Social Contract versus Invisible Hand

Author(s):  
Viktor J. Vanberg

The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at the relation between the invisible hand paradigm that is at the heart of economists’ theoretical outlook at markets and its “visible hand” counterpart, the social contract paradigm as a theory of government. It is argued that in its generalized interpretation as an individualistic model of organized collective action the social contract paradigm consistently complements the invisible hand paradigm as an individualistic theory of spontaneous social order. What Hayek has referred to as “the two kinds of order,” spontaneous order and corporate order, can thus be accounted for within one coherent individualistic theoretical framework.

1989 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Sartori

MY SENSE OF OUR TIME IS OF A GROWING GAP BETWEEN THE good society that we seek and the ways and means of achieving it. As I have put it,Knowledge becomes more and more the problem as politics becomes more and more complicated. The growing complexity of the world of politics . . . results not only from increasing and global interdependencies, but from the very expansion of the sphere of politics. The more the visible hand and political engineering displace the invisible hand of automatic adjustments (and maladjustments), and the more politics enters everywhere, the less we are in control of what we are doing.And my conclusion repeats: ‘We are . . . living above and beyond our intelligence, above our grasp of what we are doing. The more we engage in remaking the body politic, the more I am struck by the uneasy feeling that we are apprentice sorcerers’.


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Froese

This article argues that Rousseau's Social Contract both upholds and transcends liberal concepts of political right. Rather than maintaining a distinction between public right and public good, Rousseau tries to collapse the division between the two in order to effect a transition from a bourgeois society to a moral community. In his view, individuals are best protected from each other by participating in the formation of a community of equals. Rousseau's conception of morality is not based on absolutes, but is a process whereby individuals consciously integrate themselves into the community. This presupposes a desire to belong on the part of individuals, and recognizes their propensity to distance themselves from the social order. Rather than trying to eradicate the tension between individuality and integration, Rousseau affirms that the effort to reconcile this tension is the foundation of morality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Lovisa Näslund

In the archive, the materialized traces of theatrical organization and performances remain. In this paper, we focus on the employment contract, as a type of source material commonly found but rarely studied in theatre studies. Empirically, the paper is based on a study of contracts from Albert Ranft’s Stockholm theatres, 1895-1926. Ranft built his commercially funded theatrical empire in Stockholm in a period when the competition from subsidized theatre was minimal, and for a time dominated the Stockholm theatres. The study demonstrates how the study of employment contracts allows us to form an understanding of power relations between managers on the one hand, and artists and directors on the other, and also the formal and social aspects of the employment contracts. In the case of Albert Ranft, the contracts bear evidence of his dominant position in Stockholm theatre, which in turn a orded him an unusually powerful position in relation to his employees. The relationship between the formal and social contract is explored, and it is suggested that the formal contract could be seen as a photographic negative of the social contract: if there is an extensive social contract, the formal contract will be more elaborate, and vice versa. The extensive formal contracts of the studied period might therefore be seen as evidence of a relatively thin social contract, implying that industry norms were, at the time, not institutionalized enough to be taken for granted.


2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgann Cope Watson

The division of students into social categories is a phenomenon that invites inquiry. Historically, students have tended to migrate towards one of two groups: the preps who embrace all aspects of school life and the punks who reject all aspects of school life. These two groups are reproductions of the social order. This paper inquires into three elements of the discourse of schooling that influence the categorization of students; normalization, the hidden curriculum and the social contract.


2019 ◽  
pp. 213-247
Author(s):  
Martín Krause

One of the main contributions of economics to the social sciences, expressed in the famous metaphor of the “invisible hand”, ended up being questioned by a good part of the economists. Based on the assumption of an individual maximizer of monetary utility, the social cooperation in which it con- sists failed, and it was not possible to expect it to succeed. However, recent developments in various areas have provided new elements in favor of its pos- sibility, its sustainability over time, and its extension to larger groups. In this work we will consider the recent contributions related to this topic in Game The- ory, Experimental Economics, Evolutionary Psychology and the analysis of his- torical cases that help to elucidate the theory and confirm its concepts. It will be considered how these areas of the social sciences have contributed with new elements to the understanding of social cooperation and voluntary actions. It concludes by stating that the invisible hand failure should, at least, be ques- tioned, and that there is still a large field to be developed in the analysis of these spontaneous orders, although there have been great contributions in recent decades. Keywords: Invisible hand, social cooperation, Game Theory, Experimental Eco- nomics, Evolutionary Psychology JEL classification: A12, C71, C92, D71, D91, H41 Resumen: Una de las principales contribuciones de la economía a las ciencias sociales, expresada en la famosa metáfora de la “mano invisible”, terminó siendo cuestionada por buena parte de los economistas. En base al supuesto de un individuo maximizador de utilidad monetaria, la cooperación social en que ésta consiste fracasaba, no era posible esperar que tuviera éxito. No obstante, recientes desarrollos en diversas áreas han brindado nuevos elemen- tos en favor de la misma, su posibilidad, su sostenibilidad en el tiempo, su extensión a grupos de mayor tamaño. En este trabajo consideraremos las con- tribuciones recientes relacionadas con este tema en Teoría de los Juegos, Economía Experimental, Psicología Evolutiva y el análisis de casos históricos que contribuyen a dilucidar la teoría y confirmar sus conceptos. Se considerará cómo estas áreas de las ciencias sociales aportan nuevos elementos para la comprensión de la cooperación social y las acciones voluntarias. Se concluye planteando que su fracaso debería, al menos, ser puesto en duda, y que hay un gran campo a desarrollar todavía en el análisis de esos órdenes espontá- neos, aunque ha habido grandes contribuciones en las últimas décadas. Palabras clave: Mano invisible, cooperación social, teoría de juegos, economía experimental, psicología evolutiva Clasificación JEL: A12, C71, C92, D71, D91, H41


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 467-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Horne ◽  
Stefanie Mollborn

Norms are a foundational concept in sociology. Following a period of skepticism about norms as overly deterministic and as paying too little attention to social conflict, inequalities, and agency, the past 20 years have seen a proliferation of norms research across the social sciences. Here we focus on the burgeoning research in sociology to answer questions about where norms come from, why people enforce them, and how they are applied. To do so, we rely on three key theoretical approaches in the literature—consequentialist, relational, and agentic. As we apply these approaches, we explore their implications for what are arguably the two most fundamental issues in sociology—social order and inequality. We conclude by synthesizing and building on existing norms research to produce an integrated theoretical framework that can shed light on aspects of norms that are currently not well understood—in particular, their change and erosion.


1997 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Afsaneh Najmabadi

Modern nations have often been explicitly imagined through familial metaphors. In particular, the construction of the national community as a brotherhood (a fraternity) has pointed both to the centrality of male bonding in the production of nationalist sentiment and to the exclusion of women from the social contract. Within that contract not only were women “subject to men's power; it also implied complementary bonds between men;… women had no place in the new political and social order except as markers of social relations between men.”Hunt's observation recalls Sedgwick's analysis of how male bonding is mediated through the figure of woman. In nationalist discourse representing the homeland as a female body has often been used to construct a national identity based on male bonding among a nation of brothers.


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