Capabilities, Freedom, and Severe Poverty

Author(s):  
Thom Brooks

Severe poverty is a key challenge for theorists of global justice. Most theorists have approached this issue primarily by developing accounts for understanding which kinds of duties have relevance and how responsibilities for tackling severe poverty might be assigned to agents, whether individuals, nations, or states. All such views share a commitment to ending severe poverty as a wrongful deprivation with a profoundly negative impact on affected individuals. While much attention has prioritized identifying reasons for others to provide relief, this chapter examines the nature of the wrongful deprivation that characterizes severe poverty. One influential view is championed by Martha Nussbaum in her distinctive capabilities approach. An individual might be considered to experience severe poverty where she is unable to enjoy the use of the capabilities which should be available to her. But this position raises several questions. Take the fact that about 1 billion people are unable to meet their basic needs today. Would the capabilities approach claim the number is much higher given its wider grasp of human flourishing beyond mere material subsistence—and what implications would flow from this? Or would the capabilities approach claim only a portion of those unable to meet their basic needs are in a wrongful state because their circumstances are a result of free choice—and what would this mean? These questions indicate a potential concern about whether the approach is over- or underinclusive and why.

Author(s):  
Gregory S. Alexander

This chapter argues that the moral end of property is human flourishing, a concept which the author uses in a neo-Aristotelian sense. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the concept of human flourishing. It stresses three points: First, human flourishing, although overlapping at times with the concept of welfare, is fundamentally different from welfare. Second, human flourishing is a value-plural concept, encompassing multiple and incommensurable moral values; hence property has multiple ends. Third, property’s pluralistic moral foundation does not mean that rationality and consistency must be sacrificed when property’s various ends come into conflict. Value pluralism is reconcilable with both rational choice and rule-of-law values such as consistency. The human flourishing theory is a consequentialist theory, but in measuring human flourishing, its primary focus is on capabilities rather than resources, and thus the theory draws upon the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Latika Vashist

This paper seeks to contrast the language of human rights with capabilities approach conceptualized by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. While capabilities approach is an effective way of comprehending and mplementing the rights guaranteed to people, language of human rights remains the essential pre-requisite for the development and enhancement of people’s capabilities. While both these frameworks for justice operate within the western liberal paradigm, capabilities approach fills in the gaps of modern human rights discourse. The new idea of justice that accords a central place to human dignity mandates that the human rights entrenched in the Constitution be read as capabilities. The desperate vacuum that exists between the promises of law and realities of existence can only be bridged by institutionalizing a blend of rights and capabilities in the pursuit of justice. The paper argues that the language of human rights and that of capabilities ought to supplement and complement each other for true human flourishing


Author(s):  
Bruce P. Archibald

This chapter examines the question of whether the law should prohibit or prevent jobs that are robotic in the nature of their performance against two normative frameworks: first, the framework of human rights and, secondly, the framework of human capabilities. These two frameworks justify controls, albeit not necessarily the same, over the sorts of jobs that are available on the labour market. The chapter finds that both frameworks recognize the value of work as an important interest and an element of human flourishing, and both frameworks impose duties as to the content of work. The duties that human rights impose include the creation of work opportunities and the prohibition of exploitation at work, rather than the creation of meaningful work. Working like a robot, or like a cog in a machine, is not necessarily incompatible with human rights. However, it appears to be incompatible with Nussbaum’s account of human capabilities. It undermines both architectonic capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, the exercise of which affects all other capabilities. Even though boring and monotonous work is incompatible with this approach, it is less clear whether there should be a state duty to prohibit it, according to the theory of human capabilities. This is because work, even if boring and monotonous, may still be conducive to human flourishing for it is good for the enjoyment of several human capabilities. This lack of clarity as to the duties imposed in this area is a weakness of the capabilities approach.


Author(s):  
Virginia Mantouvalou

This chapter examines the value of work and the requirements of the content of work against two normative frameworks: first, human rights, and second, human capabilities. Its main question is whether working like a robot should be prohibited. The chapter identifies certain overlaps in the requirements imposed by the two frameworks, such as a duty to create opportunities to work and the prohibition of being forced to work. When it comes to the content of work, both frameworks prohibit workers’ exploitation, and both recognize the value of self-development in the workplace, up to a certain extent. The overlap is justified given that there are connections between human dignity and human flourishing, both values that are also linked to human rights. However, the chapter also suggests that capabilities theory, as a theory of human flourishing, requires the promotion of meaningful work for everyone. This requirement is more demanding than the duties imposed by human rights, which are primarily about identifying and addressing moral wrongs. Whether boring and monotonous jobs should be prohibited as a moral wrong, though, is not specifically addressed within capabilities theory. The lack of specificity as to the duties imposed is a weakness of the capabilities approach.


Author(s):  
K. Seeta Prabhu ◽  
Sandhya S. Iyer

This chapter explains in detail the notions of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’. It discusses the multi-layered phenomena of capabilities in the form of as threshold, internal, external, and complex capabilities. It analyses how they provide valuable understanding about the conversion factors that are involved in the translation of resources to capabilities and capabilities into functionings. It critically evaluates the capabilities approach and emphasises the importance of the role of endowments and entitlements as factors influencing and contributing to human flourishing and well-being. The unique feature of the chapter is the presentation of an integrated analytical framework that traces the pathways to human development through equity, sustainability, empowerment, and productivity processes. In addition, the chapter discusses the Human Development Index (HDI) and the challenges relating to its computation.


Author(s):  
Hans-Uwe Otto ◽  
Melanie Walker ◽  
Holger Ziegler

This book has examined how the capability approach provides a politically normative metric for the critical analysis of policies and public policy structures, as well as policy interventions driven by human development or human security concerns. It has demonstrated that existing social structures and institutions play a key role in the realisation of capabilities or the feasibility of human flourishing. This chapter summarises the book's main arguments and considers new principles and aspirations towards capability-promoting policy. It argues that an alliance with the tradition of critical social science may ‘secure’ the capabilities approach, with its analytic focus on real-world conditions and requirements for renegotiating social justice and creating more capabilities-promoting policies, and vice versa. Capability-promoting policies include emancipatory and democratic strategies that transform unjust structures in order to enhance the agency of individual subjects in terms of human flourishing.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Flesher Fominaya

The relation between face-to-face and online communication and its impact on collective identity processes is understudied. In this article I draw on two case studies conducted during a 3-year ethnographic study of the Global Justice Movement network in Madrid, Spain, from 2002 to 2005 to explore the unintended impact of e-mail on the sustainability, internal dynamics, and collective identity of two groups committed to participatory and deliberative practices as key features of their collective identity. I found that despite an explicit commitment to ‘horizontalism’ the use of e-mail in these two groups increased existing hierarchies, hindered consensus, decreased participation, and worked towards marginalization of group members. In addition, the negative and unintended consequences of e-mail use affected both groups, independently of activists’ evaluation of their experience in their face-to-face assemblies (one of which was overwhelmingly perceived as positive and one of which was perceived as negative). The article draws on e-mail research in organizations, online political deliberation research, and existing studies of e-mail use in social movement groups to analyse these findings.


2019 ◽  

In Scotland, the Curriculum for Excellence (CfE) provides education practitioners with the opportunity for transformational change through the delivery of a holistic, broad and general education. This paper explores the extent to which play can be used as a pedagogical tool in developing the capabilities of children to realise the ambitions of CfE. The focus here is four of the ten core capabilities identified by Martha Nussbaum in her version of the Capabilities Approach; one of which is play, the others being those with which it is intrinsically linked, i.e. affiliation, ‘senses, imagination and thought’, and ‘practical reason’. This conceptual analysis of play, autonomy and the Capabilities Approach constitutes a theoretical case for playful approaches in all stages of Scottish primary schools. It is argued that this would provide opportunities for human flourishing in the context of the CfE.


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