derived an estimate of a living wage that yields a weighted capability that represents individuals' capabilities to achieve and pursue valued outcomes, freedoms, and entitlements. This initial attempt at estimating a living wage based on individuals' capability to achieve and pursue a good life is presented as the main contribution of the research. The limitations of the study as well as its implications to living wage research and policy are discussed.


Waste ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Eiko Maruko Siniawer

With the ever increasing sense in the 1980s that Japan had arrived as an economic power, attention was newly focused on what beyond financial wealth and material abundance constituted an affluent life, on what constituted “true affluence” or an “affluence of the heart.” Affluence—and waste along with it—came to be conceived in more psychological, spiritual, and emotional terms than in the past, with an attention to a well-being and self-fulfillment which extended beyond the purely financial. What was often being sought was yutori, or leisure, relaxation, space, and unconstricted time. Financial and material prosperity made possible self-reflection about what a good life could and should be in an affluent society.


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