False-Belief Understanding, 4E Cognition, and Predictive Processing

2018 ◽  
pp. 492-512
Author(s):  
Leon De Bruin
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
The Past ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
4E Cognition

Mindreading accounts of social cognition have been increasingly challenged over the past couple of decades. Proponents of 4E cognition have argued that social cognition is not (primarily) about reading another agent’s mental states in order to predict or explain his or her behavior. A large part of their criticism has focused on the empirical findings on false-belief understanding, questioning both the philosophical interpretation of these findings and the experimental designs that give rise to them. In this chapter I will (1) discuss the empirical findings on false-belief understanding in light of the criticism leveled by proponents of 4E cognition, and (2) propose an alternative interpretation of these findings, one that is inspired by the predictive processing paradigm, and investigate to what extent this interpretation is compatible with the main insights of 4E cognition.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children’s everyday social cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Cognitive Behavior ◽  
School Age ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

scholarly journals Importance of language for children’s theory of mind: Comparison of verbal and nonverbal theory of mind tasks

Psihologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 23-23
Author(s):  
Sanja Simlesa ◽  
Kaja Hacin ◽  
Maja Cepanec ◽  
Jasmina Ivsac-Pavlisa
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Language Comprehension ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Hierarchical Regression ◽  
Typically Developing ◽  
Typically Developing Children ◽  
The Past ◽  
Verbal Tasks

The ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, known as the theory of mind (ToM), has been widely researched over the past 40 years, along with its relation to language comprehension. However, a majority of the research on the relation between ToM and language used only verbal tasks assessing false belief understanding as a measure of ToM. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the relation between language and ToM, using a larger battery of ToM measures, with different language demands. A total of 203 typically developing children between 46 and 68 months of age, with average nonverbal cognitive skills, were assessed using language comprehension and ToM tasks. The language aspect was assessed using the Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Language Comprehension scale A). To assess ToM, verbal and non-verbal tasks were taken from the ToM subtest of the NEPSY-II. Results indicated a significant correlation between language comprehension and verbal and non-verbal ToM measures. Hierarchical regression showed that language comprehension was a significant predictor for children's performance on both verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks. Specifically, language comprehension affected ToM, regardless of the language demands of the ToM tasks. However, language comprehension was a stronger predictor for verbal than non-verbal ToM tasks. The results of this study contribute to the view that the relation between language and ToM is fundamental and exceeds the features of specific tasks.

scholarly journals Direct Social Perception

2018 ◽  
pp. 300-320
Author(s):  
Joel Krueger
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Mental States ◽  
4E Cognition ◽  
Goal Directed Behavior ◽  
Direct Social Perception

Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires, intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible to everyone but their owner. In this chapter, I consider a version of DSP that draws upon phenomenology, 4E cognition, and empirical work in cognitive science. I first examine DSP in its historical context, focusing on its development in the hands of phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I then consider some supporting arguments and empirical evidence—particularly work suggesting that embodied expressions of emotions (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, etc.) may constitute part of the emotion itself. I conclude by defending DSP against several objections.

scholarly journals Growing Up Thinking of God’s Beliefs: Theory of Mind and Ontological Knowledge

SAGE Open ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 215824401880987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinzia Di Dio ◽  
Sara Isernia ◽  
Chiara Ceolaro ◽  
Antonella Marchetti ◽  
Davide Massaro
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Growing Up ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Knowledge Bias

The study of social cognition involves the attribution of states of mind to humans, as well as, quite recently, to nonhuman creatures, like God. Some studies support the role of social cognition in religious beliefs, whereas others ascribe religious beliefs to an ontological knowledge bias. The present study compares these distinct approaches in 37 catholic children aged 4 to 10 years, who were administered an adapted version of the unexpected content task assessing false beliefs of different agents: a human, a dog, a robot, and God. The children were also administered an intentionality understanding task, a component of mentalization abilities, and an interview on ontological knowledge assessing emotions, intentions, imagination, and epistemic knowledge. In line with previous research, the results showed that children did not attribute false beliefs to God as they did to the human and to other nonhuman agents. Importantly, while false-belief attribution to the human was associated with the children’s ability to attribute mental states (intentionality understanding), false-belief attribution to God was related to children’s ontological knowledge. We conclude that, contrary to false-belief attribution to the human and to other nonhuman agents, children’s understanding of God’s mind is largely a function of ontological knowledge about God, rather than of children’s social cognitive functions.

The relationships among social cognition, peer acceptance, and social behavior in Israeli kindergarteners

2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Diesendruck ◽  
Adar Ben-Eliyahu
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Peer Acceptance ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Kindergarten Children ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
The Social ◽  
Diverse Cultures

The present study investigated the relationships among Israeli kindergarten children's social cognitive capacities, their popularity, and their social behavior. We found that children's understanding of others' behavioral motives was positively related to their popularity, that children's false-belief understanding was positively related to peers' positive behavioral and teachers' prosocial evaluations of them, and that children's understanding of emotions was positively related to teachers' prosocial ratings but negatively related to both peers' negative behavioral and teachers' aggressiveness evaluations of them. Moreover, we found that Israeli kindergarten children value the same kinds of social behaviors in their peers as do children from other cultures. The findings substantiate the importance of assessing the implications of a variety of socio-cognitive capacities to the social functioning of young children from diverse cultures.

Learning words from speakers with false beliefs

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 905-923 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNA PAPAFRAGOU ◽  
SARAH FAIRCHILD ◽  
MATTHEW L. COHEN ◽  
CARLYN FRIEDBERG
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Word Learning ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Mind Reading ◽  
Learning Contexts ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Reading Abilities

AbstractDuring communication, hearers try to infer the speaker's intentions to be able to understand what the speaker means. Nevertheless, whether (and how early) preschoolers track their interlocutors' mental states is still a matter of debate. Furthermore, there is disagreement about how children's ability to consult a speaker's belief in communicative contexts relates to their ability to track someone's belief in non-communicative contexts. Here, we study young children's ability to successfully acquire a word from a speaker with a false belief; we also assess the same children's success on a traditional false belief attribution task. We show that the ability to consult the epistemic state of a speaker during word learning develops between the ages of three and five. We also show that false belief understanding in word-learning contexts proceeds similarly to standard belief-attribution contexts when the tasks are equated. Our data offer evidence for the development of mind-reading abilities during language acquisition.

Synchrony in the onset of mental state understanding across cultures? A study among children in Samoa

2012 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Mayer ◽  
Birgit E. Träuble
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Location Task ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Continuous Survey ◽  
Suitable Object

The development of false belief understanding in Samoa was investigated in two studies testing more than 300 children. Children’s understanding was assessed with a change of location task. The results of study 1 suggest that Samoan children improve gradually and slowly, with no succeeding majority before 8 years of age. One third of the 10–13-year-olds still failed. Study 2 used a different translation among 55 children from 4–8 years of age and supports the former results. These findings speak for the cultural variability of theory of mind development and provide the first cross-cultural continuous survey on false belief understanding of children older than 5 years of age with a large sample in a place where mental states are no suitable object for conjecture.

scholarly journals Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning

2015 ◽  
Vol 112 (15) ◽  
pp. 4827-4832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Spunt ◽  
Jed T. Elison ◽  
Nicholas Dufour ◽  
René Hurlemann ◽  
Rebecca Saxe ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cortical Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cortical Network ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
False Belief Reasoning ◽  
Patient Responses ◽  
Amygdala Lesions ◽  
Belief Reasoning

The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people's mental states as distinct from one's own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM—false-belief reasoning—suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.

scholarly journals On the Relationship between Theory of Mind and Syntax in Clinical and Non-Clinical Populations: State of the Art and Implications for Research

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Fontana ◽  
Mauro Adenzato ◽  
Jacopo S. Penso ◽  
Ivan Enrici ◽  
Rita B. Ardito
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Language Impairment ◽  
Specific Language Impairment ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Neuropsychological Disorders ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
The Relationship

Background:Over the years, different explanations have been given on the relationship between syntax and Theory of Mind,i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to others and predict, describe, and explain behavior based on such mental states. In the present study, we focus on the relationship between false-belief understanding as a crucial aspect of Theory of Mind, and on the ability to master the syntax of complementation,i.e., the ability to produce and comprehend sentences in a recursive way.Objective:Our purpose is to test two main hypotheses on the relationship between false-belief understanding and the ability to master the syntax of complementation: the dependence and the independence of false-belief understanding on syntactic complementation.Method:We analyze studies on children with typical development, deaf children with deaf signing or hearing parents, children with specific language impairment, children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, longitudinal and training studies, and studies on adults with neuropsychological disorders.Conclusion:Strengths and weaknesses of the two hypotheses are discussed and limitations of the current state of knowledge are presented. A lifespan approach taking into account both the emergence and maintenance of false-belief understanding and using both implicit and explicit false-belief tasks is proposed to face the issue discussed.

scholarly journals The development of false-belief understanding in Japanese children: Delay and difference?

2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 290-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mika Naito ◽  
Kayo Koyama
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Difference ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Japanese Children ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Situational Cues ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Full Development ◽  
Transfer Tasks

Three experiments investigated the development of Japanese children’s false-belief understanding. In Experiment 1, children’s mastery of two standard false-belief tasks was considerably later and slower than typically reported, with the full development between 6 and 7 years. Experiments 2 and 3 tested Japanese 6-to 8-year-olds on interpersonal transfer tasks where a relocated item was a person who changed locations with and without their own intention. Children’s judgments on the main character’s belief about this person’s whereabouts were not influenced by the protagonists’ different mental states included in the tasks; children’s justifications referred not to the people’s belief or desire but primarily to their behaviors and social rules. Results suggest that Japanese children show not only a delay in false-belief understanding but a cultural difference in reasoning about human action as attributing it to behavioral and situational cues, rather than to individuals’ mental states.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document